📅 Original date posted:2014-03-29
📝 Original message:On Saturday, 29 March 2014, at 2:08 pm, Alan Reiner wrote:
> Regardless of how SSSS does it, I believe that obfuscating that
> information is bad news from a usability perspective. Undoubtedly,
> users will make lots of backups of lots of wallets and think they
> remember the M-parameter but don't. They will accidentally mix in some
> 3-of-5 fragments with their 2-of-4 not realizing they are incompatible,
> or not able to distinguish them. Or they'll distribute too many
> thinking the threshold is higher and end up insecure, or possibly not
> have enough fragments to restore their wallet thinking the M-value was
> lower than it actually was.
>
> I just don't see the value in adding such complexity for the benefit of
> obfuscating information an attacker might be able to figure out anyway
> (most backups will be 2-of-N or 3-of-N) and can't act on anyway (because
> he doesn't know where the other frags are and they are actually in
> safe-deposit boxes)
Okay, you've convinced me. However, it looks like the consensus here is that my BIP is unneeded, so I'm not sure it would be worth the effort for me to improve it with your suggestions.
Matt Whitlock [ARCHIVE] /
npub17q…upwet
2023-06-07 15:16:41
in reply to nevent1q…d4fd
Author Public Key
npub17qxssk9sj2r7jswvh3y32e7vwz7mcckhz33gk9nurdmw0lhsfkgswupwetPublished at
2023-06-07 15:16:41Event JSON
{
"id": "11e41244f4ae744df8fdb7e9204829bad97362feb08740e02e0780cf24dba8f4",
"pubkey": "f00d0858b09287e941ccbc491567cc70bdbc62d714628b167c1b76e7fef04d91",
"created_at": 1686151001,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"cd470d06d90a3107c21da4b48b344ebdd3b4ab813362bb85b0e7a02311012700",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"3b216daddc9acd2389ec045b0a378bc8a4cd65201ed898952bcd65d40dd3c310",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"86f42bcb76a431c128b596c36714ae73a42cae48706a9e5513d716043447f5ec"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-03-29\n📝 Original message:On Saturday, 29 March 2014, at 2:08 pm, Alan Reiner wrote:\n\u003e Regardless of how SSSS does it, I believe that obfuscating that\n\u003e information is bad news from a usability perspective. Undoubtedly,\n\u003e users will make lots of backups of lots of wallets and think they\n\u003e remember the M-parameter but don't. They will accidentally mix in some\n\u003e 3-of-5 fragments with their 2-of-4 not realizing they are incompatible,\n\u003e or not able to distinguish them. Or they'll distribute too many\n\u003e thinking the threshold is higher and end up insecure, or possibly not\n\u003e have enough fragments to restore their wallet thinking the M-value was\n\u003e lower than it actually was. \n\u003e \n\u003e I just don't see the value in adding such complexity for the benefit of\n\u003e obfuscating information an attacker might be able to figure out anyway\n\u003e (most backups will be 2-of-N or 3-of-N) and can't act on anyway (because\n\u003e he doesn't know where the other frags are and they are actually in\n\u003e safe-deposit boxes)\n\nOkay, you've convinced me. However, it looks like the consensus here is that my BIP is unneeded, so I'm not sure it would be worth the effort for me to improve it with your suggestions.",
"sig": "47756cf18a1915f658c9aad22898b54f7341da6855a4068202c77414a3ef6a0f1ce0ef9f7e444a4104be5441ba91699c04a91ae9e2a765595d214891714c55ed"
}