📅 Original date posted:2019-10-06
📝 Original message:
Hi Thread,
I made a reply to the OP but didn't "reply all" so it just went directly to
Ethan. Since the comments were interesting I'll attempt to salvage them by
posting them in full:
== Lloyd's post ==
Hi Ethan,
I'd be interested to know what protocols you need OP_CAT for. I'm trying to
figure out if there really exists any script based protocol that doesn't
have a more efficient scriptless counterpart. For example,
A²L[1] achieves the same thing as Tumblebit but requires no script. I can
imagine paying based on a merkle path could be useful, but a protocol was
recently suggested on lightning-dev [2] that does this but without OP_CAT
(and without any script!).
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/589.pdf
[2]
https://www.mail-archive.com/lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org/msg01427.html
(*I linked to the wrong thread in the original email*).
LL
== Ethan's response ==
Hi Lloyd,
Thanks for your response. I am not sure if you intended to take this off
list or not.
I plan to at some point to enumerate in detail protocols that OP_CAT would
benefit. A more important point is that OP_CAT is a basic building block
and that we don't know what future protocols it would allow. In my own
research I have avoiding going down certain paths because it isn't worth
the time to investigate knowing that OP_CAT wouldn't make the protocol
practical.
In regards to scriptless scripts they almost always require an interactive
protocol and sometimes ZKPs. A2L is very impressive but like TumbleBit it
places a large burden on the developer. Additionally I am aware of no way
to reveal a subset of preimages with scriptless scripts, do a conditioned
reveal i.e. these preimages can only spend under these two pubkeys and
timelockA where after timelockZ this other pubkey can spend without a
preimages. Scriptless scripts are a fantastic tool but they shouldn't be
the only tool that we have.
I'm not sure I follow what you are saying with [2]
This brings me back a philosophical point:
Bitcoin should give people basic tools to build protocols without first
knowing what all those protocols are especially when those tools have very
little downside.
I really appreciate your comments.
Thanks,
Ethan
==
*Back to normal thread*
Hi Ethan,
Thanks for the insightful reply and sorry for my mailing list errors.
> I plan to at some point to enumerate in detail protocols that OP_CAT
would benefit.
Sweet. Thanks.
> Additionally I am aware of no way to reveal a subset of preimages with
scriptless scripts, do a conditioned reveal i.e. these preimages can only
spend under these two pubkeys and timelockA where after timelockZ this
other pubkey can spend without a preimages. Scriptless scripts are a
fantastic tool but they shouldn't be the only tool that we have.
Yes. With adaptor signatures there is no way to reveal more than one
pre-image; you are limited to revealing a single scalar. But you can have
multiple transactions spending from the same output, each with a different
set of scriptless conditions (absolute time locks, relative time locks and
pre-image reveal). This is enough to achieve what I think you are
describing. FWIW there's a growing consensus that you can do lightning
without script [1]. Perhaps we can't do everything with this technique. My
current focus is figuring out what useful things we can't do like this
(even if we were to go wild and add whatever opcodes we wanted). So far it
looks like covenants are the main exception.
> I'm not sure I follow what you are saying with [2]
That is perfectly understandable as I linked the wrong thread (sorry!).
Here's the right one:
https://www.mail-archive.com/lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org/msg01427.html
I was pointing to the surprising result that you can actually pay for a
merkle path with a particular merkle root leading to a particular leaf that
you're interested in without validating the merkle path on chain (e.g.
OP_CAT and OP_SHA256). The catch is that the leaves have to be pedersen
commitments and you prove the existence of your data in the merkle root by
showing an opening to the leaf pedersen commitment. This may not be general
enough to cover every merkle tree use case (but I'm not sure what those
are!).
> This brings me back a philosophical point:
> Bitcoin should give people basic tools to build protocols without first
knowing what all those protocols are especially when those tools have very
little downside.
This is a really powerful idea. But I've started feeling like you have to
just design the layer 2 protocols first and then design layer 1! It seems
like almost every protocol that people want to make requires very
particular fundamental changes: SegWit for LN-penalty and NOINPUT for eltoo
for example. On top of that it seems like just having the right signature
scheme (schnorr) at layer 1 is enough to enable most useful stuff in an
elegant way.
