📅 Original date posted:2018-04-03
📝 Original message:Hey. This idea sounds quite interesting. It'd be helpful to see some more
numbers to evaluate it.
- How much bandwidth is consumed by redundant tx INVs currently? What is
this as a % of overall bandwidth usage?
- How would filtering txs through N=2 links affect network propagation?
This probably requires simulation to determine.
- Do you propose setting filters on inbound peers as well?
On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 3:18 PM, Gleb Naumenko via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi all,
> I have a couple of ideas regarding transaction relay protocol and wanted
> to share it with and probably get some feedback.
>
> I did some emulation and simulation and found out that around 90% of INV
> messages sent by public-IP nodes are idle (duplicate), obviously because
> each node creates 8 connections. I also realized that sending INV messages
> is a significant part of the overall bandwidth consumed by a public-IP
> node. At a larger scale, this will result in people not able to run a
> public-IP node.
>
> My idea is in some sense similar to BIP37 but applied to public-IP nodes.
> Here I want to emphasize that all the nodes will still receive *all* of the
> transactions. A new protocol should also keep the same zero-trust,
> robustness, decentralization guarantees and latency.
>
> Idea: while joining the network, a new node agrees on some filter with
> each of 8 nodes it connects to. So that NewNode <-> Node_A will be used to
> relay only a subset of transactions, NewNode <-> Node_B for another subset.
> This will significantly decrease the redundancy.
>
> To keep the guarantees, I would keep some redundancy (for example, each
> transaction INV is sent over 2 links).
>
> To make it robust to attacks, I have 2 extensions in my mind:
> 1. Set reconciliation (for a subset of transactions) with *other* nodes.
> Getting a bloom filter of a subset of the mempool transactions from Node_B
> may help to figure out whether Node_A is malicious, very slow, etc.
> 2. Rotating the filters every N minutes (N < 10)
>
> I can see some issues with latency here, but I believe this problem has a
> solution.
>
> Feedback is appreciated!
>
> If you want to look at a draft of the proposal — please let me know.
> If there were any similar ideas — please let me know.
>
> Best,
> Gleb
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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Jim Posen [ARCHIVE] /
npub1nc…lqt2n
2023-06-07 18:11:27
in reply to nevent1q…chlm
Author Public Key
npub1ncnj8arudstdxzfhxk7k4nwgkrw3hyw8sgt0wqqmm5hh2c4knmgs2lqt2nPublished at
2023-06-07 18:11:27Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-04-03\n📝 Original message:Hey. This idea sounds quite interesting. It'd be helpful to see some more\nnumbers to evaluate it.\n\n- How much bandwidth is consumed by redundant tx INVs currently? What is\nthis as a % of overall bandwidth usage?\n- How would filtering txs through N=2 links affect network propagation?\nThis probably requires simulation to determine.\n- Do you propose setting filters on inbound peers as well?\n\nOn Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 3:18 PM, Gleb Naumenko via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi all,\n\u003e I have a couple of ideas regarding transaction relay protocol and wanted\n\u003e to share it with and probably get some feedback.\n\u003e\n\u003e I did some emulation and simulation and found out that around 90% of INV\n\u003e messages sent by public-IP nodes are idle (duplicate), obviously because\n\u003e each node creates 8 connections. I also realized that sending INV messages\n\u003e is a significant part of the overall bandwidth consumed by a public-IP\n\u003e node. At a larger scale, this will result in people not able to run a\n\u003e public-IP node.\n\u003e\n\u003e My idea is in some sense similar to BIP37 but applied to public-IP nodes.\n\u003e Here I want to emphasize that all the nodes will still receive *all* of the\n\u003e transactions. A new protocol should also keep the same zero-trust,\n\u003e robustness, decentralization guarantees and latency.\n\u003e\n\u003e Idea: while joining the network, a new node agrees on some filter with\n\u003e each of 8 nodes it connects to. So that NewNode \u003c-\u003e Node_A will be used to\n\u003e relay only a subset of transactions, NewNode \u003c-\u003e Node_B for another subset.\n\u003e This will significantly decrease the redundancy.\n\u003e\n\u003e To keep the guarantees, I would keep some redundancy (for example, each\n\u003e transaction INV is sent over 2 links).\n\u003e\n\u003e To make it robust to attacks, I have 2 extensions in my mind:\n\u003e 1. Set reconciliation (for a subset of transactions) with *other* nodes.\n\u003e Getting a bloom filter of a subset of the mempool transactions from Node_B\n\u003e may help to figure out whether Node_A is malicious, very slow, etc.\n\u003e 2. Rotating the filters every N minutes (N \u003c 10)\n\u003e\n\u003e I can see some issues with latency here, but I believe this problem has a\n\u003e solution.\n\u003e\n\u003e Feedback is appreciated!\n\u003e\n\u003e If you want to look at a draft of the proposal — please let me know.\n\u003e If there were any similar ideas — please let me know.\n\u003e\n\u003e Best,\n\u003e Gleb\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180403/89d5a284/attachment.html\u003e",
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