📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28
📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Do you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün
> Sirer/Ittay Eyal's paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant
> issue in a scenario - one malicious miner with >30% hashing power -
> where you're already very close to the margins anyway; the difference
> between a 50% attack threshold and a 30% attack threshold isn't very
> significant.
>
This is not quite right: we know that selfish mining is a guaranteed win
at 34%. We do not know when exactly it begins to pay off. The more
consolidated and centralized the other mining pools, the less of a threat
it is below 34%; the more decentralized, the more likely it is to pay off
at lower thresholds.
Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
> small miners.
On a related note, the Bitcoin-NG paper took a big step towards moving
these kinds of concerns out of the realm of gut-feelings and wavy hands
into science. In particular, it introduced metrics for fairness (i.e.
differential
rate in orphans experienced by small and large miners), hash power
efficiency, as well as consensus delay.
> For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
> problem.
Indeed, there is a slight, quantifiable benefit to larger pools. Which is
why
we need to be diligent about not letting pools get too big.
> Note though that Eligius is *not* the only pool to have had problems
>
with block withholding, though AFAIK Eligius is the only one who has
> gone on record so far. (as I said in my original post, I'm relaying
> information given to me under condition of confidentiality)
>
I can see why they don't want to go public with this: it means that they
are less profitable than other pools.
It still looks to me like Ittay's discovery is doing exactly the right
thing:
this pool will need to be more careful when signing up new people,
curbing its otherwise steady march towards the 51% boundary.
- egs
- egs
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Emin Gün Sirer [ARCHIVE] /
npub1k6…xvja6
2023-06-07 17:46:57
in reply to nevent1q…qenx
Author Public Key
npub1k6906yrdzekdkn23mrskcf6up8s2fypqldhnz9gfc44kwsan02zq5xvja6Published at
2023-06-07 17:46:57Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28\n📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Do you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün\n\u003e Sirer/Ittay Eyal's paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant\n\u003e issue in a scenario - one malicious miner with \u003e30% hashing power -\n\u003e where you're already very close to the margins anyway; the difference\n\u003e between a 50% attack threshold and a 30% attack threshold isn't very\n\u003e significant.\n\u003e\n\nThis is not quite right: we know that selfish mining is a guaranteed win\nat 34%. We do not know when exactly it begins to pay off. The more\nconsolidated and centralized the other mining pools, the less of a threat\nit is below 34%; the more decentralized, the more likely it is to pay off\nat lower thresholds.\n\nFar more concerning is network propagation effects between large and\n\u003e small miners.\n\n\nOn a related note, the Bitcoin-NG paper took a big step towards moving\nthese kinds of concerns out of the realm of gut-feelings and wavy hands\ninto science. In particular, it introduced metrics for fairness (i.e.\ndifferential\nrate in orphans experienced by small and large miners), hash power\nefficiency, as well as consensus delay.\n\n\n\u003e For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt\n\u003e where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil\n\u003e attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small\n\u003e and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying\n\u003e problem.\n\n\nIndeed, there is a slight, quantifiable benefit to larger pools. Which is\nwhy\nwe need to be diligent about not letting pools get too big.\n\n\n\u003e Note though that Eligius is *not* the only pool to have had problems\n\u003e\nwith block withholding, though AFAIK Eligius is the only one who has\n\u003e gone on record so far. (as I said in my original post, I'm relaying\n\u003e information given to me under condition of confidentiality)\n\u003e\n\nI can see why they don't want to go public with this: it means that they\nare less profitable than other pools.\n\nIt still looks to me like Ittay's discovery is doing exactly the right\nthing:\nthis pool will need to be more careful when signing up new people,\ncurbing its otherwise steady march towards the 51% boundary.\n\n- egs\n\n\n- egs\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151228/2e490a2b/attachment.html\u003e",
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