[1]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-September/017309.html
Cheers,
LL
On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 1:08 AM Ethan Heilman <eth3rs at gmail.com> wrote:
> To avoid derailing the NO_INPUT conversation, I have changed the
> subject to OP_CAT.
>
> Responding to:
> """
> * `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly
> retained from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on
> par with:
> [..]
> * `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends
> [..]
> """
>
> OP_CAT is an extremely valuable op code. I understand why it was
> removed as the situation at the time with scripts was dire. However
> most of the protocols I've wanted to build on Bitcoin run into the
> limitation that stack values can not be concatenated. For instance
> TumbleBit would have far smaller transaction sizes if OP_CAT was
> supported in Bitcoin. If it happens to me as a researcher it is
> probably holding other people back as well. If I could wave a magic
> wand and turn on one of the disabled op codes it would be OP_CAT. Of
> course with the change that size of each concatenated value must be 64
> Bytes or less.
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 10:04 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Good morning lists,
> >
> > Let me propose the below radical idea:
> >
> > * `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly retained
> from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on par with:
> > * 1 RETURN
> > * higher-`nSequence` replacement
> > * DER-encoded pubkeys
> > * unrestricted `scriptPubKey`
> > * Payee-security-paid-by-payer (i.e. lack of P2SH)
> > * `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends
> > * transaction malleability
> > * probably many more
> >
> > So let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1:
> >
> > * Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures.
> > * Put `SIGHASH` on public keys.
> >
> > Public keys are now encoded as either 33-bytes (implicit `SIGHASH_ALL`)
> or 34-bytes (`SIGHASH` byte, followed by pubkey type, followed by pubkey
> coordinate).
> > `OP_CHECKSIG` and friends then look at the *public key* to determine
> sighash algorithm rather than the signature.
> >
> > As we expect public keys to be indirectly committed to on every output
> `scriptPubKey`, this is automatically output tagging to allow particular
> `SIGHASH`.
> > However, we can then utilize the many many ways to hide public keys away
> until they are needed, exemplified in MAST-inside-Taproot.
> >
> > I propose also the addition of the opcode:
> >
> > <sighash> <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH
> >
> > * `sighash` must be one byte.
> > * `pubkey` may be the special byte `0x1`, meaning "just use the Taproot
> internal pubkey".
> > * `pubkey` may be 33-byte public key, in which case the `sighash` byte
> is just prepended to it.
> > * `pubkey` may be 34-byte public key with sighash, in which case the
> first byte is replaced with `sighash` byte.
> > * If `sighash` is `0x00` then the result is a 33-byte public key (the
> sighash byte is removed) i.e. `SIGHASH_ALL` implicit.
> >
> > This retains the old feature where the sighash is selected at
> time-of-spending rather than time-of-payment.
> > This is done by using the script:
> >
> > <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH OP_CHECKSIG
> >
> > Then the sighash can be put in the witness stack after the signature,
> letting the `SIGHASH` flag be selected at time-of-signing, but only if the
> SCRIPT specifically is formed to do so.
> > This is malleability-safe as the signature still commits to the
> `SIGHASH` it was created for.
> >
> > However, by default, public keys will not have an attached `SIGHASH`
> byte, implying `SIGHASH_ALL` (and disallowing-by-default non-`SIGHASH_ALL`).
> >
> > This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they
> are allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed.
> >
> > Would this not be a superior solution?
