📅 Original date posted:2018-09-14
📝 Original message:You might be interested in an idea I wrote about that is in a similar
spirit here:
https://medium.com/coinmonks/taming-large-miners-with-helper-blocks-6ae67ac242f6
>From the article:
When a block is solved, it randomly selects one satoshi from the utxo set
and gives whomever controls that satoshi the power to generate a “Helper
Block”. The Helper Block commits to a subset of transactions for inclusion
in the next block. A miner can accept the Helper Block by including the
suggested transactions and giving the associated transaction fees to a
payment address specified in the Helper Block. Miners who do not use a
Helper Block must satisfy a 25% higher difficulty.
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 9:56 AM Andrew via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
>
> The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
> and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
> and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
> order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of
> changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.
>
> You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk
> thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of
> "reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout
> script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total
> fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "reserve"
> (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee will
> be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h
> and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),
> a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction
> (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be
> released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in
> that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps
> rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can be
> used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for
> paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block
> space).
>
> This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since
> if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.
> Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising
> hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require
> transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.
>
> I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there
> is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the
> block reward, but they will get more important, and this change
> wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners
> have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the
> anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements
> for validation are quite small I believe.
>
> On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew <onelineproof at gmail.com> wrote:
> > As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to
> > mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently.
> > What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the
> > future plans?
> >
> > One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according
> > to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)
> > consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1
> > day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can
> > then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at
> > peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of
> > 0.5 r.
> >
> > If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then
> > they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that,
> > the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their
> > interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.
> >
> > What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due
> > to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to
> > be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment
> > algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising
> > indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.
> >
> > Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion
> > of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.
> >
> >
> > --
> > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
>
>
>
> --
> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Moral Agent [ARCHIVE] /
npub1gh…gc6pd
2023-06-07 18:14:20
in reply to nevent1q…prgm
Author Public Key
npub1ghl954l59wm5pnv8j2y0ymmp6dt70kx2037e06wavfut7gjh68hqdgc6pdPublished at
2023-06-07 18:14:20Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-09-14\n📝 Original message:You might be interested in an idea I wrote about that is in a similar\nspirit here:\n\nhttps://medium.com/coinmonks/taming-large-miners-with-helper-blocks-6ae67ac242f6\n\n\u003eFrom the article:\n\nWhen a block is solved, it randomly selects one satoshi from the utxo set\nand gives whomever controls that satoshi the power to generate a “Helper\nBlock”. The Helper Block commits to a subset of transactions for inclusion\nin the next block. A miner can accept the Helper Block by including the\nsuggested transactions and giving the associated transaction fees to a\npayment address specified in the Helper Block. Miners who do not use a\nHelper Block must satisfy a 25% higher difficulty.\n\nOn Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 9:56 AM Andrew via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e I discussed this more at bitcointalk:\n\u003e https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0\n\u003e\n\u003e The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining\n\u003e and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,\n\u003e and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in\n\u003e order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of\n\u003e changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.\n\u003e\n\u003e You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk\n\u003e thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of\n\u003e \"reserve fees\". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout\n\u003e script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total\n\u003e fee that is held in \"reserve\" and the time it is held in \"reserve\"\n\u003e (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This \"reserve\" part of the fee will\n\u003e be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h\n\u003e and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),\n\u003e a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 \u003e h, then the fraction\n\u003e (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be\n\u003e released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in\n\u003e that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps\n\u003e rising, until the \"contract\" expires, and the leftover part can be\n\u003e used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for\n\u003e paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block\n\u003e space).\n\u003e\n\u003e This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since\n\u003e if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.\n\u003e Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising\n\u003e hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require\n\u003e transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.\n\u003e\n\u003e I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there\n\u003e is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the\n\u003e block reward, but they will get more important, and this change\n\u003e wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners\n\u003e have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the\n\u003e anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements\n\u003e for validation are quite small I believe.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew \u003conelineproof at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to\n\u003e \u003e mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently.\n\u003e \u003e What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the\n\u003e \u003e future plans?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e One idea I have is to let the block reward get \"modulated\" according\n\u003e \u003e to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)\n\u003e \u003e consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1\n\u003e \u003e day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can\n\u003e \u003e then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at\n\u003e \u003e peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of\n\u003e \u003e 0.5 r.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then\n\u003e \u003e they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that,\n\u003e \u003e the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their\n\u003e \u003e interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due\n\u003e \u003e to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to\n\u003e \u003e be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment\n\u003e \u003e algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising\n\u003e \u003e indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion\n\u003e \u003e of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180914/22e64f75/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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