📅 Original date posted:2014-04-10
📝 Original message:On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:12 PM, Tier Nolan <tier.nolan at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> If you trust hashrate for determining which UTXO set is valid, a 51%
>> attack becomes worse in that you can be made to believe a version of
>> history which is in fact invalid.
>
>
> If there are invalidation proofs, then this isn't strictly true.
I'm aware of fraud proofs, and they're a very cool idea. They allow
you to leverage some "herd immunity" in the system (assuming you'll be
told about invalid data you received without actually validating it).
However, they are certainly not the same thing as zero trust security
a fully validating node offers.
For example, a sybil attack that hides the actual best chain + fraud
proofs from you, plus being fed a chain that commits to an invalid
UTXO set.
There are many ideas that make attacks harder, and they're probably
good ideas to deploy, but there is little that achieves the security
of a full node. (well, perhaps a zero-knowledge proof of having run
the validation code against the claimed chain tip to produce the known
UTXO set...).
--
Pieter
Pieter Wuille [ARCHIVE] /
npub1tj…jtl6r
2023-06-07 15:18:32
in reply to nevent1q…9gg7
Author Public Key
npub1tjephawh7fdf6358jufuh5eyxwauzrjqa7qn50pglee4tayc2ntqcjtl6rPublished at
2023-06-07 15:18:32Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-04-10\n📝 Original message:On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 10:12 PM, Tier Nolan \u003ctier.nolan at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 7:32 PM, Pieter Wuille \u003cpieter.wuille at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e If you trust hashrate for determining which UTXO set is valid, a 51%\n\u003e\u003e attack becomes worse in that you can be made to believe a version of\n\u003e\u003e history which is in fact invalid.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e If there are invalidation proofs, then this isn't strictly true.\n\nI'm aware of fraud proofs, and they're a very cool idea. They allow\nyou to leverage some \"herd immunity\" in the system (assuming you'll be\ntold about invalid data you received without actually validating it).\nHowever, they are certainly not the same thing as zero trust security\na fully validating node offers.\n\nFor example, a sybil attack that hides the actual best chain + fraud\nproofs from you, plus being fed a chain that commits to an invalid\nUTXO set.\n\nThere are many ideas that make attacks harder, and they're probably\ngood ideas to deploy, but there is little that achieves the security\nof a full node. (well, perhaps a zero-knowledge proof of having run\nthe validation code against the claimed chain tip to produce the known\nUTXO set...).\n-- \nPieter",
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