đ
Original date posted:2022-01-28
đ Original message:> Even if we were to adopt something like TXHASH, how long is it going to take to develop, test, and release? My guess is "a while" - in the meantime, users of Bitcoin are without a vault strategy that doesn't require either presigning transactions with ephemeral keys (operationally difficult) or multisig configurations that would make Rube Goldberg blush (operationally difficult and precarious).
To me this seems to be jumping ahead a number of steps from where we are at the current time. If the ecosystem was widely using all the tools available to them at the current time (MuSig(2), Taproot trees to embed complex scripts, Miniscript etc), was testing out upcoming available tools like threshold key aggregation schemes (e.g. FROST) on signets and the final missing piece was a covenant opcode to avoid the deleted key requirement then the argument for urgency would be stronger. I would still share the concerns I and many others have repeated over rushing soft forks and treating mainnet as a testbed for new use cases rather than the final destination for changes that will stand the test of time. But I would be a lot more sympathetic to that argument.
This isn't a criticism of the ecosystem or individual vault projects like Revault, it is clearly still very early. darosior (Revault) is working on getting a first version of Miniscript finalized and in Core [0] and I'm assuming will be part of the effort to get Taproot support in Miniscript assuming that initial effort succeeds. Murch is tracking basic send and receive to the P2TR addresses (not complex scripts, multisig, MuSig(2), merely single key spends) in the ecosystem [1] and there is still a long way to go there.
There are a bunch of covenant opcodes that have been enabled on Liquid [2] that I haven't heard yet of anyone building vault prototypes with. It would be good to get others (TLUV, TXHASH) in future. There is not even a custom signet with CTV (as far as I know) for those who subscribe to the view that we must rush to get CTV activated on mainnet as soon as possible with no thought to what opcodes might follow.
When this discussion focuses on the pros and cons of various proposals and how they are being tested and used in prototypes on signets, sidechains I think it is really productive. But when it gets onto urgency (or worse activation speculation) I am just perplexed. That viewpoint seems to completely ignore where we are currently with Taproot use and tooling (on which most vault designs will presumably build) and even more perplexingly where we are with vault prototypes on signets, sidechains.
I am sure at some point in the future we will have various vault prototypes on signets, sidechains making use of Taproot, Miniscript, MuSig(2), FROST etc and crying out for a covenant opcode or sighash flag to go into production on mainnet. But we seem miles away from that at the present time.
[0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/24147
[1]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bech32_adoption
[2]: https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/master/doc/tapscript_opcodes.md
--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
Keybase: michaelfolkson
PGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3
âââââââ Original Message âââââââ
On Friday, January 28th, 2022 at 12:18 AM, James O'Beirne via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> I don't think implementing a CTV opcode that we expect to largely be obsoleted by a TXHASH at a later date is yielding good value from a soft fork process.
>
> This presumes the eventual adoption of TXHASH (or something like it). You're presenting a novel idea that, as far as I know, hasn't had much time to bake in public. Like Jeremy, I'm concerned by the combinatorial growth of flags and the implications that has for testing. Caching for something like TXHASH looks to me like a whole different ballgame relative to CTV, which has a single kind of hash.
>
> Even if we were to adopt something like TXHASH, how long is it going to take to develop, test, and release? My guess is "a while" - in the meantime, users of Bitcoin are without a vault strategy that doesn't require either presigning transactions with ephemeral keys (operationally difficult) or multisig configurations that would make Rube Goldberg blush (operationally difficult and precarious). The utility of vaulting seems underappreciated among consensus devs and it's something I'd like to write about soon in a separate post.
>
>> The strongest argument I can make in favour of CTV would be something like: "We definitely want bare CTV and if we are going to add CTV to legacy script (since we cannot use TXHASH in legacy script), then it is actually easier not to exclude it from tapscript, even if we plan to add TXHASH to tapscript as well."
>
> Another argument for CTV (which I find especially persuasive) is its simplicity - it's relatively easy to reason about and, at this point, pretty well understood. It seems like a low-risk change relative to some of the other covenant proposals, nearly all of which elicit a good deal of headscratching (at least from me) and seem to require not only larger on-chain footprints but sizable code changes.
>
>> I am sensitive to technical debt and soft fork processes
>
> If OP_CTV ends up being the most practical approach for vaulting - among other things - in terms of weight (which it seems to be at the moment) I don't think "technical debt" is an applicable term.
>
> On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 5:20 PM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> I am sensitive to technical debt and soft fork processes, and I don't believe I'm unordinary particular about these issues. Once implemented, opcodes must be supported and maintained indefinitely. Some opcodes are easier to maintain than others. These particular opcodes involve caching of hash computations and, for that reason, I would judge them to be of moderate complexity.
>>
>> But more importantly, soft-forks are inherently a risky process, so we should be getting as much value out of them as we reasonably can. I don't think implementing a CTV opcode that we expect to largely be obsoleted by a TXHASH at a later date is yielding good value from a soft fork process.
