📅 Original date posted:2015-05-26
📝 Original message:On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 11:00 PM, Tom Harding <tomh at thinlink.com> wrote:
> The bitcoin transaction is part of a real-world "deal" with unknown
> connections to the other parts
I'm having a hard time parsing this. You might as well say that its
part of a weeblix for how informative it is, since you've not defined
it.
> not the case if paying parties are kicked out of the deal, and possibly
> don't learn about it right away.
The signatures of a transaction can always be changed any any time,
including by the miner, as they're not signed.
> A subset of parties to an Armory simulfunding transaction (an actual
> multi-input use case) could replace one signer's input after they broadcast
> it.
They can already do this.
> Maybe the
> receiver cares where he is paid from or is basing a subsequent decision on
> it. Maybe a new output is being added, whose presence makes the transaction
> less likely to be confirmed quickly, with that speed affecting the business.
The RBF behavior always moves in the direction of more prefered or
otherwise the node would not switch to the replacement. Petertodd
should perhaps make that more clear.
But your "maybe"s are what I was asking you to clarify. You said it
wasn't hard to imagine; so I was asking for specific clarification.
> With Kalle's Proof of Payment proposed standard, one payer in a two-input
> transaction could decide to boot the other, and claim the concert tickets
> all for himself. The fact that he pays is not the only consideration in the
> real world -- what if these are the last 2 tickets?
They can already do that.
> I'd argue that changing how an input is signed doesn't change the deal. For
> example if a different 2 of 3 multisig participants sign, those 3 people
> gave up that level of control when they created the multisig.
Then why do you not argue that changing the input set does not change
the weeblix?
Why is one case of writing out a participant different that the other
case of writing out a participant?
> Replacement is new - we have a choice what kind of warnings we need to give
> to signers of multi-input transactions. IMHO we should avoid needing a
> stronger warning than is already needed for 0-conf.
How could a _stronger_ warning be required?
Gregory Maxwell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1f2…crwet
2023-06-07 15:35:40
in reply to nevent1q…rdd8
Author Public Key
npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwetPublished at
2023-06-07 15:35:40Event JSON
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"created_at": 1686152140,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-05-26\n📝 Original message:On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 11:00 PM, Tom Harding \u003ctomh at thinlink.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e The bitcoin transaction is part of a real-world \"deal\" with unknown\n\u003e connections to the other parts\n\nI'm having a hard time parsing this. You might as well say that its\npart of a weeblix for how informative it is, since you've not defined\nit.\n\n\u003e not the case if paying parties are kicked out of the deal, and possibly\n\u003e don't learn about it right away.\n\nThe signatures of a transaction can always be changed any any time,\nincluding by the miner, as they're not signed.\n\n\u003e A subset of parties to an Armory simulfunding transaction (an actual\n\u003e multi-input use case) could replace one signer's input after they broadcast\n\u003e it.\n\nThey can already do this.\n\n\u003e Maybe the\n\u003e receiver cares where he is paid from or is basing a subsequent decision on\n\u003e it. Maybe a new output is being added, whose presence makes the transaction\n\u003e less likely to be confirmed quickly, with that speed affecting the business.\n\nThe RBF behavior always moves in the direction of more prefered or\notherwise the node would not switch to the replacement. Petertodd\nshould perhaps make that more clear.\n\nBut your \"maybe\"s are what I was asking you to clarify. You said it\nwasn't hard to imagine; so I was asking for specific clarification.\n\n\u003e With Kalle's Proof of Payment proposed standard, one payer in a two-input\n\u003e transaction could decide to boot the other, and claim the concert tickets\n\u003e all for himself. The fact that he pays is not the only consideration in the\n\u003e real world -- what if these are the last 2 tickets?\n\nThey can already do that.\n\n\u003e I'd argue that changing how an input is signed doesn't change the deal. For\n\u003e example if a different 2 of 3 multisig participants sign, those 3 people\n\u003e gave up that level of control when they created the multisig.\n\nThen why do you not argue that changing the input set does not change\nthe weeblix?\n\nWhy is one case of writing out a participant different that the other\ncase of writing out a participant?\n\n\u003e Replacement is new - we have a choice what kind of warnings we need to give\n\u003e to signers of multi-input transactions. IMHO we should avoid needing a\n\u003e stronger warning than is already needed for 0-conf.\n\nHow could a _stronger_ warning be required?",
"sig": "8ad4722024c7580eb4fc914474e8ca9b263fa1e34bab025d7733b380d632f366ae2919c9f53a7eba651600ca3abfb6730439fe065e0ba30dc1d4d051b073b3b2"
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