📅 Original date posted:2023-03-03
🗒️ Summary of this message: Proposal for a new protocol rule, min_fees, where miners set a minimum fee for the next block to increase network security and incentivize higher fees.
📝 Original message:This will indeed give some power to the miners. But they have no incentives
in posting super high numbers as that means they won't get paid or they
will with a lot of delay.
This is not simply like setting the price for a product that has a fixed
quality. In the case of the mining services, setting the price also means
setting the quality of the product you offer (as higher price = higher
security). This is simply a way to let miners have have a say about the
quality of the product that they offer. They can always set 0 min fees and
settle for the lowest quality/ low price service, or maybe find out that
offering a better product for a higher price actually makes them more
money.
On Fri, Mar 3, 2023, 3:45 AM WMOURA <neo.m.revolutions at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> In my amateur opinion, I imagine that this would give excessive power to the miner, introducing a bug in the system, because if the miner put an absurdly high minimum rate intentionally or not, this would cause a serious problem, or not.
>
>
> Em qua., 1 de mar. de 2023 às 17:25, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> escreveu:
>
>> Hello everyone,
>>
>> I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been
>> discussed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.
>>
>> I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the
>> base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large
>> transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.
>>
>> In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are
>> very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is
>> enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher
>> fees as they know that that would increase the network security, however
>> nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like
>> being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they
>> just stay low because that's the only rational individual choice.
>>
>> Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule,
>> min_fees, that would work like this:
>> - the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the
>> block, specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the
>> following block in order for it to be valid.
>> - one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the
>> chain getting stuck.
>>
>> min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or
>> the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value
>> transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. Of
>> course min_fees=0 would correspond to the current situation.
>>
>> It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the
>> equilibrium closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually
>> optimal), and to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course
>> it's just a rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was
>> just interested in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit
>> or if it's not even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not
>> considering.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Giuseppe.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
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Giuseppe B [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sp…2z75w
2023-06-07 23:20:14
in reply to nevent1q…pltv
Author Public Key
npub1spdrln2clr763n86lhsx7g9hpu0w5cv9hasv4amyyqdde96r7h8s72z75wPublished at
2023-06-07 23:20:14Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2023-03-03\n🗒️ Summary of this message: Proposal for a new protocol rule, min_fees, where miners set a minimum fee for the next block to increase network security and incentivize higher fees.\n📝 Original message:This will indeed give some power to the miners. But they have no incentives\nin posting super high numbers as that means they won't get paid or they\nwill with a lot of delay.\nThis is not simply like setting the price for a product that has a fixed\nquality. In the case of the mining services, setting the price also means\nsetting the quality of the product you offer (as higher price = higher\nsecurity). This is simply a way to let miners have have a say about the\nquality of the product that they offer. They can always set 0 min fees and\nsettle for the lowest quality/ low price service, or maybe find out that\noffering a better product for a higher price actually makes them more\nmoney.\n\n\n\nOn Fri, Mar 3, 2023, 3:45 AM WMOURA \u003cneo.m.revolutions at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hello,\n\u003e\n\u003e In my amateur opinion, I imagine that this would give excessive power to the miner, introducing a bug in the system, because if the miner put an absurdly high minimum rate intentionally or not, this would cause a serious problem, or not.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Em qua., 1 de mar. de 2023 às 17:25, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e escreveu:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Hello everyone,\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been\n\u003e\u003e discussed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the\n\u003e\u003e base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large\n\u003e\u003e transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are\n\u003e\u003e very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is\n\u003e\u003e enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher\n\u003e\u003e fees as they know that that would increase the network security, however\n\u003e\u003e nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like\n\u003e\u003e being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they\n\u003e\u003e just stay low because that's the only rational individual choice.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule,\n\u003e\u003e min_fees, that would work like this:\n\u003e\u003e - the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the\n\u003e\u003e block, specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the\n\u003e\u003e following block in order for it to be valid.\n\u003e\u003e - one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the\n\u003e\u003e chain getting stuck.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or\n\u003e\u003e the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value\n\u003e\u003e transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. Of\n\u003e\u003e course min_fees=0 would correspond to the current situation.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the\n\u003e\u003e equilibrium closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually\n\u003e\u003e optimal), and to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course\n\u003e\u003e it's just a rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was\n\u003e\u003e just interested in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit\n\u003e\u003e or if it's not even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not\n\u003e\u003e considering.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Giuseppe.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20230303/62aece2e/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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