>>
>> The strongest argument I can make in favour of CTV would be something like: "We definitely want bare CTV and if we are going to add CTV to legacy script (since we cannot use TXHASH in legacy script), then it is actually easier not to exclude it from tapscript, even if we plan to add TXHASH to tapscript as well."
>>
>> But that argument basically rests the entire value of CTV on the shoulders of bare CTV. As I understand, the argument for why we want bare CTV, instead of just letting people use tapscript, involves the finer details of weight calculations, and I haven't really reviewed that aspect yet. I think it would need to be pretty compelling to make it worthwhile to add CTV for that one use case.
>>
>> Regarding "OP_TXHASH+CSFSV doesn't seem to be the 'full' set of things needed", I totally agree we will want more things such as CAT, rolling SHA256 opcodes, wider arithmetic, pushing amounts onto the stack, some kind of tapleaf manipulation and/or TWEAKVERIFY. For now, I only want to argue TXHASH+CSFSV is better than CTV+APO because it gives us more value, namely oracle signature verification. In particular, I want to argue that TXHASH's push semantics is better that CTV's verify semantics because it composes better by not needing to carry an extra 32-bytes (per instance) in the witness data. I expect that in a world of full recursive covenants, TXHASH would still be useful as a fast and cheap way to verify the "payload" of these covenants, i.e. that a transaction is paying a certain, possibly large, set of addresses certain specific amounts of money. And even if not, TXHASH+CSFSV would still be the way that eltoo would be implemented under this proposal.
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 5:16 PM Jeremy <jlrubin at mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Russell,
>>>
>>> Thanks for this email, it's great to see this approach described.
>>>
>>> A few preliminary notes of feedback:
>>>
>>> 1) a Verify approach can be made to work for OP_TXHASH (even with CTV as-is) E.g., suppose a semantic added for a single byte stack[-1] sighash flag to read the hash at stack[-2], then the hash can be passed in instead of put on the stack. This has the disadvantage of larger witnesses, but the advantage of allowing undefined sighash flags to pass for any hash type.
>>> 2) using the internal key for APO covenants is not an option because it makes transaction construction interactive and precludes contracts with a NUMS point taproot key. Instead, if you want similar savings, you should advocate an OP_GENERATOR which puts G on the stack. Further, an untagged APO variant which has split R and S values would permit something like <sig> OP_GENERATOR OP_GENERATOR CHECKSIGAPO, which would be only 2 more bytes than CTV.
>>> 3) I count something like 20 different flags in your proposal. As long as flags are under 40 bytes (and 32 assuming we want it to be easy) without upgrading math this should be feasible to manipulate on the stack programmatically. This is ignoring some of the more flexible additions you mention about picking which outputs/inputs are included. However, 20 flags means that for testing we would want comprehensive tests and understanding for ~1 million different flag combos and the behaviors they expose. I think this necessitates a formal model of scripting and transaction validity properties. Are there any combinations that might be undesirable?
>>> 4) Just hashing or not hashing isn't actually that flexible, because it doesn't natively let you do things like (for example) TLUV. You really do need tx operations for directly manipulating the data on the stack to construct the hash if you want more flexible covenants. This happens to be compatible with either a Verify or Push approach, since you either destructure a pushed hash or build up a hash for a verify.
>>> 5) Flexible hashing has the potential for quadratic hashing bugs. The fields you propose seem to be within similar range to work you could cause with a regular OP_HASH256, although you'd want to be careful with some of the proposed extensions that you don't create risk of quadratic hashing, which seems possible with an output selecting opcode unless you cache properly (which might be tricky to do). Overall for the fields explicitly mentioned, seems safe, the "possibles" seem to have some more complex interactions. E.g., CTV with the ability to pick a subset of outputs would be exposed to quadratic hashing.
>>> 6) Missing field: covering the annex or some sub-range of the annex (quadratic hashing issues on the latter)
>>> 7) It seems simpler to, for many of these fields, push values directly (as in OP_PUSHTXDATA from Johnson Lau) because the combo of flags to push the hash of a single output's amount to emulate OP_AMOUNT looks 'general but annoying'. It may make more sense to do the OP_PUSHTXDATA style opcode instead. This also makes it simpler to think about the combinations of flags, since it's really N independent multi-byte opcodes.
>>>
>>> Ultimately if we had OP_TXHASH available "tomorrow", I would be able to build out the use cases I care about for CTV (and more). So I don't have an opposition on it with regards to lack of function.
>>>
>>> However, if one finds the TXHASH approach acceptable, then you should also be relatively fine doing APO, CTV, CSFS, TXHASH acceptable in any order (whenever "ready"), unless you are particularly sensitive to "technical debt" and "soft fork processes". The only costs of doing something for CTV or APO given an eventual TXHASH is perhaps a wasted key version or the 32 byte argument of a NOP opcode and some code to maintain.
>>>
>>> Are there other costs I am missing?
