📅 Original date posted:2017-02-10
📝 Original message:
Well two transactions to be confirmed is not too bad. Approximately 30
minutes. Compare that to the time it takes to apply for a prepaid debit
card.
So we have two possibilities so far without segwit: one transaction to be
confirmed but definite channel lifetime.
Or two transactions to be confirmed but indefinite channel lifetime.
Not sure yet what is the best from user perspective as channel renewal can
be done in the background.
On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 2:51 AM, "Christopher Jämthagen" <cjamthagen at gmx.com
> wrote:
> Two-layer HTLCs still need a malleability fix or some other workaround to
> avoid excessive timeouts.
>
> /Christopher
>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 08, 2017 at 5:16 AM
> *From:* "Nicolas Dorier" <nicolas.dorier at gmail.com>
> *To:* "Tier Nolan" <tier.nolan at gmail.com>
> *Cc:* lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> *Subject:* Re: [Lightning-dev] Anchor transaction for no expiration
> channels without segwit
> With this solution, is there any problem left without Segwit outside no
> third party channel monitoring and channel establishment which need to wait
> Bob bounty expiration ?
>
> On Tue, Feb 7, 2017 at 9:02 PM, Tier Nolan <tier.nolan at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 7, 2017 at 2:39 AM, Nicolas Dorier <nicolas.dorier at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Good point, actually, a simpler way to do it, is for TX2 to be
>>> nTimelocked after bounty's expiration.
>>>
>>
>> That works too and keeps the transaction smaller.
>>
>> I think a symmetrically funded channel needs 4 1BTC outputs, so it is
>> pretty much two single funded channels. It would be slightly smaller than
>> 2 transactions to open the channel.
>>
>> TX1
>>
>> Input
>> 2 from Alice
>> 2 from Bob
>>
>> Output
>> 1: (Alice + Bob) OR (Bob + AliceSecret)
>> 1: (Alice + Bob) OR (Alice + BobSecret)
>> 1: (Bob + timeout(now + T)) OR (Alice + AliceSecret)
>> 1: (Alice + timeout(now + T)) OR (Bob + BobSecret)
>>
>> TX2
>> locktime: now + 2T
>>
>> Input
>> TX1/0: signed by (Alice + Bob)
>> TX1/1: signed by (Alice + Bob)
>> Output
>> Initial channel paying Alice & Bob 1BTC each
>>
>> ---------------------------------------
>>
>> Alice and Bob create TX1, sign it and share the result.
>>
>> Alice and Bob create TX2, sign it and share the result.
>>
>> Abort for those 2 steps:
>> * If one signs and the other doesn't then the signer should spend their
>> inputs to be safe.
>> * If TX1 is broadcast, then they can both spend their timeouts to
>> recover their funds, so it is safe.
>>
>> Once they both have signed versions of TX1 and TX2, they should broadcast
>> TX1. This initializes the channel.
>>
>> If TX1 is mutated, then they should both abort and spend their timeouts
>> and recover their funds.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Lightning-dev mailing list
>> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>>
>
> _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing
> list Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>
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Nicolas Dorier [ARCHIVE] /
npub1hu…9q4u3
2023-06-09 12:47:03
in reply to nevent1q…kwd0
Author Public Key
npub1huz53hq26gu7nc0qhw3uj6tr9hk5q2ngpywduxep5zy4ay9unftsm9q4u3Published at
2023-06-09 12:47:03Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-02-10\n📝 Original message:\nWell two transactions to be confirmed is not too bad. Approximately 30\nminutes. Compare that to the time it takes to apply for a prepaid debit\ncard.\n\nSo we have two possibilities so far without segwit: one transaction to be\nconfirmed but definite channel lifetime.\nOr two transactions to be confirmed but indefinite channel lifetime.\n\nNot sure yet what is the best from user perspective as channel renewal can\nbe done in the background.\n\nOn Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 2:51 AM, \"Christopher Jämthagen\" \u003ccjamthagen at gmx.com\n\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Two-layer HTLCs still need a malleability fix or some other workaround to\n\u003e avoid excessive timeouts.\n\u003e\n\u003e /Christopher\n\u003e\n\u003e *Sent:* Wednesday, February 08, 2017 at 5:16 AM\n\u003e *From:* \"Nicolas Dorier\" \u003cnicolas.dorier at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e *To:* \"Tier Nolan\" \u003ctier.nolan at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e *Cc:* lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e *Subject:* Re: [Lightning-dev] Anchor transaction for no expiration\n\u003e channels without segwit\n\u003e With this solution, is there any problem left without Segwit outside no\n\u003e third party channel monitoring and channel establishment which need to wait\n\u003e Bob bounty expiration ?\n\u003e\n\u003e On Tue, Feb 7, 2017 at 9:02 PM, Tier Nolan \u003ctier.nolan at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Tue, Feb 7, 2017 at 2:39 AM, Nicolas Dorier \u003cnicolas.dorier at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Good point, actually, a simpler way to do it, is for TX2 to be\n\u003e\u003e\u003e nTimelocked after bounty's expiration.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e That works too and keeps the transaction smaller.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I think a symmetrically funded channel needs 4 1BTC outputs, so it is\n\u003e\u003e pretty much two single funded channels. It would be slightly smaller than\n\u003e\u003e 2 transactions to open the channel.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e TX1\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Input\n\u003e\u003e 2 from Alice\n\u003e\u003e 2 from Bob\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Output\n\u003e\u003e 1: (Alice + Bob) OR (Bob + AliceSecret)\n\u003e\u003e 1: (Alice + Bob) OR (Alice + BobSecret)\n\u003e\u003e 1: (Bob + timeout(now + T)) OR (Alice + AliceSecret)\n\u003e\u003e 1: (Alice + timeout(now + T)) OR (Bob + BobSecret)\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e TX2\n\u003e\u003e locktime: now + 2T\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Input\n\u003e\u003e TX1/0: signed by (Alice + Bob)\n\u003e\u003e TX1/1: signed by (Alice + Bob)\n\u003e\u003e Output\n\u003e\u003e Initial channel paying Alice \u0026 Bob 1BTC each\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e ---------------------------------------\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Alice and Bob create TX1, sign it and share the result.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Alice and Bob create TX2, sign it and share the result.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Abort for those 2 steps:\n\u003e\u003e * If one signs and the other doesn't then the signer should spend their\n\u003e\u003e inputs to be safe.\n\u003e\u003e * If TX1 is broadcast, then they can both spend their timeouts to\n\u003e\u003e recover their funds, so it is safe.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Once they both have signed versions of TX1 and TX2, they should broadcast\n\u003e\u003e TX1. This initializes the channel.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e If TX1 is mutated, then they should both abort and spend their timeouts\n\u003e\u003e and recover their funds.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing\n\u003e list Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20170210/a5c4bb17/attachment.html\u003e",
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