📅 Original date posted:2018-09-17
📝 Original message:> Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
small to make a profit.
The share (hash power) of a miner is proportional to capital investment, not the newness of that investment. The efficiency of a new mine (inclusive of pooling pressures) can certainly be sufficient to outperform other miners, resulting in the departure of the latter, thus not preventing the entry of the former.
The point you should be making here is that energy consumption is regulated by the cost of capital (in addition to reward value and the cost of energy).
Note that higher efficiency mining does not reduce energy consumption, nor does variation in the necessary cost of mining hardware. The total energy cost is the control, not the hash rate. This is of course why proof-of-memory (space) is pointless. It simply shifts most of the energy cost to hardware manufacture, shipment, etc.
e
On Sep 17, 2018, at 06:18, Andrew <onelineproof at gmail.com> wrote:
>> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
>
> In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more
> than the peak hashrate). As long as hashrate is rising and still
> didn't reach the target, miners will incrementally get the reserve
> fees. Once the "contract" times out, the remaining part can be used as
> fees by the users who created the reserve fee "contract". So if
> hashrate remains the same or falls, then users get the reserve fees
> back.
>
> I agree that we can't stop people from being greedy. If they are not
> Bitcoin mining, they will try to put their energy to earn in some
> other way...The hashrate is related the demand for Bitcoin (price) and
> the amount of fees/subsidies the miners will get paid. For every level
> of mining rewards (based on demand) there exists a limit on the
> hashrate. Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
> hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
> small to make a profit.
>
> Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in
> the future. But of course I sympathize with the "don't be greedy"
> philosophy, and it can be good to educate people to use less resources
> than they need, just I think it's a bit outside of the scope of what
> the Bitcoin software protocol does.
Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sg…ppx3c
2023-06-07 18:14:25
in reply to nevent1q…ucdf
Author Public Key
npub1sgs97fe0n9wehe6zw7drcxdz4cy9yt9pfqjv8gasz5jlk4zezc0quppx3cPublished at
2023-06-07 18:14:25Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-09-17\n📝 Original message:\u003e Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional\nhashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too\nsmall to make a profit.\n\nThe share (hash power) of a miner is proportional to capital investment, not the newness of that investment. The efficiency of a new mine (inclusive of pooling pressures) can certainly be sufficient to outperform other miners, resulting in the departure of the latter, thus not preventing the entry of the former.\n\nThe point you should be making here is that energy consumption is regulated by the cost of capital (in addition to reward value and the cost of energy).\n\nNote that higher efficiency mining does not reduce energy consumption, nor does variation in the necessary cost of mining hardware. The total energy cost is the control, not the hash rate. This is of course why proof-of-memory (space) is pointless. It simply shifts most of the energy cost to hardware manufacture, shipment, etc.\n\ne\n\nOn Sep 17, 2018, at 06:18, Andrew \u003conelineproof at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\u003e I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says \"And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising,\" - what actually happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?\n\u003e \n\u003e In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more\n\u003e than the peak hashrate). As long as hashrate is rising and still\n\u003e didn't reach the target, miners will incrementally get the reserve\n\u003e fees. Once the \"contract\" times out, the remaining part can be used as\n\u003e fees by the users who created the reserve fee \"contract\". So if\n\u003e hashrate remains the same or falls, then users get the reserve fees\n\u003e back.\n\u003e \n\u003e I agree that we can't stop people from being greedy. If they are not\n\u003e Bitcoin mining, they will try to put their energy to earn in some\n\u003e other way...The hashrate is related the demand for Bitcoin (price) and\n\u003e the amount of fees/subsidies the miners will get paid. For every level\n\u003e of mining rewards (based on demand) there exists a limit on the\n\u003e hashrate. Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional\n\u003e hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too\n\u003e small to make a profit.\n\u003e \n\u003e Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in\n\u003e the future. But of course I sympathize with the \"don't be greedy\"\n\u003e philosophy, and it can be good to educate people to use less resources\n\u003e than they need, just I think it's a bit outside of the scope of what\n\u003e the Bitcoin software protocol does.",
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