>>>
>>> However, as it pertains to actual rollout:
>>>
>>> - OP_TXHASH+CSFSV doesn't seem to be the "full" set of things needed (we still need e.g. OP_CAT, Upgraded >=64 bit Math, TLUV or OP_TWEAK OP_TAPBRANCH OP_MANIPULATETAPTREE, and more) to full realize covenanting power it intends to introduce.
>>> - What sort of timeline would it take to ready something like TXHASH (and desired friends) given greater scope of testing and analysis (standalone + compared to CTV)?
>>> - Is there opposition from the community to this degree of general/recursive covenants?
>>> - Does it make "more sense" to invest the research and development effort that would go into proving TXHASH safe, for example, into Simplicity instead?
>>>
>>> Overall, my opinion is that:
>>>
>>> - TXHASH is an acceptable theoretical approach, and I am happy to put more thought into it and maybe draft a prototype of it.
>>> - I prefer CTV as a first step for pragmatic engineering and availability timeline reasons.
>>> - If TXHASH were to take, optimistically, 2 years to develop and review, and then 1 year to activate, the "path dependence of software" would put Bitcoin in a much better place were we to have CTV within 1 year and applications (that are to be a subset of TXHASH later) being built over the next few years enhanced in the future by TXHASH's availability.
>>> - There is an element of expediency meritted for something like CTV insofar as it provides primitives to tackle time sensitive issues around privacy, scalability, self custody, and decentralization. The aforementioned properties may be difficult to reclaim once given away (with the exception of perhaps scalability).
>>> - Bringing CTV to an implemented state of near-unanimous "we could do this, technically" is good for concretely driving the process of review for any covenant proposals forward, irrespective of if we ultimately activate. (I.e., if there were a reason we could not do CTV safely, it would likely have implications for any other future covenant)
>>>
>>> Concretely, I'm not going to stop advocating for CTV based on the above, but I'm very happy to have something new in the mix to consider!
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jeremy
>>>
>>> --
>>> [@JeremyRubin](https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin)https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 9:23 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Recapping the relationship between CTV and ANYPREVOUT::
>>>>
>>>> It is known that there is a significant amount of overlap in the applications that are enabled by the CTV and ANYPREVOUT proposals despite the fact that their primary applications (congestion control for CTV and eltoo lightning channels for ANYPREVOUT) are quite distinct.
>>>> In particular, ANYPREVOUT can enable most of the applications of CTV, albeit with a higher cost. The primary functionality of CTV is to allow a scriptPubKey to make a commitment to its spending transaction's hash with the input's TXID excluded from the hash. This exclusion is necessary because the scriptPubKey is hashed into the input's TXID, and including the TXID would cause a cycle of hash commitments, which is impossible to construct. On the other hand, ANYPREVOUT defines a signature hash mode that similarly excludes the inputs TXID for its purpose of rebindable signatures.
>>>>
>>>> This means that ANYPREVOUT can mimic most of the properties of CTV by committing both a public key along with an ANYPREVOUT signature inside scriptPubKey. In fact, the only reason Bitcoin doesn't have covenants today is due to this cycle between scriptPubKeys and the TXIDs that occur in all the sighash modes.
>>>>
>>>> The major differences between simulating CTV via ANYPREVOUT and the actual CTV proposal is: (1) The cost of simulating CTV. With CTV the spending transaction is committed using a hash of 32 bytes, while simulating it with ANYPREVOUT requires 64 bytes for a signature, and 32 bytes for some public key, plus a few more bytes for various flags. Some of that cost could be reduced by using the inner public key (1 byte representation) and, if we had CAT, maybe by assembling the signature from reusable pieces (i.e. setting the nonce of the commited signature equal to the public key).
>>>>
>>>> The other major difference is: (2) CTV's transaction hash covers values such as the number of inputs in the transaction and their sequence numbers, which ANYPREVOUT does not cover. CTV's hash contains enough information so that when combined with the missing TXIDs, you can compute the TXID of the spending transaction. In particular if the number of inputs is committed to being 1, once the scriptpubkey's transaction id is known and committed to the blockchain, the TXID of its spending transaction is deducible. And if that transaction has outputs that have CTV commitments in them, you can deduce their spending TXIDs in turn. While this is a pretty neat feature, something that ANYPREVOUT cannot mimic, the main application for it is listed as using congestion control to fund lightning channels, fixing their TXIDs in advance of them being placed on chain. However, if ANYPREVOUT were used to mimic CTV, then likely it would be eltoo channels that would be funded, and it isn't necessary to know the TXIDs of eltoo channels in advance in order to use them.
>>>>
>>>> An Alternative Proposal::
>>>>
>>>> Given the overlap in functionality between CTV and ANYPREVOUT, I think it makes sense to decompose their operations into their constituent pieces and reassemble their behaviour programmatically. To this end, I'd like to instead propose OP_TXHASH and OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY.
>>>>
>>>> OP_TXHASH would pop a txhash flag from the stack and compute a (tagged) txhash in accordance with that flag, and push the resulting hash onto the stack.
