📅 Original date posted:2017-03-25
📝 Original message:Surely you are aware that what you are proposing is vastly different from
the way soft forks have historically worked.
First of all, the bar for miners being on the new chain is extremely high,
95%.
Second of all, soft forks make rule restrictions on classes of transactions
that are already non-standard so that any non-upgraded miners are unlikely
to be including txs in their blocks which would violate the new rules and
should not have their blocks orphaned even after the fork.
Finally, soft forks are designed to only be used when there is a very wide
community consensus and the intention is not to overrule anyone's choice to
remain on the old rules but to ensure the security of nodes that may have
neglected to upgrade. Obviously it is impossible to draw a bright line
between users who intentionally are not upgrading due to opposition and
users that are just being lazy. But in the case of a proposed BU hard fork
it is abundantly clear that there is a very significant fraction, in fact
likely a majority of users who intentionally want to remain on the old
rules.
As a Bitcoin user I find it abhorrent the way you are proposing to
intentionally cripple the chain and rules I want to use instead of just
peacefully splitting.
On Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 3:28 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> One of the purported benefits of a soft-forking change (a tightening of
> the consensus rule set) is the reduced risk of a blockchain split compared
> to a loosening of the consensus rule set. The way this works is that
> miners who fail to upgrade to the new tighter ruleset will have their
> non-compliant blocks orphaned by the hash power majority. This is a strong
> incentive to upgrade and has historically worked well. If a minority
> subset of the network didn’t want to abide by the new restricted rule set,
> a reasonable solution would be for them to change the proof-of-work and
> start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger (
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563972.0).
>
> In the case of the coming network upgrade to larger blocks, a primary
> concern of both business such as Coinbase and Bitpay, and most miners, is
> the possibility of a blockchain split and the associated confusion, replay
> risk, etc. By applying techniques that are known to be successful for
> soft-forking changes, we can likewise benefit in a way that makes a split
> less likely as we move towards larger blocks. Two proposed techniques to
> reduce the chances of a split are:
>
> 1. That miners begin to orphan the blocks of non-upgraded miners once a
> super-majority of the network hash power has upgraded. This would serve as
> an expensive-to-ignore reminder to upgrade.
>
> 2. That, in the case where a minority branch emerges (unlikely IMO),
> majority miners would continually re-org that minority branch with empty
> blocks to prevent transactions from confirming, thereby eliminating replay
> risk.
>
> Just like after a soft forking change, a minority that does not want to
> abide by the current ruleset enforced by the majority could change the
> proof-of-work and start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger, as
> suggested by Emin.
>
> Best regards,
> Peter R
>
>
> > On Mar 25, 2017, at 9:12 AM, CANNON via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.
> linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> >> I don't know what "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50%
> >> is supposed to be reached
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA512
> >
> > On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: > I don't know what
> > "Time is running short I fear" stands for and when 50% > is supposed
> > to be reached
> >
> > According to current hashrate distribution tracking site coin.dance,
> > very likely within less than four weeks according to current hashrate
> > takeover rate.
> >
> > While a fork is very likely, that I dont really fear because worst
> > case scenario is that bitcoin still survives and the invalid chain
> > becomes an alt. My fear is the centralized mining power being used
> > to attack the valid chain with intentions on killing it. [1]
> >
> > Shouldn't this 50% attack they are threatening be a concern? If it
> > is a concern, what options are on the table. If it is not a concern
> > please enlightent me as to why.
> >
> >
> > [1] Source:
> > https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6172s3/peter_
> rizun_tells_miners_to_force_a_hard_fork_by/
> >
> > Text:
> >
> > The attack quoted from his article:
> > https://medium.com/@peter_r/on-the-emerging-consensus-
> regarding-bitcoins-block-size-limit-insights-from-my-visit-
> with-2348878a16d8
> >
> > [Level 2] Anti-split protection Miners will orphan the
> > blocks of non-compliant miners prior to the first larger block
> > to serve as a reminder to upgrade. Simply due to the possibility
> > of having blocks orphaned, all miners would be motivated to
> > begin signalling for larger blocks once support definitively
> > passes 51%. If some miners hold out (e.g., they may not be
> > paying attention regarding the upgrade), then they will begin
> > to pay attention after losing approximately $15,000 of revenue
> > due to an orphaned block.