> >
> > Regards,
> > ZmnSCPxj
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> _______________________________________________
> Lightning-dev mailing list
> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>
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Lloyd Fournier [ARCHIVE] /
npub1kh…y05yp
2023-06-09 12:56:26
in reply to nevent1q…lre6
Author Public Key
npub1khlhcuz0jrjwa0ayznq2q9agg4zvxfvx5x7jljrvwnpfzngrcf0q7y05ypPublished at
2023-06-09 12:56:26Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2019-10-06\n📝 Original message:\nHi Thread,\n\nI made a reply to the OP but didn't \"reply all\" so it just went directly to\nEthan. Since the comments were interesting I'll attempt to salvage them by\nposting them in full:\n\n== Lloyd's post ==\nHi Ethan,\n\nI'd be interested to know what protocols you need OP_CAT for. I'm trying to\nfigure out if there really exists any script based protocol that doesn't\nhave a more efficient scriptless counterpart. For example,\nA²L[1] achieves the same thing as Tumblebit but requires no script. I can\nimagine paying based on a merkle path could be useful, but a protocol was\nrecently suggested on lightning-dev [2] that does this but without OP_CAT\n(and without any script!).\n\n\n[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/589.pdf\n[2]\nhttps://www.mail-archive.com/lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org/msg01427.html\n(*I linked to the wrong thread in the original email*).\n\nLL\n\n== Ethan's response ==\nHi Lloyd,\n\nThanks for your response. I am not sure if you intended to take this off\nlist or not.\n\nI plan to at some point to enumerate in detail protocols that OP_CAT would\nbenefit. A more important point is that OP_CAT is a basic building block\nand that we don't know what future protocols it would allow. In my own\nresearch I have avoiding going down certain paths because it isn't worth\nthe time to investigate knowing that OP_CAT wouldn't make the protocol\npractical.\n\nIn regards to scriptless scripts they almost always require an interactive\nprotocol and sometimes ZKPs. A2L is very impressive but like TumbleBit it\nplaces a large burden on the developer. Additionally I am aware of no way\nto reveal a subset of preimages with scriptless scripts, do a conditioned\nreveal i.e. these preimages can only spend under these two pubkeys and\ntimelockA where after timelockZ this other pubkey can spend without a\npreimages. Scriptless scripts are a fantastic tool but they shouldn't be\nthe only tool that we have.\n\nI'm not sure I follow what you are saying with [2]\n\nThis brings me back a philosophical point:\nBitcoin should give people basic tools to build protocols without first\nknowing what all those protocols are especially when those tools have very\nlittle downside.\n\nI really appreciate your comments.\n\nThanks,\nEthan\n==\n\n*Back to normal thread*\n\nHi Ethan,\n\nThanks for the insightful reply and sorry for my mailing list errors.\n\n\u003e I plan to at some point to enumerate in detail protocols that OP_CAT\nwould benefit.\n\nSweet. Thanks.\n\n\u003e Additionally I am aware of no way to reveal a subset of preimages with\nscriptless scripts, do a conditioned reveal i.e. these preimages can only\nspend under these two pubkeys and timelockA where after timelockZ this\nother pubkey can spend without a preimages. Scriptless scripts are a\nfantastic tool but they shouldn't be the only tool that we have.\n\nYes. With adaptor signatures there is no way to reveal more than one\npre-image; you are limited to revealing a single scalar. But you can have\nmultiple transactions spending from the same output, each with a different\nset of scriptless conditions (absolute time locks, relative time locks and\npre-image reveal). This is enough to achieve what I think you are\ndescribing. FWIW there's a growing consensus that you can do lightning\nwithout script [1]. Perhaps we can't do everything with this technique. My\ncurrent focus is figuring out what useful things we can't do like this\n(even if we were to go wild and add whatever opcodes we wanted). So far it\nlooks like covenants are the main exception.\n\n\u003e I'm not sure I follow what you are saying with [2]\n\nThat is perfectly understandable as I linked the wrong thread (sorry!).\nHere's the right one:\nhttps://www.mail-archive.com/lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org/msg01427.html\n\nI was pointing to the surprising result that you can actually pay for a\nmerkle path with a particular merkle root leading to a particular leaf that\nyou're interested in without validating the merkle path on chain (e.g.\nOP_CAT and OP_SHA256). The catch is that the leaves have to be pedersen\ncommitments and you prove the existence of your data in the merkle root by\nshowing an opening to the leaf pedersen commitment. This may not be general\nenough to cover every merkle tree use case (but I'm not sure what those\nare!).\n\n\u003e This brings me back a philosophical point:\n\u003e Bitcoin should give people basic tools to build protocols without first\nknowing what all those protocols are especially when those tools have very\nlittle downside.\n\nThis is a really powerful idea. But I've started feeling like you have to\njust design the layer 2 protocols first and then design layer 1! It seems\nlike almost every protocol that people want to make requires very\nparticular fundamental changes: SegWit for LN-penalty and NOINPUT for eltoo\nfor example. On top of that it seems like just having the right signature\nscheme (schnorr) at layer 1 is enough to enable most useful stuff in an\nelegant way.