Anthony Towns [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-02-07 📝 Original message:On Sun, Feb 07, 2016 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-02-07
📝 Original message:On Sun, Feb 07, 2016 at 09:16:02AM -0500, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> There will be approximately zero percentage of hash power left on the
> weaker branch of the fork, based on past soft-fork adoption by miners (they
> upgrade VERY quickly from 75% to over 95%).
The stated reasoning for 75% versus 95% is "because it gives "veto power"
to a single big solo miner or mining pool". But if a 20% miner wants to
"veto" the upgrade, with a 75% threshold, they could instead simply use
their hashpower to vote for an upgrade, but then not mine anything on
the new chain. At that point there'd be as little as 55% mining the new
2MB chain with 45% of hashpower remaining on the old chain. That'd be 18
minute blocks versus 22 minute blocks, which doesn't seem like much of
a difference in practice, and at that point hashpower could plausibly
end up switching almost entirely back to the original consensus rules
prior to the grace period ending.
With a non-consensus fork, I think you need to expect people involved to
potentially act in ways that aren't very gentlemanly, and guard against
it if you want the fork to be anything other than a huge mess.
Cheers,
aj
Published at
2023-06-07 17:48:44Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-02-07\n📝 Original message:On Sun, Feb 07, 2016 at 09:16:02AM -0500, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e There will be approximately zero percentage of hash power left on the\n\u003e weaker branch of the fork, based on past soft-fork adoption by miners (they\n\u003e upgrade VERY quickly from 75% to over 95%).\n\nThe stated reasoning for 75% versus 95% is \"because it gives \"veto power\"\nto a single big solo miner or mining pool\". But if a 20% miner wants to\n\"veto\" the upgrade, with a 75% threshold, they could instead simply use\ntheir hashpower to vote for an upgrade, but then not mine anything on\nthe new chain. At that point there'd be as little as 55% mining the new\n2MB chain with 45% of hashpower remaining on the old chain. That'd be 18\nminute blocks versus 22 minute blocks, which doesn't seem like much of\na difference in practice, and at that point hashpower could plausibly\nend up switching almost entirely back to the original consensus rules\nprior to the grace period ending.\n\nWith a non-consensus fork, I think you need to expect people involved to\npotentially act in ways that aren't very gentlemanly, and guard against\nit if you want the fork to be anything other than a huge mess.\n\nCheers,\naj",
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