> >
> > [Level 3] Anti-split protection In the scenario where Levels
> > 1 and 2 protection fails to entice all non-compliant miners to
> > upgrade, a small-block minority chain may emerge. To address the
> > risk of coins being spent on this chain (replay risk), majority
> > miners will deploy hash power as needed to ensure the minority
> > chain includes only empty blocks after the forking point. This
> > can easily be accomplished if the majority miners maintain a
> > secret chain of empty blocks built off their last empty
> > block publishing only as much of this chain as necessary
> > to orphan any non-empty blocks produced on the minority chain.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > - --
> > Cannon
> > PGP Fingerprint: 2BB5 15CD 66E7 4E28 45DC 6494 A5A2 2879 3F06 E832
> > Email: cannon at cannon-ciota.info
> >
> > NOTICE: ALL EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE NOT SIGNED/ENCRYPTED WITH PGP SHOULD
> > BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FORGED, AND NOT PRIVATE.
> > If this matters to you, use PGP.
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> > =R71g
> > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Alex Morcos [ARCHIVE] /
npub10z…3xfzw
2023-06-07 17:57:48
in reply to nevent1q…rtmy
Author Public Key
npub10z4xjfgftd3fm9dfu7dw6mkemgyhxgumcmhd7yd0ggjq7rsaw4wqa3xfzwPublished at
2023-06-07 17:57:48Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-03-25\n📝 Original message:Surely you are aware that what you are proposing is vastly different from\nthe way soft forks have historically worked.\n\nFirst of all, the bar for miners being on the new chain is extremely high,\n95%.\n\nSecond of all, soft forks make rule restrictions on classes of transactions\nthat are already non-standard so that any non-upgraded miners are unlikely\nto be including txs in their blocks which would violate the new rules and\nshould not have their blocks orphaned even after the fork.\n\nFinally, soft forks are designed to only be used when there is a very wide\ncommunity consensus and the intention is not to overrule anyone's choice to\nremain on the old rules but to ensure the security of nodes that may have\nneglected to upgrade. Obviously it is impossible to draw a bright line\nbetween users who intentionally are not upgrading due to opposition and\nusers that are just being lazy. But in the case of a proposed BU hard fork\nit is abundantly clear that there is a very significant fraction, in fact\nlikely a majority of users who intentionally want to remain on the old\nrules.\n\nAs a Bitcoin user I find it abhorrent the way you are proposing to\nintentionally cripple the chain and rules I want to use instead of just\npeacefully splitting.\n\n\nOn Sat, Mar 25, 2017 at 3:28 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e One of the purported benefits of a soft-forking change (a tightening of\n\u003e the consensus rule set) is the reduced risk of a blockchain split compared\n\u003e to a loosening of the consensus rule set. The way this works is that\n\u003e miners who fail to upgrade to the new tighter ruleset will have their\n\u003e non-compliant blocks orphaned by the hash power majority. This is a strong\n\u003e incentive to upgrade and has historically worked well. If a minority\n\u003e subset of the network didn’t want to abide by the new restricted rule set,\n\u003e a reasonable solution would be for them to change the proof-of-work and\n\u003e start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger (\n\u003e https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=563972.0).\n\u003e\n\u003e In the case of the coming network upgrade to larger blocks, a primary\n\u003e concern of both business such as Coinbase and Bitpay, and most miners, is\n\u003e the possibility of a blockchain split and the associated confusion, replay\n\u003e risk, etc. By applying techniques that are known to be successful for\n\u003e soft-forking changes, we can likewise benefit in a way that makes a split\n\u003e less likely as we move towards larger blocks. Two proposed techniques to\n\u003e reduce the chances of a split are:\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. That miners begin to orphan the blocks of non-upgraded miners once a\n\u003e super-majority of the network hash power has upgraded. This would serve as\n\u003e an expensive-to-ignore reminder to upgrade.\n\u003e\n\u003e 2. That, in the case where a minority branch emerges (unlikely IMO),\n\u003e majority miners would continually re-org that minority branch with empty\n\u003e blocks to prevent transactions from confirming, thereby eliminating replay\n\u003e risk.\n\u003e\n\u003e Just like after a soft forking change, a minority that does not want to\n\u003e abide by the current ruleset enforced by the majority could change the\n\u003e proof-of-work and start a spin-off from the existing Bitcoin ledger, as\n\u003e suggested by Emin.\n\u003e\n\u003e Best regards,\n\u003e Peter R\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Mar 25, 2017, at 9:12 AM, CANNON via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.