š
Original date posted:2016-12-11
š Original message:How is the adverse scenario you describe different from a plain old 51%
attack? Each proposed protocol change where 51% or more of the network
can potentially game the rules and break the system should be considered
just as acceptable/unacceptable as another.
There comes a point where some form of basic honesty must be assumed on
behalf of participants benefiting from the system working properly and
reliably.
Afterall, what magic line of code prohibits all miners from simultaneously
turning all their equipment off... just because?
Maybe this 'one':
"As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not
cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and
outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure."
Is there such a thing as an unrecognizable 51% attack? One where the
remaining 49% get dragged in against their will?
Daniele
On Dec 10, 2016 6:39 PM, "Pieter Wuille" <pieter.wuille at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 4:23 AM, Daniele Pinna via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> We have models for estimating the probability that a block is orphaned
>> given average network bandwidth and block size.
>>
>> The question is, do we have objective measures of these two quantities?
>> Couldn't we target an orphan_rate < max_rate?
>>
>
> Models can predict orphan rate given block size and network/hashrate
> topology, but you can't control the topology (and things like FIBRE hide
> the effect of block size on this as well). The result is that if you're
> purely optimizing for minimal orphan rate, you can end up with a single
> (conglomerate of) pools producing all the blocks. Such a setup has no
> propagation delay at all, and as a result can always achieve 0 orphans.
>
> Cheers,
>
> --
> Pieter
>
>
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Daniele Pinna [ARCHIVE] /
npub16zā¦jg59c
2023-06-07 17:54:54
in reply to nevent1qā¦7cul
Author Public Key
npub16z2msvydkmd6xsjyrggnavcwrlpevfwq74x5avxrkg2dpq7cg6js5jg59cPublished at
2023-06-07 17:54:54Event JSON
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Original date posted:2016-12-11\nš Original message:How is the adverse scenario you describe different from a plain old 51%\nattack? Each proposed protocol change where 51% or more of the network\ncan potentially game the rules and break the system should be considered\njust as acceptable/unacceptable as another.\n\nThere comes a point where some form of basic honesty must be assumed on\nbehalf of participants benefiting from the system working properly and\nreliably.\n\nAfterall, what magic line of code prohibits all miners from simultaneously\nturning all their equipment off... just because?\n\nMaybe this 'one':\n\n\"As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not\ncooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and\noutpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure.\"\n\nIs there such a thing as an unrecognizable 51% attack? One where the\nremaining 49% get dragged in against their will?\n\nDaniele\n\nOn Dec 10, 2016 6:39 PM, \"Pieter Wuille\" \u003cpieter.wuille at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 4:23 AM, Daniele Pinna via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e We have models for estimating the probability that a block is orphaned\n\u003e\u003e given average network bandwidth and block size.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e The question is, do we have objective measures of these two quantities?\n\u003e\u003e Couldn't we target an orphan_rate \u003c max_rate?\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Models can predict orphan rate given block size and network/hashrate\n\u003e topology, but you can't control the topology (and things like FIBRE hide\n\u003e the effect of block size on this as well). The result is that if you're\n\u003e purely optimizing for minimal orphan rate, you can end up with a single\n\u003e (conglomerate of) pools producing all the blocks. Such a setup has no\n\u003e propagation delay at all, and as a result can always achieve 0 orphans.\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e Pieter\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20161211/53c05206/attachment.html\u003e",
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