>>>> OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY would pop a pubkey, message, and signature from the stack and fail if the signature does not verify on that message.
>>>>
>>>> CTV and TXHASH have roughly equivalent functionality. 'CTV DROP' can be simulated by '<ctv_style_flag> TXHASH EQUALVERIFY'. The reverse is also true where '<ctv_style_flag> TXHASH' can be simulated by CTV by '<ctv-result-from-witness-stack> CTV', however, as you can see, simulating TXHASH from CTV is much more expensive than the other way around, because the resulting 32-byte hash result must be included as part of the witness stack.
>>>>
>>>> '<anyprevout-pubkey> CHECKSIGVERIFY can be simulated by '<apo_style_flag> TXHASH <pubkey> CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY'. Here we see the advantage of pushing the hash value onto the stack. APO can be simulated without needing to include a copy of the resulting txhash inside the witness data.
>>>>
>>>> In addition to the CTV and ANYPREVOUT applications, with CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY we can verify signatures on arbitrary messages signed by oracles for oracle applications. This is where we see the benefit of decomposing operations into primitive pieces. By giving users the ability to program their own use cases from components, we get more applications out of fewer op codes!
>>>>
>>>> Caveats::
>>>>
>>>> First, I acknowledge that replicating the behaviour of CTV and ANYPREVOUT does cost a few more bytes than using the custom purpose built proposals themselves. That is the price to be paid when we choose the ability to program solutions from pieces. But we get to reap the advantages of being able to build more applications from these pieces.
>>>>
>>>> Unlike CTV, TXHASH is not NOP-compatable and can only be implemented within tapscript. In particular, bare CTV isn't possible with this proposal. However, this proposal doesn't preclude the possibility of having CTV added to legacy script in while having TXHASH added to tapscript.
>>>>
>>>> For similar reasons, TXHASH is not amenable to extending the set of txflags at a later date. In theory, one could have TXHASH abort-with-success when encountering an unknown set of flags. However, this would make analyzing tapscript much more difficult. Tapscripts would then be able to abort with success or failure depending on the order script fragments are assembled and executed, and getting the order incorrect would be catastrophic. This behavior is manifestly different from the current batch of OP_SUCCESS opcodes that abort-with-success just by their mere presence, whether they would be executed or not.
>>>>
>>>> I believe the difficulties with upgrading TXHASH can be mitigated by designing a robust set of TXHASH flags from the start. For example having bits to control whether (1) the version is covered; (2) the locktime is covered; (3) txids are covered; (4) sequence numbers are covered; (5) input amounts are covered; (6) input scriptpubkeys are covered; (7) number of inputs is covered; (8) output amounts are covered; (9) output scriptpubkeys are covered; (10) number of outputs is covered; (11) the tapbranch is covered; (12) the tapleaf is covered; (13) the opseparator value is covered; (14) whether all, one, or no inputs are covered; (15) whether all, one or no outputs are covered; (16) whether the one input position is covered; (17) whether the one output position is covered; (18) whether the sighash flags are covered or not (note: whether or not the sighash flags are or are not covered must itself be covered). Possibly specifying which input or output position is covered in the single case and whether the position is relative to the input's position or is an absolute position.
>>>>
>>>> That all said, even if other txhash flag modes are needed in the future, adding TXHASH2 always remains an option.
>>>>
>>>> Interactions with potential future opcodes::
>>>>
>>>> We should give some consideration on how these opcodes may interact with future opcodes such as CAT, rolling SHA256 opcodes, or how it might interface with other covenant opcodes that may do things like, directly push input or output amounts onto the stack for computation purposes, opcodes which have been added to the Elements project.
>>>>
>>>> With CAT and/or rolling SHA256 opcodes and/or existing SHA256 opcodes, the CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY could verify signatures on programmatically assembled messages. Also, in combination with multiple calls to TXHASH, could be used to create signatures that commit to complex subsets of transaction data.
>>>>
>>>> If new opcodes are added to push parts of the transaction data direction onto the stack, e.g. OP_INSPECTOUTPUTVALUE, there is perhaps concern that they would obsolete TXHASH, since, in the presence of rolling SHA256 opcodes, TXHASH could be simulated. However, given that TXHASH can compactly create a hash of large portions of transaction data, it seems unlikely that TXHASH would fall into disuse. Also, a combination of TXHASH and transaction introspection opcodes can be used to build "subtractive covenants".
>>>>
>>>> The usual way of building a covenant, which we will call "additive covenants", is to push all the parts of the transaction data you would like to fix onto the stack, hash it all together, and verify the resulting hash matches a fixed value. Another way of building covenants, which we will call "subtractive covenants", is to push all the parts of the transaction data you would like to remain free onto the stack. Then use rolling SHA256 opcodes starting from a fixed midstate that commits to a prefix of the transaction hash data. The free parts are hashed into that midstate. Finally, the resulting hash value is verified to match a value returned by TXHASH. The ability to nicely build subtractive covenants depends on the details of how the TXHASH hash value is constructed, something that I'm told CTV has given consideration to.