\n\u003e linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e I don't know what \"Time is running short I fear\" stands for and when 50%\n\u003e \u003e\u003e is supposed to be reached\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\n\u003e \u003e Hash: SHA512\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On 03/24/2017 07:00 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote: \u003e I don't know what\n\u003e \u003e \"Time is running short I fear\" stands for and when 50% \u003e is supposed\n\u003e \u003e to be reached\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e According to current hashrate distribution tracking site coin.dance,\n\u003e \u003e very likely within less than four weeks according to current hashrate\n\u003e \u003e takeover rate.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e While a fork is very likely, that I dont really fear because worst\n\u003e \u003e case scenario is that bitcoin still survives and the invalid chain\n\u003e \u003e becomes an alt. My fear is the centralized mining power being used\n\u003e \u003e to attack the valid chain with intentions on killing it. [1]\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Shouldn't this 50% attack they are threatening be a concern? If it\n\u003e \u003e is a concern, what options are on the table. If it is not a concern\n\u003e \u003e please enlightent me as to why.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e [1] Source:\n\u003e \u003e https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/6172s3/peter_\n\u003e rizun_tells_miners_to_force_a_hard_fork_by/\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Text:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e The attack quoted from his article:\n\u003e \u003e https://medium.com/@peter_r/on-the-emerging-consensus-\n\u003e regarding-bitcoins-block-size-limit-insights-from-my-visit-\n\u003e with-2348878a16d8\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e [Level 2] Anti-split protection Miners will orphan the\n\u003e \u003e blocks of non-compliant miners prior to the first larger block\n\u003e \u003e to serve as a reminder to upgrade. Simply due to the possibility\n\u003e \u003e of having blocks orphaned, all miners would be motivated to\n\u003e \u003e begin signalling for larger blocks once support definitively\n\u003e \u003e passes 51%. If some miners hold out (e.g., they may not be\n\u003e \u003e paying attention regarding the upgrade), then they will begin\n\u003e \u003e to pay attention after losing approximately $15,000 of revenue\n\u003e \u003e due to an orphaned block.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e [Level 3] Anti-split protection In the scenario where Levels\n\u003e \u003e 1 and 2 protection fails to entice all non-compliant miners to\n\u003e \u003e upgrade, a small-block minority chain may emerge. To address the\n\u003e \u003e risk of coins being spent on this chain (replay risk), majority\n\u003e \u003e miners will deploy hash power as needed to ensure the minority\n\u003e \u003e chain includes only empty blocks after the forking point. This\n\u003e \u003e can easily be accomplished if the majority miners maintain a\n\u003e \u003e secret chain of empty blocks built off their last empty\n\u003e \u003e block publishing only as much of this chain as necessary\n\u003e \u003e to orphan any non-empty blocks produced on the minority chain.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e - --\n\u003e \u003e Cannon\n\u003e \u003e PGP Fingerprint: 2BB5 15CD 66E7 4E28 45DC 6494 A5A2 2879 3F06 E832\n\u003e \u003e Email: cannon at cannon-ciota.info\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e NOTICE: ALL EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE NOT SIGNED/ENCRYPTED WITH PGP SHOULD\n\u003e \u003e BE CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY FORGED, AND NOT PRIVATE.\n\u003e \u003e If this matters to you, use PGP.\n\u003e \u003e -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJY1pbaAAoJEAYDai9lH2mwOO0QANOWqGzPNlifWguc+Y5UQxQM\n\u003e \u003e eAiztAayQBoAyLcFE7/qdtSNlUxbIAHG17fM+aNkehjYH2oN5ODJ+j7E2Yt6EoUH\n\u003e \u003e h5t8MLhNRG/YGF1hJK8Io940EmdcjuNmohiZvrjIqEOYggmLU3hR6J4gsuGsQQhu\n\u003e \u003e gY3sMS/TtT+gZNH8w53ePGrsVhuQR7yEMMr91/vM4+Q5abpwqLeYLnslaZDcd3XK\n\u003e \u003e VB9vyyK08r34J1GQt/H4UvTvGs28MFKBkvueA/Sfyvnrih7+WSQLuSvhiFr+cW1B\n\u003e \u003e TmSVYrB2DzyHN27jDCI2ty3ryNE4PMYcaeLfI2TTbsD/MuVU5lK0kM/1JajP4eRj\n\u003e \u003e j+P03OipuQiy/dNU63w0Uka2PbdKhDC13hVtK/ttBbNppbjnGeB9PYSJCzOpInGw\n\u003e \u003e NwAyz0rVS/llGsdctcII7Z6AUMGuJXzsosY8vjUroU+KFRDqIbDfC53sH7DaPh7u\n\u003e \u003e YawwId5S5RnZsAGCUJ+qNcg0s728J1eDjofN291IS5sOKMzpI7KhaOhFxjnk1MpN\n\u003e \u003e ZAlQeTlvG+sAdn61QMQK1NbFt0km+jcqyVh0+L01yB0K4VDi1YFJaSBOaYUELBXa\n\u003e \u003e 8a6WhZf5nrl5UIpH7rRcPzzqchcdYczy5VRZp2UsU+HYeqLXlcN0a03yPpVQik9S\n\u003e \u003e /T93MuZgmvSCry5MlccA\n\u003e \u003e =R71g\n\u003e \u003e -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170325/16187c21/attachment.html\u003e",
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