4. Central Banks May *Intentionally* Withhold Liquidity at the Right Moment**
Webb implies a darker possibility: that **money printing is not a guaranteed lifeline**. In a controlled demolition scenario:
- Central banks could withhold liquidity **at a strategic moment** (like in 2008 with Lehman).
- This would trigger a cascade of failures, allowing creditors to take possession of pledged collateral.
- After the seizure is complete, QE could resume—but **only after assets have changed hands**.
> “Liquidity will not be used to save the public; it will be timed to transfer wealth first, then restore ‘order.’”
quotingWhy wouldn't money printing prevent Webb's thesis from playing out?
note1t3w…apjw
### ChatGPT said:
David Webb addresses this question implicitly throughout *The Great Taking*, and the core of his argument is this: **money printing (i.e., quantitative easing or QE)** does not prevent his thesis from playing out—in fact, it may facilitate or *disguise* the process that leads to the "great taking."
Here’s a breakdown of why money printing doesn't negate (and may even support) Webb’s core warnings:
### **1. Money Printing Delays the Collapse, It Doesn't Solve Structural Risk**
Webb argues that QE is a temporary fix that masks the underlying fragility of the system. By injecting liquidity into markets, central banks can:
- Prevent defaults *temporarily* by propping up asset prices.
- Keep heavily indebted institutions solvent on paper.
- Enable the illusion of stability and growth.
But this creates a **larger and more fragile debt bubble**. Eventually, debt levels reach a point where even infinite liquidity can’t prevent cascading defaults—especially if confidence breaks or inflation forces central banks to tighten policy.
> “Money printing can paper over insolvency, but it cannot reverse the legal and structural frameworks already in place to prioritize creditor claims.”
>
### **2. Money Printing Benefits the Wrong Side of the System**
QE and other forms of monetary stimulus primarily benefit:
- **Banks and institutional investors**, who receive capital first (the "Cantillon Effect").
- **Asset holders**, by inflating prices of financial and real assets.
Meanwhile, the broader public experiences:
- **Asset inflation** (housing, stocks) that prices them out of ownership.
- **Higher debt levels** encouraged by artificially low interest rates.
- **Wage stagnation** relative to asset growth, increasing dependency on credit.
Thus, **QE contributes to wealth concentration**, which is central to Webb’s thesis. It builds the tower higher before the collapse—and ensures that only the biggest players are positioned to take advantage when the crash comes.
### **3. Legal Structures Still Enable Seizure Despite Liquidity**
Even if money printing were unlimited, the **legal and institutional rules Webb highlights remain in place**:
- If a broker or bank holding your assets fails, super-priority creditors (e.g., derivative counterparties) can legally seize those assets—even if central banks are providing liquidity elsewhere.
- Collateralized lending systems are still governed by bankruptcy and repo rules that allow seizure without due process.
Liquidity doesn’t override these frameworks; it may **delay their activation**, but the mechanisms are still triggered under stress—especially if leverage unwinds suddenly.
### **4. Central Banks May *Intentionally* Withhold Liquidity at the Right Moment**
Webb implies a darker possibility: that **money printing is not a guaranteed lifeline**. In a controlled demolition scenario:
- Central banks could withhold liquidity **at a strategic moment** (like in 2008 with Lehman).
- This would trigger a cascade of failures, allowing creditors to take possession of pledged collateral.
- After the seizure is complete, QE could resume—but **only after assets have changed hands**.
> “Liquidity will not be used to save the public; it will be timed to transfer wealth first, then restore ‘order.’”
>
### **5. Inflation Limits Central Bank Response**
As the debt load increases, printing more money becomes inflationary. This can limit the Fed’s (or ECB’s, etc.) willingness or ability to intervene aggressively without destroying currency value. Webb’s thesis doesn’t require a monetary collapse, but if one occurs, it accelerates his vision of **centralized control through digital currencies, asset seizures, and dependency**.
### **In Summary:**
Money printing does not invalidate *The Great Taking*; it **masks systemic risk**, **concentrates wealth**, and **delays reckoning**—possibly just long enough for legal and financial frameworks to be used in a crisis to extract ownership from the public.
To Webb, QE is not a safety net—it’s **a setup**