📅 Original date posted:2017-01-25
📝 Original message:> On 25 Jan 2017, at 15:29, Natanael <natanael.l at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Den 25 jan. 2017 08:22 skrev "Johnson Lau" <jl2012 at xbt.hk <mailto:jl2012 at xbt.hk>>:
> Assuming Alice is paying Bob with an old style time-locked tx. Under your proposal, after the hardfork, Bob is still able to confirm the time-locked tx on both networks. To fulfil your new rules he just needs to send the outputs to himself again (with different tx format). But as Bob gets all the money on both forks, it is already a successful replay
>
> Why would Alice be sitting on an old-style signed transaction with UTXO:s none of which she controls (paying somebody else), with NO ability to substitute the transaction for one where she DOES control an output, leaving her unable to be the one spending the replay protecting child transaction?
If Alice still has full control, she is already protected by my proposal, which does not require any protecting child transaction.
But in many cases she may not have full control. Make it clearer, consider that’s actually a 2-of-2 multisig of Alice and Bob, and the time locked tx is sending to Bob. If the time locked tx is unprotected in the first place, Bob will get all the money from both forks anyway, as there is no reason for him to renegotiate with Alice.
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Johnson Lau [ARCHIVE] /
npub1fy…p2mv9
2023-06-07 17:55:39
in reply to nevent1q…r62h
Author Public Key
npub1fyh6gqhg8zgyhhywkty047s64z2a7fjr307enrr3kqwtnk64plmsup2mv9Seen on
wss://relay.noswhere.comPublished at
2023-06-07 17:55:39Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-01-25\n📝 Original message:\u003e On 25 Jan 2017, at 15:29, Natanael \u003cnatanael.l at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e Den 25 jan. 2017 08:22 skrev \"Johnson Lau\" \u003cjl2012 at xbt.hk \u003cmailto:jl2012 at xbt.hk\u003e\u003e:\n\u003e Assuming Alice is paying Bob with an old style time-locked tx. Under your proposal, after the hardfork, Bob is still able to confirm the time-locked tx on both networks. To fulfil your new rules he just needs to send the outputs to himself again (with different tx format). But as Bob gets all the money on both forks, it is already a successful replay\n\u003e \n\u003e Why would Alice be sitting on an old-style signed transaction with UTXO:s none of which she controls (paying somebody else), with NO ability to substitute the transaction for one where she DOES control an output, leaving her unable to be the one spending the replay protecting child transaction? \n\nIf Alice still has full control, she is already protected by my proposal, which does not require any protecting child transaction.\n\nBut in many cases she may not have full control. Make it clearer, consider that’s actually a 2-of-2 multisig of Alice and Bob, and the time locked tx is sending to Bob. If the time locked tx is unprotected in the first place, Bob will get all the money from both forks anyway, as there is no reason for him to renegotiate with Alice.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20170125/e4e33b95/attachment.html\u003e",
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