📅 Original date posted:2017-04-15
📝 Original message:On 04/15/2017 03:04 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Considering that you did not spare a single word about the specific
> property that I am concerned about-- that the proposal will reject
> the blocks of passive participants, due to avoidable design
> limitations-- I can't help but feel that you don't even care to
> understand the concern I was bringing up. :(
Not sure if you missed my previous reply to you, but I'm curious about
your thoughts on this particular point. I contend that for any UASF,
orphaning non-signalling blocks on the flag date is safer than just
considering the fork active on the flag date.
Unless we have majority miner support for the fork, we have to assume
that a chain split will occur at some point. With the orphaning
approach, we know exactly when that will be, and can plan around it.
Miners know that they need to upgrade by the flag date in order to get
paid. We even have an opportunity to back out if it looks like we don't
have enough economic support.
With the non-orphaning approach, the split won't occur until someone
chooses to craft a malicious block (short bitcoin; rent hash power;
profit). We don't know when that will be, so we can't plan around it.
Some nodes and miners will assume it won't happen at all. When it
happens, our responses to it will be clumsy, uncoordinated, and likely
panicked.
While the orphaning approach is potentially disruptive to miners, it is
necessarily so in order to minimize disruption to users. In general,
users should be prioritized over miners. The point of Bitcoin is to have
secure, digital money that we can *use*, not to enable people to earn
money from running busy-work computations.
> How many people barely reviewed the specifics of the proposal simply
> because they want something fast and this proposal does something
> fast?
I have scrutinized the strategy of BIP148 a fair bit. I was initially
opposed to it, but after Bitfury showed their support, and especially
after the Asicboost revelation, I think it has solid potential to
succeed. It would be a waste not to at least attempt to organize around
it. If it turns out that we can't get the necessary support in time, we
can abandon the effort and reassess our options.
Chris Acheson [ARCHIVE] /
npub1qm…dy5yt
2023-06-07 18:00:09
in reply to nevent1q…8gez
Author Public Key
npub1qmjkl8qy303n4742e9d5uffucmdf2n63hhaf5v827lwmz37pm6vqedy5ytPublished at
2023-06-07 18:00:09Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2017-04-15\n📝 Original message:On 04/15/2017 03:04 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e Considering that you did not spare a single word about the specific \n\u003e property that I am concerned about-- that the proposal will reject\n\u003e the blocks of passive participants, due to avoidable design\n\u003e limitations-- I can't help but feel that you don't even care to\n\u003e understand the concern I was bringing up. :(\n\nNot sure if you missed my previous reply to you, but I'm curious about\nyour thoughts on this particular point. I contend that for any UASF,\norphaning non-signalling blocks on the flag date is safer than just\nconsidering the fork active on the flag date.\n\nUnless we have majority miner support for the fork, we have to assume\nthat a chain split will occur at some point. With the orphaning\napproach, we know exactly when that will be, and can plan around it.\nMiners know that they need to upgrade by the flag date in order to get\npaid. We even have an opportunity to back out if it looks like we don't\nhave enough economic support.\n\nWith the non-orphaning approach, the split won't occur until someone\nchooses to craft a malicious block (short bitcoin; rent hash power;\nprofit). We don't know when that will be, so we can't plan around it.\nSome nodes and miners will assume it won't happen at all. When it\nhappens, our responses to it will be clumsy, uncoordinated, and likely\npanicked.\n\nWhile the orphaning approach is potentially disruptive to miners, it is\nnecessarily so in order to minimize disruption to users. In general,\nusers should be prioritized over miners. The point of Bitcoin is to have\nsecure, digital money that we can *use*, not to enable people to earn\nmoney from running busy-work computations.\n\n\u003e How many people barely reviewed the specifics of the proposal simply \n\u003e because they want something fast and this proposal does something \n\u003e fast?\n\nI have scrutinized the strategy of BIP148 a fair bit. I was initially\nopposed to it, but after Bitfury showed their support, and especially\nafter the Asicboost revelation, I think it has solid potential to\nsucceed. It would be a waste not to at least attempt to organize around\nit. If it turns out that we can't get the necessary support in time, we\ncan abandon the effort and reassess our options.",
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