📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12
📝 Original message:This is a misguided idea, to say the least. If such a mechanism of of
user input would be possible, one would use it for transaction
verification in the first place. In proof-of-stake outcomes are
determined by vote by stake (that vote has very different
characteristics than vote by compute power). There is no such thing as
making it possible to determine what "users want". That's what the
proof-of-work mechanism does in the first place, only that it is now
unfortunately skewed/corrupted/(whatever you want to call it). Before
centralization the concept of "miners" didn't exist in Bitcoin and
miners were roughly identical to users. Peer-to-Peer implies only one
class of users.
A big problem with such a vote (in PoW and PoS): miners get paid for
their work and have incentives to raise fees. Those who pay fees would
have no say in whether those fees are fair or not. Transaction
verification has to be roughly profitable, but there is no fixed
formula for determining profitability.
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip at mattwhitlock.name> wrote:
> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
>> Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner
>> influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they
>> claim in their own blocks
>
> Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:34 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> Why should miners only be able to vote for "double the limit" or "halve" the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:
>>
>> 0 0 = no preference ("wildcard" vote)
>> 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same
>> 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved
>> 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled
>>
>> User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of "0 0" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting "0 0" (no preference) could only contain transactions voting "0 0" as well.
>
> Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three
> options, and throwing away "don't care" votes entirely, makes sense.
>
>> Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of the users.
>
> Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of
> proposal, but I'm less concerned if the disaster is something users
> explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
>> > Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner
>> > influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they
>> > claim in their own blocks
>>
>> Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.
>
> Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a
> mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the
> outcome.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip at mattwhitlock.name> wrote:
> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> > Why should miners only be able to vote for "double the limit" or "halve" the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:
>> >
>> > 0 0 = no preference ("wildcard" vote)
>> > 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same
>> > 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved
>> > 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled
>> >
>> > User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of "0 0" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting "0 0" (no preference) could only contain transactions voting "0 0" as well.
>>
>> Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three
>> options, and throwing away "don't care" votes entirely, makes sense.
>
> I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away the "don't cares," not the *median*.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Benjamin [ARCHIVE] /
npub17k…sr5tq
2023-06-07 15:37:28
in reply to nevent1q…as2f
Author Public Key
npub17kz55p7ysz4ftvq2xyr2zamc776cygwcm5fdz8ndj3jm5umm65xq4sr5tqPublished at
2023-06-07 15:37:28Event JSON
{
"id": "bb4ea8e898375b1d127d840ee24f19eb15fb71a771cf1030b45f9815c5959971",
"pubkey": "f5854a07c480aa95b00a3106a17778f7b58221d8dd12d11e6d9465ba737bd50c",
"created_at": 1686152248,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"8a807127e1ae5b585bcc8f3578413a7d3eb1bd30e75c19cd4a3a0a256adcb61c",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"6b3e75cb05f0d505fb77b44309322599b9b97977bb6836588b065abd7580e286",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"f00d0858b09287e941ccbc491567cc70bdbc62d714628b167c1b76e7fef04d91"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12\n📝 Original message:This is a misguided idea, to say the least. If such a mechanism of of\nuser input would be possible, one would use it for transaction\nverification in the first place. In proof-of-stake outcomes are\ndetermined by vote by stake (that vote has very different\ncharacteristics than vote by compute power). There is no such thing as\nmaking it possible to determine what \"users want\". That's what the\nproof-of-work mechanism does in the first place, only that it is now\nunfortunately skewed/corrupted/(whatever you want to call it). Before\ncentralization the concept of \"miners\" didn't exist in Bitcoin and\nminers were roughly identical to users. Peer-to-Peer implies only one\nclass of users.\n\nA big problem with such a vote (in PoW and PoS): miners get paid for\ntheir work and have incentives to raise fees. Those who pay fees would\nhave no say in whether those fees are fair or not. Transaction\nverification has to be roughly profitable, but there is no fixed\nformula for determining profitability.\n\nOn Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Matt Whitlock \u003cbip at mattwhitlock.name\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner\n\u003e\u003e influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they\n\u003e\u003e claim in their own blocks\n\u003e\n\u003e Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\nOn Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:34 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Why should miners only be able to vote for \"double the limit\" or \"halve\" the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e 0 0 = no preference (\"wildcard\" vote)\n\u003e\u003e 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same\n\u003e\u003e 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved\n\u003e\u003e 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of \"0 0\" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting \"0 0\" (no preference) could only contain transactions voting \"0 0\" as well.\n\u003e\n\u003e Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three\n\u003e options, and throwing away \"don't care\" votes entirely, makes sense.\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of the users.\n\u003e\n\u003e Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of\n\u003e proposal, but I'm less concerned if the disaster is something users\n\u003e explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way.\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\nOn Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:\n\u003e\u003e On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner\n\u003e\u003e \u003e influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they\n\u003e\u003e \u003e claim in their own blocks\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users.\n\u003e\n\u003e Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a\n\u003e mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the\n\u003e outcome.\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\nOn Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Matt Whitlock \u003cbip at mattwhitlock.name\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote:\n\u003e\u003e On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Why should miners only be able to vote for \"double the limit\" or \"halve\" the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e 0 0 = no preference (\"wildcard\" vote)\n\u003e\u003e \u003e 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same\n\u003e\u003e \u003e 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved\n\u003e\u003e \u003e 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of \"0 0\" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting \"0 0\" (no preference) could only contain transactions voting \"0 0\" as well.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three\n\u003e\u003e options, and throwing away \"don't care\" votes entirely, makes sense.\n\u003e\n\u003e I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away the \"don't cares,\" not the *median*.\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development",
"sig": "b9f8598a10aae7e9bddf68227cf7e76bd05a941204e5ec9c5234d4977744a0efd598f5ee5748fc27d8f3cd4c6f6c872316d94b258b4ecff687d7ca51f52ee63f"
}