📅 Original date posted:2015-02-22
📝 Original message:Den 22 feb 2015 14:29 skrev "Natanael" <natanael.l at gmail.com>:
>
>
> Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev "Peter Todd" <pete at petertodd.org>:
>
> > Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has
> > a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to
> > rely entirely on inherently unreliable P2P networking: Promise to never
> > create two signatures for a specific BIP32 root pubkey and make
> > violating that promise destroy and/or reallocate a fidelity bond whose
> > value is locked until some time into the future. Since the fidelity bond
> > is a separate pool of funds, detection of the double-spend can happen
> > later.
>
> Somebody sent me a zero-confirmation transaction, or one that got
orphaned after one block. I created a transaction spending that UTXO, and
another.
>
> So at that point I have UTXO_orphaned based on the sender's UTXO_origin
and my UTXO_old (because I've had it unspent for a long time), both in one
transaction, creating UTXO_new.
>
> Now he doublespend UTXO_origin to create a UTXO_doublespend (which
conflicts with UTXO_orphaned). He conspires with a miner to get it into a
block.
>
> Now what? Can my UTXO_old effectively be tainted forever because UTXO_new
got invalidated together with UTXO_orphaned? Will that transaction be a
valid proof of doublespend against a new UTXO_replacement I created?
>
> Or otherwise, if only transactions where all UTXO's are currently valid
works as doublespend proofs, aren't you still just left without protection
against any one miner that conspires with doublespend attempting thieves?
>
> In other words, you are unprotected and potentially at greater risk if
you create a transaction depending on another zero-confirmation transaction.
Additional comments:
If you punish the creation of UTXO_replacement, you will punish people who
was lead to think zero-confirmation transactions were safe and thus that
chains of zero-confirmation transactions also were safe.
If you don't, but STILL accept chains of zero-confirmation transactions
were not all of them are covered by fidelity bonds, then you failed to
protect yourself against thieves who creates chains of unconfirmed
transactions.
Another question: if all transactions in the chain are covered by fidelity
bonds for their own value, which one pays out to who? Does only the first
one pay out, and only to the last party in the chain? Or to every
subsequent party after him? In full or just a fraction? Why, why not? You
might not know which of these serviced their customers in full without
getting full value back in exchange due to the doublespend.
What if the fidelity bond is too small, do you stop accepting it as a
zero-confirmation transaction?
Do you even accept chains of unconfirmed transactions at all?
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Natanael [ARCHIVE] /
npub179…lpmjt
2023-06-07 15:30:56
in reply to nevent1q…9ezg
Author Public Key
npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjtPublished at
2023-06-07 15:30:56Event JSON
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"created_at": 1686151856,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-22\n📝 Original message:Den 22 feb 2015 14:29 skrev \"Natanael\" \u003cnatanael.l at gmail.com\u003e:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev \"Peter Todd\" \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e:\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has\n\u003e \u003e a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to\n\u003e \u003e rely entirely on inherently unreliable P2P networking: Promise to never\n\u003e \u003e create two signatures for a specific BIP32 root pubkey and make\n\u003e \u003e violating that promise destroy and/or reallocate a fidelity bond whose\n\u003e \u003e value is locked until some time into the future. Since the fidelity bond\n\u003e \u003e is a separate pool of funds, detection of the double-spend can happen\n\u003e \u003e later.\n\u003e\n\u003e Somebody sent me a zero-confirmation transaction, or one that got\norphaned after one block. I created a transaction spending that UTXO, and\nanother.\n\u003e\n\u003e So at that point I have UTXO_orphaned based on the sender's UTXO_origin\nand my UTXO_old (because I've had it unspent for a long time), both in one\ntransaction, creating UTXO_new.\n\u003e\n\u003e Now he doublespend UTXO_origin to create a UTXO_doublespend (which\nconflicts with UTXO_orphaned). He conspires with a miner to get it into a\nblock.\n\u003e\n\u003e Now what? Can my UTXO_old effectively be tainted forever because UTXO_new\ngot invalidated together with UTXO_orphaned? Will that transaction be a\nvalid proof of doublespend against a new UTXO_replacement I created?\n\u003e\n\u003e Or otherwise, if only transactions where all UTXO's are currently valid\nworks as doublespend proofs, aren't you still just left without protection\nagainst any one miner that conspires with doublespend attempting thieves?\n\u003e\n\u003e In other words, you are unprotected and potentially at greater risk if\nyou create a transaction depending on another zero-confirmation transaction.\n\nAdditional comments:\n\nIf you punish the creation of UTXO_replacement, you will punish people who\nwas lead to think zero-confirmation transactions were safe and thus that\nchains of zero-confirmation transactions also were safe.\n\nIf you don't, but STILL accept chains of zero-confirmation transactions\nwere not all of them are covered by fidelity bonds, then you failed to\nprotect yourself against thieves who creates chains of unconfirmed\ntransactions.\n\nAnother question: if all transactions in the chain are covered by fidelity\nbonds for their own value, which one pays out to who? Does only the first\none pay out, and only to the last party in the chain? Or to every\nsubsequent party after him? In full or just a fraction? Why, why not? You\nmight not know which of these serviced their customers in full without\ngetting full value back in exchange due to the doublespend.\n\nWhat if the fidelity bond is too small, do you stop accepting it as a\nzero-confirmation transaction?\n\nDo you even accept chains of unconfirmed transactions at all?\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150222/f3b31e8e/attachment.html\u003e",
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