📅 Original date posted:2015-05-12
📝 Original message:On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik at bitpay.com> wrote:
> One general problem is that security is weakened when an attacker can DoS a
> small part of the chain by DoS'ing a small number of nodes - yet the impact
> is a network-wide DoS because nobody can complete a sync.
It might be more interesting to think of that attack as a bandwidth
exhaustion DOS attack on the archive nodes... if you can't get a copy
without them, thats where you'll go.
So the question arises: does the option make some nodes that would
have been archive not be? Probably some-- but would it do so much that
it would offset the gain of additional copies of the data when those
attacks are not going no. I suspect not.
It's also useful to give people incremental ways to participate even
when they can't swollow the whole pill; or choose to provide the
resource thats cheap for them to provide. In particular, if there is
only two kinds of full nodes-- archive and pruned; then the archive
nodes take both a huge disk and bandwidth cost; where as if there are
fractional then archives take low(er) bandwidth unless the fractionals
get DOS attacked.
Gregory Maxwell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1f2…crwet
2023-06-07 15:35:02
in reply to nevent1q…5tu9
Author Public Key
npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwetPublished at
2023-06-07 15:35:02Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-05-12\n📝 Original message:On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 7:38 PM, Jeff Garzik \u003cjgarzik at bitpay.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e One general problem is that security is weakened when an attacker can DoS a\n\u003e small part of the chain by DoS'ing a small number of nodes - yet the impact\n\u003e is a network-wide DoS because nobody can complete a sync.\n\nIt might be more interesting to think of that attack as a bandwidth\nexhaustion DOS attack on the archive nodes... if you can't get a copy\nwithout them, thats where you'll go.\n\nSo the question arises: does the option make some nodes that would\nhave been archive not be? Probably some-- but would it do so much that\nit would offset the gain of additional copies of the data when those\nattacks are not going no. I suspect not.\n\nIt's also useful to give people incremental ways to participate even\nwhen they can't swollow the whole pill; or choose to provide the\nresource thats cheap for them to provide. In particular, if there is\nonly two kinds of full nodes-- archive and pruned; then the archive\nnodes take both a huge disk and bandwidth cost; where as if there are\nfractional then archives take low(er) bandwidth unless the fractionals\nget DOS attacked.",
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