📅 Original date posted:2023-05-07
📝 Original message:
Good morning t-bast, and list,
Dual-funded 0-conf can be made safe in the following case:
* If the initiator uses swap-in-potentiam addresses (with initiator as Alice, acceptor as Bob).
If the initiator stalls, then the acceptor can retaliate by refusing to sign the swap-in-potentiam UTXOs forever after that, thus also locking their funds until the swap-in-potentiam times out, thus preventing this liquidity griefing from being cost-free.
The expected use-case is that a user expects onchain operations to be slow and take multiple confirmations to receive.
Once there is deep confirmation that a swap-in-potentiam address has been funded, then it can be transferred immediately to a 0-conf Lightning channel.
The initiator still needs to trust that the acceptor does not double-spend out from under the initiator, but see LSPS3 Promise To Unconditionally Fund 0-conf.
Also, it looks like you are allowing for the initiator to trust the acceptor in that case, as I believe you are taking the point of view of the acceptor of the dual-funding flow.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] /
npub1g5…3ms3l
2023-06-09 13:08:45
in reply to nevent1q…kmw6
Author Public Key
npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lPublished at
2023-06-09 13:08:45Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2023-05-07\n📝 Original message:\nGood morning t-bast, and list,\n\nDual-funded 0-conf can be made safe in the following case:\n\n* If the initiator uses swap-in-potentiam addresses (with initiator as Alice, acceptor as Bob).\n\nIf the initiator stalls, then the acceptor can retaliate by refusing to sign the swap-in-potentiam UTXOs forever after that, thus also locking their funds until the swap-in-potentiam times out, thus preventing this liquidity griefing from being cost-free.\n\nThe expected use-case is that a user expects onchain operations to be slow and take multiple confirmations to receive.\nOnce there is deep confirmation that a swap-in-potentiam address has been funded, then it can be transferred immediately to a 0-conf Lightning channel.\n\nThe initiator still needs to trust that the acceptor does not double-spend out from under the initiator, but see LSPS3 Promise To Unconditionally Fund 0-conf.\nAlso, it looks like you are allowing for the initiator to trust the acceptor in that case, as I believe you are taking the point of view of the acceptor of the dual-funding flow.\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj",
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