📅 Original date posted:2015-02-02
📝 Original message:If the attacker has your desktop computer but not the mobile that's acting
as an independent second factor, how are you then supposed to be able to
tell you're not signing the correct transaction on the mobile? If the
address was replaced with the attacker's address, it'll look like
everything is ok.
- Joel
On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:58 PM, Brian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi at gmail.com>
wrote:
>
> > Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering
> greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple
> secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the
> envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system)
> then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write,
> which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers the
> reduced utility arising from greater complexity, while being led to believe
> in a false promise.
>
> Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying. Are you eluding
> to that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain
> in security? Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is
> possible.
>
> As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident. Given
> how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find
> methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be
> high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed. The balance is
> trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome.
>
> Brian Erdelyi
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,
> sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is
> your
> hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought
> leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a
> look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
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Joel Joonatan Kaartinen [ARCHIVE] /
npub165…48xrx
2023-06-07 15:29:18
in reply to nevent1q…slyj
Author Public Key
npub1654pkuj4rway0043gcu6rdh4umxescp7ew42d2czqvts3kwvg3esc48xrxPublished at
2023-06-07 15:29:18Event JSON
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"pubkey": "d52a1b72551bba47beb14639a1b6f5e6cd98603ecbaaa6ab02031708d9cc4473",
"created_at": 1686151758,
"kind": 1,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-02\n📝 Original message:If the attacker has your desktop computer but not the mobile that's acting\nas an independent second factor, how are you then supposed to be able to\ntell you're not signing the correct transaction on the mobile? If the\naddress was replaced with the attacker's address, it'll look like\neverything is ok.\n\n- Joel\n\nOn Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:58 PM, Brian Erdelyi \u003cbrian.erdelyi at gmail.com\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Confusing or not, the reliance on multiple signatures as offering\n\u003e greater security than single relies on the independence of multiple\n\u003e secrets. If the secrets cannot be shown to retain independence in the\n\u003e envisioned threat scenario (e.g. a user's compromised operating system)\n\u003e then the benefit reduces to making the exploit more difficult to write,\n\u003e which, once written, reduces to no benefit. Yet the user still suffers the\n\u003e reduced utility arising from greater complexity, while being led to believe\n\u003e in a false promise.\n\u003e\n\u003e Just trying to make sure I understand what you’re saying. Are you eluding\n\u003e to that if two of the three private keys get compromised there is no gain\n\u003e in security? Although the likelihood of this occurring is lower, it is\n\u003e possible.\n\u003e\n\u003e As more malware targets bitcoins I think the utility is evident. Given\n\u003e how final Bitcoin transactions are, I think it’s worth trying to find\n\u003e methods to help verify those transactions (if a user deems it to be\n\u003e high-risk enough) before the transaction is completed. The balance is\n\u003e trying to devise something that users do not find too burdensome.\n\u003e\n\u003e Brian Erdelyi\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e Dive into the World of Parallel Programming. The Go Parallel Website,\n\u003e sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is\n\u003e your\n\u003e hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought\n\u003e leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a\n\u003e look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150202/c75f7707/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "98efd0c5e6727a2eb59e7280e6fc0079681f51e76fac737bc2504edf541c0cb37e382d3fd387c95966d7718e1d63bf8fa306c520a153415ae0074189d46dbf68"
}