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>>
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Michael Folkson [ARCHIVE] /
npub103âŚ2kpam
2023-06-07 23:02:54
in reply to nevent1qâŚczr7
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Original date posted:2022-01-28\nđ Original message:\u003e Even if we were to adopt something like TXHASH, how long is it going to take to develop, test, and release? My guess is \"a while\" - in the meantime, users of Bitcoin are without a vault strategy that doesn't require either presigning transactions with ephemeral keys (operationally difficult) or multisig configurations that would make Rube Goldberg blush (operationally difficult and precarious).\n\nTo me this seems to be jumping ahead a number of steps from where we are at the current time. If the ecosystem was widely using all the tools available to them at the current time (MuSig(2), Taproot trees to embed complex scripts, Miniscript etc), was testing out upcoming available tools like threshold key aggregation schemes (e.g. FROST) on signets and the final missing piece was a covenant opcode to avoid the deleted key requirement then the argument for urgency would be stronger. I would still share the concerns I and many others have repeated over rushing soft forks and treating mainnet as a testbed for new use cases rather than the final destination for changes that will stand the test of time. But I would be a lot more sympathetic to that argument.\n\nThis isn't a criticism of the ecosystem or individual vault projects like Revault, it is clearly still very early. darosior (Revault) is working on getting a first version of Miniscript finalized and in Core [0] and I'm assuming will be part of the effort to get Taproot support in Miniscript assuming that initial effort succeeds. Murch is tracking basic send and receive to the P2TR addresses (not complex scripts, multisig, MuSig(2), merely single key spends) in the ecosystem [1] and there is still a long way to go there.\n\nThere are a bunch of covenant opcodes that have been enabled on Liquid [2] that I haven't heard yet of anyone building vault prototypes with. It would be good to get others (TLUV, TXHASH) in future. There is not even a custom signet with CTV (as far as I know) for those who subscribe to the view that we must rush to get CTV activated on mainnet as soon as possible with no thought to what opcodes might follow.\n\nWhen this discussion focuses on the pros and cons of various proposals and how they are being tested and used in prototypes on signets, sidechains I think it is really productive. But when it gets onto urgency (or worse activation speculation) I am just perplexed. That viewpoint seems to completely ignore where we are currently with Taproot use and tooling (on which most vault designs will presumably build) and even more perplexingly where we are with vault prototypes on signets, sidechains.\n\nI am sure at some point in the future we will have various vault prototypes on signets, sidechains making use of Taproot, Miniscript, MuSig(2), FROST etc and crying out for a covenant opcode or sighash flag to go into production on mainnet. But we seem miles away from that at the present time.\n\n[0]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/24147\n[1]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Bech32_adoption\n[2]: https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/master/doc/tapscript_opcodes.md\n\n--\nMichael Folkson\nEmail: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)\nKeybase: michaelfolkson\nPGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3\n\nâââââââ Original Message âââââââ\nOn Friday, January 28th, 2022 at 12:18 AM, James O'Beirne via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\u003e I don't think implementing a CTV opcode that we expect to largely be obsoleted by a TXHASH at a later date is yielding good value from a soft fork process.\n\u003e\n\u003e This presumes the eventual adoption of TXHASH (or something like it). You're presenting a novel idea that, as far as I know, hasn't had much time to bake in public. Like Jeremy, I'm concerned by the combinatorial growth of flags and the implications that has for testing. Caching for something like TXHASH looks to me like a whole different ballgame relative to CTV, which has a single kind of hash.\n\u003e\n\u003e Even if we were to adopt something like TXHASH, how long is it going to take to develop, test, and release? My guess is \"a while\" - in the meantime, users of Bitcoin are without a vault strategy that doesn't require either presigning transactions with ephemeral keys (operationally difficult) or multisig configurations that would make Rube Goldberg blush (operationally difficult and precarious). The utility of vaulting seems underappreciated among consensus devs and it's something I'd like to write about soon in a separate post.\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e The strongest argument I can make in favour of CTV would be something like: \"We definitely want bare CTV and if we are going to add CTV to legacy script (since we cannot use TXHASH in legacy script), then it is actually easier not to exclude it from tapscript, even if we plan to add TXHASH to tapscript as well.\"\n\u003e\n\u003e Another argument for CTV (which I find especially persuasive) is its simplicity - it's relatively easy to reason about and, at this point, pretty well understood. It seems like a low-risk change relative to some of the other covenant proposals, nearly all of which elicit a good deal of headscratching (at least from me) and seem to require not only larger on-chain footprints but sizable code changes.\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I am sensitive to technical debt and soft fork processes\n\u003e\n\u003e If OP_CTV ends up being the most practical approach for vaulting - among other things - in terms of weight (which it seems to be at the moment) I don't think \"technical debt\" is an applicable term.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 5:20 PM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I am sensitive to technical debt and soft fork processes, and I don't believe I'm unordinary particular about these issues. Once implemented, opcodes must be supported and maintained indefinitely. Some opcodes are easier to maintain than others. These particular opcodes involve caching of hash computations and, for that reason, I would judge them to be of moderate complexity.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e But more importantly, soft-forks are inherently a risky process, so we should be getting as much value out of them as we reasonably can. I don't think implementing a CTV opcode that we expect to largely be obsoleted by a TXHASH at a later date is yielding good value from a soft fork process.