📅 Original date posted:2020-03-24
📝 Original message:Good morning Andrew,
> > Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward drops
> > too low to ensure the security of the network?
> >
> > IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and once
> > the block reward drop to zero we're merely hoping that transaction fees will
> > keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying
> > enough hash power to attack the network. If that's the case, should we start
> > making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block reward?
> >
> > Here's a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block reward
> > dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to keep the
> > reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what incentivizes
> > mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high enough
> > to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to decide
> > the block reward they "should", hypothetically, reliably choose a value that
> > balances these two concerns.
They already do so, via an implicit "field", known as the transaction fee.
This is "implicit" since it is only the difference of the sum of all inputs with the sum of all outputs, but any Bitcoin HODLer spending their coins always need to make this decision.
This makes the vote for how much security is needed to be costly to the voter, which is appropriate: you pay for your security.
This mechanism is the same mechanism as well that is the long-term plan for the lowered block rewards in the future, and is already the best known idea to tackle this problem as well.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] /
npub1g5…3ms3l
2023-06-07 18:23:29
in reply to nevent1q…madv
Author Public Key
npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3lPublished at
2023-06-07 18:23:29Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2020-03-24\n📝 Original message:Good morning Andrew,\n\n\n\u003e \u003e Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward drops\n\u003e \u003e too low to ensure the security of the network?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and once\n\u003e \u003e the block reward drop to zero we're merely hoping that transaction fees will\n\u003e \u003e keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying\n\u003e \u003e enough hash power to attack the network. If that's the case, should we start\n\u003e \u003e making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block reward?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Here's a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block reward\n\u003e \u003e dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to keep the\n\u003e \u003e reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what incentivizes\n\u003e \u003e mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high enough\n\u003e \u003e to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to decide\n\u003e \u003e the block reward they \"should\", hypothetically, reliably choose a value that\n\u003e \u003e balances these two concerns.\n\nThey already do so, via an implicit \"field\", known as the transaction fee.\nThis is \"implicit\" since it is only the difference of the sum of all inputs with the sum of all outputs, but any Bitcoin HODLer spending their coins always need to make this decision.\n\nThis makes the vote for how much security is needed to be costly to the voter, which is appropriate: you pay for your security.\n\nThis mechanism is the same mechanism as well that is the long-term plan for the lowered block rewards in the future, and is already the best known idea to tackle this problem as well.\n\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj",
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