📅 Original date posted:2017-09-29
📝 Original message:On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 07:45:02PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
>
>
> > On Sep 28, 2017, at 7:02 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> >
> >> On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 06:06:29PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> Unlike other proposed fixes to the fee model, this is not trivially
> >> broken by paying the miner out of band. If you pay out of band fee
> >> instead of regular fee, then your transaction cannot be included with
> >> other regular fee paying transactions without the miner giving up all
> >> regular fee income. Any transaction paying less fee in-band than the
> >> otherwise minimum fee rate needs to also provide ~1Mvbyte * fee rate
> >> difference fee to make up for that lost income. So out of band fee is
> >> only realistically considered when it pays on top of a regular feerate
> >> paying transaction that would have been included in the block anyway.
> >> And what would be the point of that?
> >
> > This proposed fix is itself broken, because the miner can easily include *only*
> > transactions paying out-of-band, at which point the fee can be anything.
>
> And in doing so either reduce the claimable income from other transactions (miner won’t do that), or require paying more non-rebateable fee than is needed to get in the block (why would the user do that?)
>
> This is specifically addressed in the text you quoted.
I specifically outlined a scenario where that text isn't relevant: *all*
transaction in a block can be paying out of band.
> > Equally, miners can provide fee *rebates*, forcing up prices for everyone else
> > while still allowing them to make deals.
>
> Discounted by the fact rebates would not be honored by other miners. The rebate would have to be higher than what they could get from straight fee collection, making it less profitable than doing nothing.
You're making the incorrect assumption that all transactions have to be
broadcast publicly; they don't.
> > Also, remember that you can pay fees via anyone-can-spend outputs, as miners
> > have full ability to control what transactions end up spending those outputs.
>
> You’d still have to pay the minimum fee rate of the other transactions or you’d bring down the miners income. Otherwise this is nearly the same cost as the rebate fee, since they both involve explicit outputs claimed by the miner, but the rebate goes back to you. So why would you not want to do that instead?
>
> A different way of looking at this proposal is that it creates a penalty for out of band payments.
It certainly does not. It simply adds another level of complexity and overhead
to the out-of-band payment situation, which is not desirable. If we can't
eliminate out of band payments entirely, we do not want to make the playing
field of them even more unbalanced than it already is.
This is a typical academic proposal that only considers first order effects
while ignoring second order effects.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 455 bytes
Desc: Digital signature
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170928/830d78cd/attachment.sig>;
Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] /
npub1m2…a2np2
2023-06-07 18:06:36
in reply to nevent1q…46ep
Author Public Key
npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2Published at
2023-06-07 18:06:36Event JSON
{
"id": "0587427699643d30ede3f8920edc0f2e7c1885e6ca435ce5b73268036a9c1725",
"pubkey": "daa2fc676a25e3b5b45644540bcbd1e1168b111427cd0e3cf19c56194fb231aa",
"created_at": 1686161196,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"ae5bb64562efc3a1339440e5c70f6b3b8b12997d5b034703d0bb377a6fd6447b",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"721bd3f9a9aae29fb231974adbb2b16f3f76b3262a71e6d0d94270c26dc45fe0",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"f0feda6ad58ea9f486e469f87b3b9996494363a26982b864667c5d8acb0542ab"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-09-29\n📝 Original message:On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 07:45:02PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e \u003e On Sep 28, 2017, at 7:02 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e \n\u003e \u003e\u003e On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 06:06:29PM -0700, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Unlike other proposed fixes to the fee model, this is not trivially\n\u003e \u003e\u003e broken by paying the miner out of band. If you pay out of band fee\n\u003e \u003e\u003e instead of regular fee, then your transaction cannot be included with\n\u003e \u003e\u003e other regular fee paying transactions without the miner giving up all\n\u003e \u003e\u003e regular fee income. Any transaction paying less fee in-band than the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e otherwise minimum fee rate needs to also provide ~1Mvbyte * fee rate\n\u003e \u003e\u003e difference fee to make up for that lost income. So out of band fee is\n\u003e \u003e\u003e only realistically considered when it pays on top of a regular feerate\n\u003e \u003e\u003e paying transaction that would have been included in the block anyway.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e And what would be the point of that?\n\u003e \u003e \n\u003e \u003e This proposed fix is itself broken, because the miner can easily include *only*\n\u003e \u003e transactions paying out-of-band, at which point the fee can be anything.\n\u003e \n\u003e And in doing so either reduce the claimable income from other transactions (miner won’t do that), or require paying more non-rebateable fee than is needed to get in the block (why would the user do that?)\n\u003e \n\u003e This is specifically addressed in the text you quoted. \n\nI specifically outlined a scenario where that text isn't relevant: *all*\ntransaction in a block can be paying out of band.\n\n\u003e \u003e Equally, miners can provide fee *rebates*, forcing up prices for everyone else\n\u003e \u003e while still allowing them to make deals.\n\u003e \n\u003e Discounted by the fact rebates would not be honored by other miners. The rebate would have to be higher than what they could get from straight fee collection, making it less profitable than doing nothing. \n\nYou're making the incorrect assumption that all transactions have to be\nbroadcast publicly; they don't.\n\n\u003e \u003e Also, remember that you can pay fees via anyone-can-spend outputs, as miners\n\u003e \u003e have full ability to control what transactions end up spending those outputs.\n\u003e \n\u003e You’d still have to pay the minimum fee rate of the other transactions or you’d bring down the miners income. Otherwise this is nearly the same cost as the rebate fee, since they both involve explicit outputs claimed by the miner, but the rebate goes back to you. So why would you not want to do that instead?\n\u003e \n\u003e A different way of looking at this proposal is that it creates a penalty for out of band payments. \n\nIt certainly does not. It simply adds another level of complexity and overhead\nto the out-of-band payment situation, which is not desirable. If we can't\neliminate out of band payments entirely, we do not want to make the playing\nfield of them even more unbalanced than it already is.\n\nThis is a typical academic proposal that only considers first order effects\nwhile ignoring second order effects.\n\n-- \nhttps://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 455 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170928/830d78cd/attachment.sig\u003e",
"sig": "06d90edfebf6fcc5e4c7d9d777f645b67728a8818879f560a5c5683f44c4b28a01b45c568a9324a1b3b37150baa0fb813eef44f68f312ba02cc31620a2291a88"
}