š
Original date posted:2019-08-06
š Original message:Good morning all,
It might be useful to remember that there exists pressure to pool proof-of-work due to tiny non-linearities caused by Proximity Premium and Variance Discount flaws.
Similarly, any non-linearity in any fidelity bond scheme exerts the same pooling pressure.
Deliberately increasing the non-linearity to V^2 worsens the pooling pressure, not lessens it.
(I wonder if instead going the opposite way and doing V^0.999 might work better; I have not figured all the implications of such a scheme and leave it to the reader.)
> Unfortunately, both described schemes fail the same way as
> 'require TXOs to be consolidated by the owner', by the fact that with
> muSig, shared ownership of TXO is possible, as explained by ZmnSCPxj in
> [1]. 2P-ECDSA is also possible, just more complex, so just saying 'ban
> musig for the bonds' is not the answer, I believe.
If my understanding is correct, efforts to expand ECDSA to more than two-party n-of-n "true" multisignatures already are ongoing.
One might attempt to use transaction malleability as a protection, and require that transactions that put up bond TXOs should spend from at least one ***non***-SegWit output, so that the scheme as described fails (as the funding txid is malleable after-the-fact).
But the scheme as described only considers ways to securely aggregate *within* the Bitcoin universe.
I have recently learned of a spacce called the "real world", wherein apparently there exist things as "contract law".
It seems to me this "contract law" is a half-baked implementation of Bitcoin cryptographic smart contracts.
By what little I understand of this "contract law", it would be possible for an aggregator to accept some amount of money, with a promise to return that money in the future with some additional funds.
If the aggregator fails to uphold its promise, then some (admittedly centralized) authority entity within the "real world" then imposes punishments (apparently inspired by similar mechanisms in Lightning Network) on the aggregator.
Such arrangements (accepting some money now with a promise to return the money, plus some interest earned, in the future) apparently already exist in this "real world", under the name of "time deposits".
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
>
> [1]
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-August/017217.html
>
> Š Wed, 7 Aug 2019 01:55:41 +0500
> Dmitry Petukhov dp at simplexum.com wrote:
>
> > Š Mon, 5 Aug 2019 20:04:26 +0100
> > Chris Belcher belcher at riseup.net wrote:
> >
> > > So what's needed is a way to make renting out TXOs impossible or
> > > very difficult.
> >
> > You can make renting the TXOs risky for the attacker. Make it so that
> > the entity that rented out the TXO can revoke the participation of
> > said TXO in the market, by publishing some special signature. That
> > act of revocation can also mean revocation of all other TXOs that
> > were used in a bond alongside it. This way, any entity that wants to
> > spoil an attacker's consolidation via rent, can rent out its TXO to
> > the attacker, and then revoke it, spoiling the whole package the
> > attacker have consolidated.
> > There may be other way to impose penalties.
> > For example, all locked TXO may be required to be spendable by any
> > key that controls any TXO in the 'bond TXO package'. I think this
> > should be possible with taproot - you will have to publish a taproot
> > trees for your locked TXOs (say, N of them), and the tree for each TXO
> > will have N leaves, each leaf will specify a condition "spendable by
> > the key N". This way, if I give you my TXO to include it in a bond by
> > locking it, you also need to make your other TXOs in a bond spendable
> > by me.
> > For both scenarios to work for the attacker, there's need to be an
> > off-chain contractual relationship between the parties. Otherwise the
> > entity that rents out the TXOs can spoil or just confiscate the bond
> > of the entity that rented them, without reprecussions.