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e The strongest argument I can make in favour of CTV would be something like: \"We definitely want bare CTV and if we are going to add CTV to legacy script (since we cannot use TXHASH in legacy script), then it is actually easier not to exclude it from tapscript, even if we plan to add TXHASH to tapscript as well.\"\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e But that argument basically rests the entire value of CTV on the shoulders of bare CTV. As I understand, the argument for why we want bare CTV, instead of just letting people use tapscript, involves the finer details of weight calculations, and I haven't really reviewed that aspect yet. I think it would need to be pretty compelling to make it worthwhile to add CTV for that one use case.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Regarding \"OP_TXHASH+CSFSV doesn't seem to be the 'full' set of things needed\", I totally agree we will want more things such as CAT, rolling SHA256 opcodes, wider arithmetic, pushing amounts onto the stack, some kind of tapleaf manipulation and/or TWEAKVERIFY. For now, I only want to argue TXHASH+CSFSV is better than CTV+APO because it gives us more value, namely oracle signature verification. In particular, I want to argue that TXHASH's push semantics is better that CTV's verify semantics because it composes better by not needing to carry an extra 32-bytes (per instance) in the witness data. I expect that in a world of full recursive covenants, TXHASH would still be useful as a fast and cheap way to verify the \"payload\" of these covenants, i.e. that a transaction is paying a certain, possibly large, set of addresses certain specific amounts of money. And even if not, TXHASH+CSFSV would still be the way that eltoo would be implemented under this proposal.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 5:16 PM Jeremy \u003cjlrubin at mit.edu\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Hi Russell,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Thanks for this email, it's great to see this approach described.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e A few preliminary notes of feedback:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 1) a Verify approach can be made to work for OP_TXHASH (even with CTV as-is) E.g., suppose a semantic added for a single byte stack[-1] sighash flag to read the hash at stack[-2], then the hash can be passed in instead of put on the stack. This has the disadvantage of larger witnesses, but the advantage of allowing undefined sighash flags to pass for any hash type.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 2) using the internal key for APO covenants is not an option because it makes transaction construction interactive and precludes contracts with a NUMS point taproot key. Instead, if you want similar savings, you should advocate an OP_GENERATOR which puts G on the stack. Further, an untagged APO variant which has split R and S values would permit something like \u003csig\u003e OP_GENERATOR OP_GENERATOR CHECKSIGAPO, which would be only 2 more bytes than CTV.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 3) I count something like 20 different flags in your proposal. As long as flags are under 40 bytes (and 32 assuming we want it to be easy) without upgrading math this should be feasible to manipulate on the stack programmatically. This is ignoring some of the more flexible additions you mention about picking which outputs/inputs are included. However, 20 flags means that for testing we would want comprehensive tests and understanding for ~1 million different flag combos and the behaviors they expose. I think this necessitates a formal model of scripting and transaction validity properties. Are there any combinations that might be undesirable?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 4) Just hashing or not hashing isn't actually that flexible, because it doesn't natively let you do things like (for example) TLUV. You really do need tx operations for directly manipulating the data on the stack to construct the hash if you want more flexible covenants. This happens to be compatible with either a Verify or Push approach, since you either destructure a pushed hash or build up a hash for a verify.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 5) Flexible hashing has the potential for quadratic hashing bugs. The fields you propose seem to be within similar range to work you could cause with a regular OP_HASH256, although you'd want to be careful with some of the proposed extensions that you don't create risk of quadratic hashing, which seems possible with an output selecting opcode unless you cache properly (which might be tricky to do). Overall for the fields explicitly mentioned, seems safe, the \"possibles\" seem to have some more complex interactions. E.g., CTV with the ability to pick a subset of outputs would be exposed to quadratic hashing.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 6) Missing field: covering the annex or some sub-range of the annex (quadratic hashing issues on the latter)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e 7) It seems simpler to, for many of these fields, push values directly (as in OP_PUSHTXDATA from Johnson Lau) because the combo of flags to push the hash of a single output's amount to emulate OP_AMOUNT looks 'general but annoying'. It may make more sense to do the OP_PUSHTXDATA style opcode instead. This also makes it simpler to think about the combinations of flags, since it's really N independent multi-byte opcodes.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Ultimately if we had OP_TXHASH available \"tomorrow\", I would be able to build out the use cases I care about for CTV (and more). So I don't have an opposition on it with regards to lack of function.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e However, if one finds the TXHASH approach acceptable, then you should also be relatively fine doing APO, CTV, CSFS, TXHASH acceptable in any order (whenever \"ready\"), unless you are particularly sensitive to \"technical debt\" and \"soft fork processes\". The only costs of doing something for CTV or APO given an eventual TXHASH is perhaps a wasted key version or the 32 byte argument of a NOP opcode and some code to maintain.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Are there other costs I am missing?