> These public payments are perfectly fine and have no risk.
Absolutely, agreed
> Your example of a forced lightning closure is a good example of a public payment.
The example I gave with anchor outputs assumes it's a forced closure with zero fees (that's the idea behind anchor outputs). The idea with it is that you can just CPFP it rather than both parties having to estimate feerates (like they do now pre-package-relay)
I would argue that OOB payments may be cheaper here than CPFP
Why construct a whole new transaction when you can just make an OOB payment to force close your zero-fee transaction into the next block?
> These private OOB payments create centralizing incentives
I definitely agree. But also if CPFP is more expensive than OOB payments in general, then this is a concern with CPFP inevitably creating centralizing incentives in general
I guess what I'm trying to get at, is how does CTV actually make this worse? It seems that centralization forces for OOB payments would be equivalent for Lightning force-closure and CTV transactions wouldn't they?
matthewjablack / Matt ₿lack ⚡️🍁 13% Bitcoiner
npub1wf…qsxhy
2024-09-11 22:58:28
in reply to nevent1q…fjtw
Author Public Key
npub1wf7w8mrzqs3uvd8wsp774462d3rtttzwetuhpmzjccgn63emy4ls5qsxhyPublished at
2024-09-11 22:58:28Event JSON
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"content": "\u003e These public payments are perfectly fine and have no risk.\n\nAbsolutely, agreed\n\n\u003e Your example of a forced lightning closure is a good example of a public payment.\n\nThe example I gave with anchor outputs assumes it's a forced closure with zero fees (that's the idea behind anchor outputs). The idea with it is that you can just CPFP it rather than both parties having to estimate feerates (like they do now pre-package-relay)\n\nI would argue that OOB payments may be cheaper here than CPFP\n\nWhy construct a whole new transaction when you can just make an OOB payment to force close your zero-fee transaction into the next block?\n\n\u003e These private OOB payments create centralizing incentives\n\nI definitely agree. But also if CPFP is more expensive than OOB payments in general, then this is a concern with CPFP inevitably creating centralizing incentives in general\n\nI guess what I'm trying to get at, is how does CTV actually make this worse? It seems that centralization forces for OOB payments would be equivalent for Lightning force-closure and CTV transactions wouldn't they? ",
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