Why Nostr? What is Njump?
2023-06-07 15:06:01
in reply to

Warren Togami Jr. [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2013-08-16 📝 Original message:Automatic heuristic driven ...

📅 Original date posted:2013-08-16
📝 Original message:Automatic heuristic driven prioritization, with sane defaults and some
configurable knobs, is exactly what I suggest.

In the short-term though, any connection limits added to the client by
default would be the simplest and easiest protection measure to audit. It
would improve things a lot over the current situation where there are no
limits, and it requires no manual intervention from node operators.

Warren







On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:46 AM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:

> A ban-subnet RPC would be a reasonable addition, but obviously DoS
> attackers that are IP or bandwidth constrained are really just script
> kiddies. Also anything that involves every node operator doing manual
> intervention rather works against decentralisation and having a big
> network. That's why I keep pushing for automated heuristic driven
> prioritisation.
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:41 PM, Warren Togami Jr. <wtogami at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>> https://togami.com/~warren/archive/2013/example-bitcoind-dos-mitigation-via-iptables.txt
>> *Anti-DoS Low Hanging Fruit: source IP or subnet connection limits*
>> If you disallow the same IP and/or subnet from establishing too many TCP
>> connections with your node, it becomes more expensive for attackers to use
>> a single host exhaust a target node's resources. This iptables firewall
>> based example has almost zero drawbacks, but it is too complicated for most
>> people to deploy. Yes, there is a small chance that you will block
>> legitimate connections, but there are plenty of other nodes for random
>> connections to choose from. Configurable per source IP and source subnet
>> limits with sane defaults enforced by bitcoind itself would be a big
>> improvement over the current situation where one host address can consume
>> limited resources of many target nodes.
>>
>> This doesn't remove the risk of a network-wide connection exhaustion
>> attack by a determined attacker, but it at least makes multiple types of
>> attacks a lot more expensive. This also doesn't do much against the io
>> vulnerability, which would require major redesigns to prevent in Bitcoin.
>>
>>
>> https://github.com/litecoin-project/litecoin/commit/db4d8e21d99551bef4c807aa1534a074e4b7964d
>> *Want to safely delay the block size limit increase for another year or
>> two?* This patch alone enables that.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:24 AM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:
>>
>>> The only other thing I'd like to see there is the start of a new
>>> anti-DoS framework. I think once the outline is in place other people will
>>> be able to fill it in appropriately. But the current framework has to be
>>> left behind.
>>>
>>> If I had to choose one thing to evict to make time for that, it'd be the
>>> whitepapers. At the moment we still have plenty of headroom in block sizes,
>>> even post April. It can probably be safely delayed for a while.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:11 PM, Mike Hearn <mike at plan99.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Cool. Maybe it's time for another development update on the foundation
>>>> blog?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:00 AM, Gavin Andresen <
>>>> gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Mike asked what non-0.9 code I'm working on; the three things on the
>>>>> top of my list are:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) Smarter fee handling on the client side, instead of hard-coded
>>>>> fees. I was busy today generating scatter-plots and histograms of
>>>>> transaction fees versus priorities to get some insight into what miner
>>>>> policies look like right now.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2) "First double-spend" relaying and alerting, to better support
>>>>> low-value in-person transactions. Related:
>>>>> *Have *a *Snack*, Pay with *Bitcoins*<http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/file/848064fa2e80f88a57aef43d7d5956c6/P2P2013_093.pdf>;
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3) Work on 2-3 whitepapers on why we need to increase or remove the
>>>>> 1MB block size limit, how we can do it safely, and go through all of the
>>>>> arguments that have been made against it and explain why they're wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> --
>>>>> Gavin Andresen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
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