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e However, as it pertains to actual rollout:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - OP_TXHASH+CSFSV doesn't seem to be the \"full\" set of things needed (we still need e.g. OP_CAT, Upgraded \u003e=64 bit Math, TLUV or OP_TWEAK OP_TAPBRANCH OP_MANIPULATETAPTREE, and more) to full realize covenanting power it intends to introduce.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - What sort of timeline would it take to ready something like TXHASH (and desired friends) given greater scope of testing and analysis (standalone + compared to CTV)?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Is there opposition from the community to this degree of general/recursive covenants?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Does it make \"more sense\" to invest the research and development effort that would go into proving TXHASH safe, for example, into Simplicity instead?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Overall, my opinion is that:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - TXHASH is an acceptable theoretical approach, and I am happy to put more thought into it and maybe draft a prototype of it.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - I prefer CTV as a first step for pragmatic engineering and availability timeline reasons.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - If TXHASH were to take, optimistically, 2 years to develop and review, and then 1 year to activate, the \"path dependence of software\" would put Bitcoin in a much better place were we to have CTV within 1 year and applications (that are to be a subset of TXHASH later) being built over the next few years enhanced in the future by TXHASH's availability.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - There is an element of expediency meritted for something like CTV insofar as it provides primitives to tackle time sensitive issues around privacy, scalability, self custody, and decentralization. The aforementioned properties may be difficult to reclaim once given away (with the exception of perhaps scalability).\n\u003e\u003e\u003e - Bringing CTV to an implemented state of near-unanimous \"we could do this, technically\" is good for concretely driving the process of review for any covenant proposals forward, irrespective of if we ultimately activate. (I.e., if there were a reason we could not do CTV safely, it would likely have implications for any other future covenant)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Concretely, I'm not going to stop advocating for CTV based on the above, but I'm very happy to have something new in the mix to consider!\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Best,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Jeremy\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e\u003e\u003e [@JeremyRubin](https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin)https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 9:23 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Recapping the relationship between CTV and ANYPREVOUT::\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e It is known that there is a significant amount of overlap in the applications that are enabled by the CTV and ANYPREVOUT proposals despite the fact that their primary applications (congestion control for CTV and eltoo lightning channels for ANYPREVOUT) are quite distinct.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e In particular, ANYPREVOUT can enable most of the applications of CTV, albeit with a higher cost. The primary functionality of CTV is to allow a scriptPubKey to make a commitment to its spending transaction's hash with the input's TXID excluded from the hash. This exclusion is necessary because the scriptPubKey is hashed into the input's TXID, and including the TXID would cause a cycle of hash commitments, which is impossible to construct. On the other hand, ANYPREVOUT defines a signature hash mode that similarly excludes the inputs TXID for its purpose of rebindable signatures.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e This means that ANYPREVOUT can mimic most of the properties of CTV by committing both a public key along with an ANYPREVOUT signature inside scriptPubKey. In fact, the only reason Bitcoin doesn't have covenants today is due to this cycle between scriptPubKeys and the TXIDs that occur in all the sighash modes.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e The major differences between simulating CTV via ANYPREVOUT and the actual CTV proposal is: (1) The cost of simulating CTV. With CTV the spending transaction is committed using a hash of 32 bytes, while simulating it with ANYPREVOUT requires 64 bytes for a signature, and 32 bytes for some public key, plus a few more bytes for various flags. Some of that cost could be reduced by using the inner public key (1 byte representation) and, if we had CAT, maybe by assembling the signature from reusable pieces (i.e. setting the nonce of the commited signature equal to the public key).\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e The other major difference is: (2) CTV's transaction hash covers values such as the number of inputs in the transaction and their sequence numbers, which ANYPREVOUT does not cover. CTV's hash contains enough information so that when combined with the missing TXIDs, you can compute the TXID of the spending transaction. In particular if the number of inputs is committed to being 1, once the scriptpubkey's transaction id is known and committed to the blockchain, the TXID of its spending transaction is deducible. And if that transaction has outputs that have CTV commitments in them, you can deduce their spending TXIDs in turn. While this is a pretty neat feature, something that ANYPREVOUT cannot mimic, the main application for it is listed as using congestion control to fund lightning channels, fixing their TXIDs in advance of them being placed on chain. However, if ANYPREVOUT were used to mimic CTV, then likely it would be eltoo channels that would be funded, and it isn't necessary to know the TXIDs of eltoo channels in advance in order to use them.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e An Alternative Proposal::\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Given the overlap in functionality between CTV and ANYPREVOUT, I think it makes sense to decompose their operations into their constituent pieces and reassemble their behaviour programmatically. To this end, I'd like to instead propose OP_TXHASH and OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e OP_TXHASH would pop a txhash flag from the stack and compute a (tagged) txhash in accordance with that flag, and push the resulting hash onto the stack.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY would pop a pubkey, message, and signature from the stack and fail if the signature does not verify on that message.