📅 Original date posted:2014-05-24
📝 Original message:On Sat, May 24, 2014 at 5:57 AM, Ashley Holman <dscvlt at gmail.com> wrote:
> * As far as I can tell, this shouldn't change any game theory or incentives
> because nodes still receive blocks exactly as they do now, just sooner. The
> difference is, invalid blocks that meet the PoW will be broadcast to
> everyone, but this is nothing new since someone can peer with you and send
> you an invalid block already. Network DoS should not be a possibility since
> it is very expensive to make invalid blocks that meet network PoW.
The difference is that with cut-through forwarding of blocks, a
sufficiently motivated attacker (being willing to blow 25BTC's worth
of electricity on the effort) can subjugate the entire Bitcoin network
to its DoS attack, rather than having to connect to every node
individually and then still have those individual nodes reject that
invalid block without relaying any knowledge of its existence.
An attack could also take the form of a block body that never arrives
- a sort of teergrube attack, where the goal is to get the network
mining empty block upon empty block on top of that valid-PoW header
whose body never arrives. It doesn't have to be with an explicitly
invalid block.
Could one mitigate such attacks by allowing nodes to send a message to
the effect of, "Oops, I know that header i just sent is valid PoW, but
I'd like you to forget about it - I think its body is invalid"?
Bernd Jendrissek [ARCHIVE] /
npub1nv…fc33f
2023-06-07 15:22:03
in reply to nevent1q…ezlh
Author Public Key
npub1nvq5fvffrnm296rpdlknzcs00mnaedm4wp23pz3cc3vpfjh7s9xqnfc33fPublished at
2023-06-07 15:22:03Event JSON
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"pubkey": "9b0144b1291cf6a2e8616fed31620f7ee7dcb7757055108a38c45814cafe814c",
"created_at": 1686151323,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-05-24\n📝 Original message:On Sat, May 24, 2014 at 5:57 AM, Ashley Holman \u003cdscvlt at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e * As far as I can tell, this shouldn't change any game theory or incentives\n\u003e because nodes still receive blocks exactly as they do now, just sooner. The\n\u003e difference is, invalid blocks that meet the PoW will be broadcast to\n\u003e everyone, but this is nothing new since someone can peer with you and send\n\u003e you an invalid block already. Network DoS should not be a possibility since\n\u003e it is very expensive to make invalid blocks that meet network PoW.\n\nThe difference is that with cut-through forwarding of blocks, a\nsufficiently motivated attacker (being willing to blow 25BTC's worth\nof electricity on the effort) can subjugate the entire Bitcoin network\nto its DoS attack, rather than having to connect to every node\nindividually and then still have those individual nodes reject that\ninvalid block without relaying any knowledge of its existence.\n\nAn attack could also take the form of a block body that never arrives\n- a sort of teergrube attack, where the goal is to get the network\nmining empty block upon empty block on top of that valid-PoW header\nwhose body never arrives. It doesn't have to be with an explicitly\ninvalid block.\n\nCould one mitigate such attacks by allowing nodes to send a message to\nthe effect of, \"Oops, I know that header i just sent is valid PoW, but\nI'd like you to forget about it - I think its body is invalid\"?",
"sig": "ace12f8d08e7629b3db8eb9053f004264bc6c61864c34fa69523ad494be52ec6cc762e788132e2b3afd7fdca77d6f598c0729b79824fac97ddeca2a4de879a88"
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