📅 Original date posted:2019-08-08
📝 Original message:В Wed, 7 Aug 2019 20:10:17 +0500
Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
wrote:
> In shared ownership rent scheme that ZmnSCPxj described in [1],
> the 'TXO rentier' has a signed timelocked 'backout' transaction that
> spends the locked TXO, and assigns the reward to rentier.
>
> If we say that any transaction that spends any TXO in the bond
> (ignoring the timelock), invalidates the bond when presented to
> takers, then TXO rentier can revoke the bond by simply
> publishing this transaction (not to the blockchain, but by some other
> means so that takers can receive it).
>
> The transaction validity can be verified, with the relaxed rules that
> ignores the timelock. After it is verified, takers mark the whole
> bond as revoked and will not consider it when chosing makers.
The backout transaction might not be timelocked itself, but can depend
on another timelocked transaction (made specifically to avoid the
backout transaction be timelocked). That extra transaction will need to
be broadcast before the backout transaction.
To account for that possibility, takers would need to either use more
relaxed verification rules (do not check if the inputs of the 'snitch
transaction' exist), or would need to check the whole package of
dependent transactions in which the last one spends the bond.
Dmitry Petukhov [ARCHIVE] /
npub10r…9afdw
2023-06-07 18:20:00
in reply to nevent1q…xjlr
Author Public Key
npub10r66s2stvnancx9axwnfc5a34asjkwkgmkq7ztm5hf30x7fa4szsv9afdwPublished at
2023-06-07 18:20:00Event JSON
{
"id": "b643ecdc9d0d35265cb0997debaeca61e99fe1e48f5f92861a94b985189f9bd5",
"pubkey": "78f5a82a0b64fb3c18bd33a69c53b1af612b3ac8dd81e12f74ba62f3793dac05",
"created_at": 1686162000,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"a08dce3b67359ed00d4e2ce273a5fce8912dd2b587c89f8e261331c71b6b29ce",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"8bbb1e5bd8f7258d9efd861cd5b316777aa0fdb87ed91957c1524bda3abe11f0",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"cd99305dce8f7a8772455d28d44a8451787c19b2ffd2c8b1010acecc3c5f95c7"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2019-08-08\n📝 Original message:В Wed, 7 Aug 2019 20:10:17 +0500\nDmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e In shared ownership rent scheme that ZmnSCPxj described in [1],\n\u003e the 'TXO rentier' has a signed timelocked 'backout' transaction that\n\u003e spends the locked TXO, and assigns the reward to rentier.\n\u003e \n\u003e If we say that any transaction that spends any TXO in the bond\n\u003e (ignoring the timelock), invalidates the bond when presented to\n\u003e takers, then TXO rentier can revoke the bond by simply\n\u003e publishing this transaction (not to the blockchain, but by some other\n\u003e means so that takers can receive it).\n\u003e \n\u003e The transaction validity can be verified, with the relaxed rules that\n\u003e ignores the timelock. After it is verified, takers mark the whole\n\u003e bond as revoked and will not consider it when chosing makers.\n\nThe backout transaction might not be timelocked itself, but can depend\non another timelocked transaction (made specifically to avoid the\nbackout transaction be timelocked). That extra transaction will need to\nbe broadcast before the backout transaction.\n\nTo account for that possibility, takers would need to either use more\nrelaxed verification rules (do not check if the inputs of the 'snitch\ntransaction' exist), or would need to check the whole package of\ndependent transactions in which the last one spends the bond.",
"sig": "276b85e57a7d2f3addec9a2501cab4fd46bbb76a59c411a8213759f6d2b5a0ca7410fba455874ddd88c55954d9c0a25bf27266d3a67ad2ac185159bfbf8716af"
}