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e CTV and TXHASH have roughly equivalent functionality. 'CTV DROP' can be simulated by '\u003cctv_style_flag\u003e TXHASH EQUALVERIFY'. The reverse is also true where '\u003cctv_style_flag\u003e TXHASH' can be simulated by CTV by '\u003cctv-result-from-witness-stack\u003e CTV', however, as you can see, simulating TXHASH from CTV is much more expensive than the other way around, because the resulting 32-byte hash result must be included as part of the witness stack.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e '\u003canyprevout-pubkey\u003e CHECKSIGVERIFY can be simulated by '\u003capo_style_flag\u003e TXHASH \u003cpubkey\u003e CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY'. Here we see the advantage of pushing the hash value onto the stack. APO can be simulated without needing to include a copy of the resulting txhash inside the witness data.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e In addition to the CTV and ANYPREVOUT applications, with CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY we can verify signatures on arbitrary messages signed by oracles for oracle applications. This is where we see the benefit of decomposing operations into primitive pieces. By giving users the ability to program their own use cases from components, we get more applications out of fewer op codes!\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Caveats::\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e First, I acknowledge that replicating the behaviour of CTV and ANYPREVOUT does cost a few more bytes than using the custom purpose built proposals themselves. That is the price to be paid when we choose the ability to program solutions from pieces. But we get to reap the advantages of being able to build more applications from these pieces.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Unlike CTV, TXHASH is not NOP-compatable and can only be implemented within tapscript. In particular, bare CTV isn't possible with this proposal. However, this proposal doesn't preclude the possibility of having CTV added to legacy script in while having TXHASH added to tapscript.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e For similar reasons, TXHASH is not amenable to extending the set of txflags at a later date. In theory, one could have TXHASH abort-with-success when encountering an unknown set of flags. However, this would make analyzing tapscript much more difficult. Tapscripts would then be able to abort with success or failure depending on the order script fragments are assembled and executed, and getting the order incorrect would be catastrophic. This behavior is manifestly different from the current batch of OP_SUCCESS opcodes that abort-with-success just by their mere presence, whether they would be executed or not.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e I believe the difficulties with upgrading TXHASH can be mitigated by designing a robust set of TXHASH flags from the start. For example having bits to control whether (1) the version is covered; (2) the locktime is covered; (3) txids are covered; (4) sequence numbers are covered; (5) input amounts are covered; (6) input scriptpubkeys are covered; (7) number of inputs is covered; (8) output amounts are covered; (9) output scriptpubkeys are covered; (10) number of outputs is covered; (11) the tapbranch is covered; (12) the tapleaf is covered; (13) the opseparator value is covered; (14) whether all, one, or no inputs are covered; (15) whether all, one or no outputs are covered; (16) whether the one input position is covered; (17) whether the one output position is covered; (18) whether the sighash flags are covered or not (note: whether or not the sighash flags are or are not covered must itself be covered). Possibly specifying which input or output position is covered in the single case and whether the position is relative to the input's position or is an absolute position.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e That all said, even if other txhash flag modes are needed in the future, adding TXHASH2 always remains an option.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Interactions with potential future opcodes::\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e We should give some consideration on how these opcodes may interact with future opcodes such as CAT, rolling SHA256 opcodes, or how it might interface with other covenant opcodes that may do things like, directly push input or output amounts onto the stack for computation purposes, opcodes which have been added to the Elements project.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e With CAT and/or rolling SHA256 opcodes and/or existing SHA256 opcodes, the CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY could verify signatures on programmatically assembled messages. Also, in combination with multiple calls to TXHASH, could be used to create signatures that commit to complex subsets of transaction data.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e If new opcodes are added to push parts of the transaction data direction onto the stack, e.g. OP_INSPECTOUTPUTVALUE, there is perhaps concern that they would obsolete TXHASH, since, in the presence of rolling SHA256 opcodes, TXHASH could be simulated. However, given that TXHASH can compactly create a hash of large portions of transaction data, it seems unlikely that TXHASH would fall into disuse. Also, a combination of TXHASH and transaction introspection opcodes can be used to build \"subtractive covenants\".\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e The usual way of building a covenant, which we will call \"additive covenants\", is to push all the parts of the transaction data you would like to fix onto the stack, hash it all together, and verify the resulting hash matches a fixed value. Another way of building covenants, which we will call \"subtractive covenants\", is to push all the parts of the transaction data you would like to remain free onto the stack. Then use rolling SHA256 opcodes starting from a fixed midstate that commits to a prefix of the transaction hash data. The free parts are hashed into that midstate. Finally, the resulting hash value is verified to match a value returned by TXHASH. The ability to nicely build subtractive covenants depends on the details of how the TXHASH hash value is constructed, something that I'm told CTV has given consideration to.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220128/4df9e5b2/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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