>
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] /
npub1g5ā¦3ms3l
2023-06-07 18:19:57
in reply to nevent1qā¦j33g
Author Public Key
npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lPublished at
2023-06-07 18:19:57Event JSON
{
"id": "02383b12344f3fd30975bb5ec7a5f016f8df079171b45a75f4bf0209ff65988e",
"pubkey": "4505072744a9d3e490af9262bfe38e6ee5338a77177b565b6b37730b63a7b861",
"created_at": 1686161997,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"a08dce3b67359ed00d4e2ce273a5fce8912dd2b587c89f8e261331c71b6b29ce",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"26a22d0a2c5ac0ac9e44dcd46600ac2181a3e158ffe3a6b85bf232c076ab3e57",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"78f5a82a0b64fb3c18bd33a69c53b1af612b3ac8dd81e12f74ba62f3793dac05"
]
],
"content": "š
Original date posted:2019-08-06\nš Original message:Good morning all,\n\nIt might be useful to remember that there exists pressure to pool proof-of-work due to tiny non-linearities caused by Proximity Premium and Variance Discount flaws.\nSimilarly, any non-linearity in any fidelity bond scheme exerts the same pooling pressure.\nDeliberately increasing the non-linearity to V^2 worsens the pooling pressure, not lessens it.\n\n(I wonder if instead going the opposite way and doing V^0.999 might work better; I have not figured all the implications of such a scheme and leave it to the reader.)\n\n\u003e Unfortunately, both described schemes fail the same way as\n\u003e 'require TXOs to be consolidated by the owner', by the fact that with\n\u003e muSig, shared ownership of TXO is possible, as explained by ZmnSCPxj in\n\u003e [1]. 2P-ECDSA is also possible, just more complex, so just saying 'ban\n\u003e musig for the bonds' is not the answer, I believe.\n\nIf my understanding is correct, efforts to expand ECDSA to more than two-party n-of-n \"true\" multisignatures already are ongoing.\n\nOne might attempt to use transaction malleability as a protection, and require that transactions that put up bond TXOs should spend from at least one ***non***-SegWit output, so that the scheme as described fails (as the funding txid is malleable after-the-fact).\n\nBut the scheme as described only considers ways to securely aggregate *within* the Bitcoin universe.\n\nI have recently learned of a spacce called the \"real world\", wherein apparently there exist things as \"contract law\".\nIt seems to me this \"contract law\" is a half-baked implementation of Bitcoin cryptographic smart contracts.\nBy what little I understand of this \"contract law\", it would be possible for an aggregator to accept some amount of money, with a promise to return that money in the future with some additional funds.\nIf the aggregator fails to uphold its promise, then some (admittedly centralized) authority entity within the \"real world\" then imposes punishments (apparently inspired by similar mechanisms in Lightning Network) on the aggregator.\nSuch arrangements (accepting some money now with a promise to return the money, plus some interest earned, in the future) apparently already exist in this \"real world\", under the name of \"time deposits\".\n\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj\n\n\u003e\n\u003e [1]\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-August/017217.html\n\u003e\n\u003e Š Wed, 7 Aug 2019 01:55:41 +0500\n\u003e Dmitry Petukhov dp at simplexum.com wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Š Mon, 5 Aug 2019 20:04:26 +0100\n\u003e \u003e Chris Belcher belcher at riseup.net wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e So what's needed is a way to make renting out TXOs impossible or\n\u003e \u003e \u003e very difficult.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e You can make renting the TXOs risky for the attacker. Make it so that\n\u003e \u003e the entity that rented out the TXO can revoke the participation of\n\u003e \u003e said TXO in the market, by publishing some special signature. That\n\u003e \u003e act of revocation can also mean revocation of all other TXOs that\n\u003e \u003e were used in a bond alongside it. This way, any entity that wants to\n\u003e \u003e spoil an attacker's consolidation via rent, can rent out its TXO to\n\u003e \u003e the attacker, and then revoke it, spoiling the whole package the\n\u003e \u003e attacker have consolidated.\n\u003e \u003e There may be other way to impose penalties.\n\u003e \u003e For example, all locked TXO may be required to be spendable by any\n\u003e \u003e key that controls any TXO in the 'bond TXO package'. I think this\n\u003e \u003e should be possible with taproot - you will have to publish a taproot\n\u003e \u003e trees for your locked TXOs (say, N of them), and the tree for each TXO\n\u003e \u003e will have N leaves, each leaf will specify a condition \"spendable by\n\u003e \u003e the key N\". This way, if I give you my TXO to include it in a bond by\n\u003e \u003e locking it, you also need to make your other TXOs in a bond spendable\n\u003e \u003e by me.\n\u003e \u003e For both scenarios to work for the attacker, there's need to be an\n\u003e \u003e off-chain contractual relationship between the parties. Otherwise the\n\u003e \u003e entity that rents out the TXOs can spoil or just confiscate the bond\n\u003e \u003e of the entity that rented them, without reprecussions.\n\u003e\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev",
"sig": "c321e8c5f5c3d7de1e52d4ac5e6340b936fe8dbcf6cdad53f4830855a6f4f6d05ca1c8273964ae8ec696f4902481dd79d3d965214ebf1e850c9b3decf6d926bf"
}