📅 Original date posted:2011-08-24
🗒️ Summary of this message: Discussion on the use of multi-signature transactions for secure Bitcoin wallets, including the possibility of new Bitcoin addresses and opcodes.
📝 Original message:On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 8:45 AM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 11:12 AM, Gavin Andresen
> <gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
> > It seems to me the fastest path to very secure, very-hard-to-lose
> > bitcoin wallets is multi-signature transactions.
> >
> > To organize this discussion: first, does everybody agree?
>
> It's a good tool which we should have in our tool-belt.
>
> Though it's a bit of when you are a hammer all problems are nails.
> This issue can also be addressed by things like external private key
> protectors. But someone would have to build one.
>
> Someone might be more inclined to build such a thing if the software
> had good support for tracking public keys without private keys, and
> generating unsigned transactions for export to the device for signing.
>
> > ByteCoin pointed to a research paper that gives a scheme for splitting
> > a private key between two people, neither of which every knows the
> [snip]
> > So I'm assuming that is NOT the fastest way to solving the problem.
>
> Regardless, it might be useful to contact the authors.
>
> > I still think it is a good idea to enable a set of new 'standard'
> > multisignature transactions, so they get relayed and included into
> > blocks. I don't want to let "the perfect become the enemy of the
> > good" -- does anybody disagree?
>
> I agree.
>
> > The arguments against are that if the proposed standard transactions
> > are accepted, then the next step is to define a new kind of bitcoin
> > address that lets coins be deposited into a multisignature-protected
> > wallet.
> >
> > And those new as-yet-undefined bitcoin addresses will have to be 2 or
> > 3 times as big as current bitcoin addresses, and will be incompatible
> > with old clients.
> >
> > So, if we are going to have new releases that are incompatible with
> > old clients why not do things right in the first place, implement or
> > enable opcodes so the new bitcoin addresses can be small, and schedule
> > a block chain split for N months from now.
>
> One way of doing this would be to have an address which hashes an
> ordered concatenation of many addresses (perhaps plus a length
> argument). To redeem you provide the public keys which are signing,
> plus the addresses which aren't signing, and the receiver validates.
>
> If it can be done, then yes, I agree it would be worth forking the chain.
>
> This _feels_ like something which could and should be done with the
> existing (but disabled opcodes).
>
>
> It's not exclusive, however, with a long N-address address type for
> multisig destinations. We could support that _now_ and defer the
> 'compressed version' until after people have experience with this
> usage. The only cost would be supporting this address type forever,
> which isn't that bad.
>
> It's also important to note that incompatibility wouldn't be complete:
> The only limit is that old clients couldn't send funds to escrow
> addresses— which is an issue no matter how you encode the information.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> EMC VNX: the world's simplest storage, starting under $10K
> The only unified storage solution that offers unified management
> Up to 160% more powerful than alternatives and 25% more efficient.
> Guaranteed. http://p.sf.net/sfu/emc-vnx-dev2dev
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
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Rick Wesson [ARCHIVE] /
npub1xz…2925u
2023-06-07 02:17:47
in reply to nevent1q…lu52
Author Public Key
npub1xz8q68hmzur6c6uje593nscy3q4njx05h4vnxmz2wxxptx7u7casl2925uPublished at
2023-06-07 02:17:47Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2011-08-24\n🗒️ Summary of this message: Discussion on the use of multi-signature transactions for secure Bitcoin wallets, including the possibility of new Bitcoin addresses and opcodes.\n📝 Original message:On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 8:45 AM, Gregory Maxwell \u003cgmaxwell at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 11:12 AM, Gavin Andresen\n\u003e \u003cgavinandresen at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e It seems to me the fastest path to very secure, very-hard-to-lose\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin wallets is multi-signature transactions.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e To organize this discussion: first, does everybody agree?\n\u003e\n\u003e It's a good tool which we should have in our tool-belt.\n\u003e\n\u003e Though it's a bit of when you are a hammer all problems are nails.\n\u003e This issue can also be addressed by things like external private key\n\u003e protectors. But someone would have to build one.\n\u003e\n\u003e Someone might be more inclined to build such a thing if the software\n\u003e had good support for tracking public keys without private keys, and\n\u003e generating unsigned transactions for export to the device for signing.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e ByteCoin pointed to a research paper that gives a scheme for splitting\n\u003e \u003e a private key between two people, neither of which every knows the\n\u003e [snip]\n\u003e \u003e So I'm assuming that is NOT the fastest way to solving the problem.\n\u003e\n\u003e Regardless, it might be useful to contact the authors.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e I still think it is a good idea to enable a set of new 'standard'\n\u003e \u003e multisignature transactions, so they get relayed and included into\n\u003e \u003e blocks. I don't want to let \"the perfect become the enemy of the\n\u003e \u003e good\" -- does anybody disagree?\n\u003e\n\u003e I agree.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e The arguments against are that if the proposed standard transactions\n\u003e \u003e are accepted, then the next step is to define a new kind of bitcoin\n\u003e \u003e address that lets coins be deposited into a multisignature-protected\n\u003e \u003e wallet.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e And those new as-yet-undefined bitcoin addresses will have to be 2 or\n\u003e \u003e 3 times as big as current bitcoin addresses, and will be incompatible\n\u003e \u003e with old clients.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e So, if we are going to have new releases that are incompatible with\n\u003e \u003e old clients why not do things right in the first place, implement or\n\u003e \u003e enable opcodes so the new bitcoin addresses can be small, and schedule\n\u003e \u003e a block chain split for N months from now.\n\u003e\n\u003e One way of doing this would be to have an address which hashes an\n\u003e ordered concatenation of many addresses (perhaps plus a length\n\u003e argument). To redeem you provide the public keys which are signing,\n\u003e plus the addresses which aren't signing, and the receiver validates.\n\u003e\n\u003e If it can be done, then yes, I agree it would be worth forking the chain.\n\u003e\n\u003e This _feels_ like something which could and should be done with the\n\u003e existing (but disabled opcodes).\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e It's not exclusive, however, with a long N-address address type for\n\u003e multisig destinations. We could support that _now_ and defer the\n\u003e 'compressed version' until after people have experience with this\n\u003e usage. The only cost would be supporting this address type forever,\n\u003e which isn't that bad.\n\u003e\n\u003e It's also important to note that incompatibility wouldn't be complete:\n\u003e The only limit is that old clients couldn't send funds to escrow\n\u003e addresses— which is an issue no matter how you encode the information.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e EMC VNX: the world's simplest storage, starting under $10K\n\u003e The only unified storage solution that offers unified management\n\u003e Up to 160% more powerful than alternatives and 25% more efficient.\n\u003e Guaranteed. http://p.sf.net/sfu/emc-vnx-dev2dev\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20110824/4805602a/attachment.html\u003e",
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}