📅 Original date posted:2021-04-16
📝 Original message:Not sure of the best place to workshop ideas, so please take this with
a grain of salt.
Starting with 3 assumptions:
- assume that there exists a proof-of-burn that, for Bitcoin's
purposes, accurately-enough models the investment in and development
of ASICs to maintain miner incentive.
- assume the resulting timing problem "how much burn is enough to keep
blocks 10 minutes apart and what does that even mean" is also...
perfectly solvable
- assume "everyone unanimously loves this idea"
The transition *could* look like this:
- validating nodes begin to require proof-of-burn, in addition to
proof-of-work (soft fork)
- the extra expense makes it more expensive for miners, so POW slowly drops
- on a predefined schedule, POB required is increased to 100% of the
"required work" to mine
Given all of that, am I correct in thinking that a hard fork would not
be necessary?
IE: We could transition to another "required proof" - such as a
quantum POW or a POB (above) or something else .... in a back-compat
way (existing nodes not aware of the rules would continue to
validate).
Erik Aronesty [ARCHIVE] /
npub1y2…5taj0
2023-06-07 22:51:51
in reply to nevent1q…rh27
Author Public Key
npub1y22yec0znyzw8qndy5qn5c2wgejkj0k9zsqra7kvrd6cd6896z4qm5taj0Published at
2023-06-07 22:51:51Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2021-04-16\n📝 Original message:Not sure of the best place to workshop ideas, so please take this with\na grain of salt.\n\nStarting with 3 assumptions:\n\n- assume that there exists a proof-of-burn that, for Bitcoin's\npurposes, accurately-enough models the investment in and development\nof ASICs to maintain miner incentive.\n- assume the resulting timing problem \"how much burn is enough to keep\nblocks 10 minutes apart and what does that even mean\" is also...\nperfectly solvable\n- assume \"everyone unanimously loves this idea\"\n\nThe transition *could* look like this:\n\n - validating nodes begin to require proof-of-burn, in addition to\nproof-of-work (soft fork)\n - the extra expense makes it more expensive for miners, so POW slowly drops\n - on a predefined schedule, POB required is increased to 100% of the\n\"required work\" to mine\n\nGiven all of that, am I correct in thinking that a hard fork would not\nbe necessary?\n\nIE: We could transition to another \"required proof\" - such as a\nquantum POW or a POB (above) or something else .... in a back-compat\nway (existing nodes not aware of the rules would continue to\nvalidate).",
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