\n\n[1]\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-September/017309.html\n\nCheers,\n\nLL\n\nOn Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 1:08 AM Ethan Heilman \u003ceth3rs at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e To avoid derailing the NO_INPUT conversation, I have changed the\n\u003e subject to OP_CAT.\n\u003e\n\u003e Responding to:\n\u003e \"\"\"\n\u003e * `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly\n\u003e retained from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on\n\u003e par with:\n\u003e [..]\n\u003e * `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends\n\u003e [..]\n\u003e \"\"\"\n\u003e\n\u003e OP_CAT is an extremely valuable op code. I understand why it was\n\u003e removed as the situation at the time with scripts was dire. However\n\u003e most of the protocols I've wanted to build on Bitcoin run into the\n\u003e limitation that stack values can not be concatenated. For instance\n\u003e TumbleBit would have far smaller transaction sizes if OP_CAT was\n\u003e supported in Bitcoin. If it happens to me as a researcher it is\n\u003e probably holding other people back as well. If I could wave a magic\n\u003e wand and turn on one of the disabled op codes it would be OP_CAT. Of\n\u003e course with the change that size of each concatenated value must be 64\n\u003e Bytes or less.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 10:04 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Good morning lists,\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Let me propose the below radical idea:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e * `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly retained\n\u003e from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on par with:\n\u003e \u003e * 1 RETURN\n\u003e \u003e * higher-`nSequence` replacement\n\u003e \u003e * DER-encoded pubkeys\n\u003e \u003e * unrestricted `scriptPubKey`\n\u003e \u003e * Payee-security-paid-by-payer (i.e. lack of P2SH)\n\u003e \u003e * `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends\n\u003e \u003e * transaction malleability\n\u003e \u003e * probably many more\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e So let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e * Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures.\n\u003e \u003e * Put `SIGHASH` on public keys.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Public keys are now encoded as either 33-bytes (implicit `SIGHASH_ALL`)\n\u003e or 34-bytes (`SIGHASH` byte, followed by pubkey type, followed by pubkey\n\u003e coordinate).\n\u003e \u003e `OP_CHECKSIG` and friends then look at the *public key* to determine\n\u003e sighash algorithm rather than the signature.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e As we expect public keys to be indirectly committed to on every output\n\u003e `scriptPubKey`, this is automatically output tagging to allow particular\n\u003e `SIGHASH`.\n\u003e \u003e However, we can then utilize the many many ways to hide public keys away\n\u003e until they are needed, exemplified in MAST-inside-Taproot.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I propose also the addition of the opcode:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003csighash\u003e \u003cpubkey\u003e OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e * `sighash` must be one byte.\n\u003e \u003e * `pubkey` may be the special byte `0x1`, meaning \"just use the Taproot\n\u003e internal pubkey\".\n\u003e \u003e * `pubkey` may be 33-byte public key, in which case the `sighash` byte\n\u003e is just prepended to it.\n\u003e \u003e * `pubkey` may be 34-byte public key with sighash, in which case the\n\u003e first byte is replaced with `sighash` byte.\n\u003e \u003e * If `sighash` is `0x00` then the result is a 33-byte public key (the\n\u003e sighash byte is removed) i.e. `SIGHASH_ALL` implicit.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e This retains the old feature where the sighash is selected at\n\u003e time-of-spending rather than time-of-payment.\n\u003e \u003e This is done by using the script:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003cpubkey\u003e OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH OP_CHECKSIG\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Then the sighash can be put in the witness stack after the signature,\n\u003e letting the `SIGHASH` flag be selected at time-of-signing, but only if the\n\u003e SCRIPT specifically is formed to do so.\n\u003e \u003e This is malleability-safe as the signature still commits to the\n\u003e `SIGHASH` it was created for.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e However, by default, public keys will not have an attached `SIGHASH`\n\u003e byte, implying `SIGHASH_ALL` (and disallowing-by-default non-`SIGHASH_ALL`).\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they\n\u003e are allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Would this not be a superior solution?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Regards,\n\u003e \u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20191006/f0e27c02/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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