📅 Original date posted:2014-08-19
📝 Original message:On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>
> Don't let perfect be the enemy of good.
>
I'm not. I don't think this proposal is even good.
> You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a "weak
> passive attacker" They do *not* have the ability to attack more than a
> small, targeted, subset of connection for both technical and political
> reasons. For starters, MITM attacks are easily detected - "Bitcoin network
> attacked by unknown agents! Has your ISP been compromised?" would make for
> great headlines and would soon see the problem fixed both technically and
> politically.
>
>
Again, the NSA might get an absolutely trivial amount of data from
monitoring connections on the Bitcoin network. A bit of publicity is *not*
worth drastically increasing the software complexity of the client.
> In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by default
> adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.
Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely huge
attack surface.
And you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to
Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect is
pretty much useless for us.
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William Yager [ARCHIVE] /
npub1mt…qzgqk
2023-06-07 15:25:23
in reply to nevent1q…myw9
Author Public Key
npub1mtzsyxnmqze93rehd90508tdg7k4mwktknmtamqam55446tkaq7qnqzgqkPublished at
2023-06-07 15:25:23Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-08-19\n📝 Original message:On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e Don't let perfect be the enemy of good.\n\u003e\n\nI'm not. I don't think this proposal is even good.\n\n\n\u003e You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a \"weak\n\u003e passive attacker\" They do *not* have the ability to attack more than a\n\u003e small, targeted, subset of connection for both technical and political\n\u003e reasons. For starters, MITM attacks are easily detected - \"Bitcoin network\n\u003e attacked by unknown agents! Has your ISP been compromised?\" would make for\n\u003e great headlines and would soon see the problem fixed both technically and\n\u003e politically.\n\u003e\n\u003e\nAgain, the NSA might get an absolutely trivial amount of data from\nmonitoring connections on the Bitcoin network. A bit of publicity is *not*\nworth drastically increasing the software complexity of the client.\n\n\n\u003e In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by default\n\u003e adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.\n\n\nEnabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely huge\nattack surface.\n\nAnd you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to\nBitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect is\npretty much useless for us.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140819/ce8073c6/attachment.html\u003e",
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