š
Original date posted:2016-09-09
š Original message:ACK
Armory used to contain code for handling these alerts but that was
removed after the PR removing alerts from Bitcoin Core was merged.
On 9/9/2016 8:42 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> The alert system was a centralized facility to allow trusted parties
> to send messages to be displayed in wallet software (and, very early
> on, actually remotely trigger the software to stop transacting).
>
> It has been removed completely in Bitcoin Core after being disabled for a while.
>
> While the system had some potential uses, there were a number of
> problems with it.
>
> The alert system was a frequent source of misunderstanding about the
> security model and 'effective governance', for example a years ago a
> BitcoinJ developer wanted it to be used to control fee levels on the
> network and few months back one of Bloq's staff was pushing for a
> scheme where "the developers" would use it to remotely change the
> difficulty-- apparently with no idea how abhorrent others would find
> it.
>
> The system also had a problem of not being scalable to different
> software vendors-- it didn't really make sense that core would have
> that facility but armory had to do something different (nor would it
> really make sense to constantly have to maintain some list of keys in
> the node software).
>
> It also had the problem of being unaccountable. No one can tell which
> of the key holders created a message. This creates a risk of misuse
> with a false origin to attack someone's reputation.
>
> Finally, there is good reason to believe that the key has been
> compromised-- It was provided to MTGox by a developer and MTGox's
> systems' were compromised and later their CEO's equipment taken by the
> Japanese police.
>
> In any case, it's gone now in Core and most other current software--
> and I think it's time to fully deactivate it.
>
> I've spent some time going around the internet looking for all
> software that contains this key (which included a few altcoins) and
> asked them to remove it. I will continue to do that.
>
> One of the facilities in the alert system is that you can send a
> maximum sequence alert which cannot be overridden and displays only a
> static key compromise text message and blocks all other alerts. I plan
> to send a triggering alert in the not-distant future (exact time to be
> announced well in advance) feedback on timing would be welcome.
>
> There are likely a few production systems that automatically shut down
> when there is an alert, so this risks some small one-time disruption
> of those services-- but none worse than if an alert were sent to
> advise about a new system upgrade.
>
> At some point after that, I would then plan to disclose this private
> key in public, eliminating any further potential of reputation attacks
> and diminishing the risk of misunderstanding the key as some special
> trusted source of authority.
>
> Cheers,
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Andrew C [ARCHIVE] /
npub1vcā¦xz0wk
2023-06-07 17:53:18
in reply to nevent1qā¦0eah
Author Public Key
npub1vceyhqxfhemlfq82ztdv9gqgc08zq2680yzy4dfuly7h8pqrkwps0xz0wkPublished at
2023-06-07 17:53:18Event JSON
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Original date posted:2016-09-09\nš Original message:ACK\n\nArmory used to contain code for handling these alerts but that was\nremoved after the PR removing alerts from Bitcoin Core was merged.\n\n\nOn 9/9/2016 8:42 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e The alert system was a centralized facility to allow trusted parties\n\u003e to send messages to be displayed in wallet software (and, very early\n\u003e on, actually remotely trigger the software to stop transacting).\n\u003e\n\u003e It has been removed completely in Bitcoin Core after being disabled for a while.\n\u003e\n\u003e While the system had some potential uses, there were a number of\n\u003e problems with it.\n\u003e\n\u003e The alert system was a frequent source of misunderstanding about the\n\u003e security model and 'effective governance', for example a years ago a\n\u003e BitcoinJ developer wanted it to be used to control fee levels on the\n\u003e network and few months back one of Bloq's staff was pushing for a\n\u003e scheme where \"the developers\" would use it to remotely change the\n\u003e difficulty-- apparently with no idea how abhorrent others would find\n\u003e it.\n\u003e\n\u003e The system also had a problem of not being scalable to different\n\u003e software vendors-- it didn't really make sense that core would have\n\u003e that facility but armory had to do something different (nor would it\n\u003e really make sense to constantly have to maintain some list of keys in\n\u003e the node software).\n\u003e\n\u003e It also had the problem of being unaccountable. No one can tell which\n\u003e of the key holders created a message. This creates a risk of misuse\n\u003e with a false origin to attack someone's reputation.\n\u003e\n\u003e Finally, there is good reason to believe that the key has been\n\u003e compromised-- It was provided to MTGox by a developer and MTGox's\n\u003e systems' were compromised and later their CEO's equipment taken by the\n\u003e Japanese police.\n\u003e\n\u003e In any case, it's gone now in Core and most other current software--\n\u003e and I think it's time to fully deactivate it.\n\u003e\n\u003e I've spent some time going around the internet looking for all\n\u003e software that contains this key (which included a few altcoins) and\n\u003e asked them to remove it. I will continue to do that.\n\u003e\n\u003e One of the facilities in the alert system is that you can send a\n\u003e maximum sequence alert which cannot be overridden and displays only a\n\u003e static key compromise text message and blocks all other alerts. I plan\n\u003e to send a triggering alert in the not-distant future (exact time to be\n\u003e announced well in advance) feedback on timing would be welcome.\n\u003e\n\u003e There are likely a few production systems that automatically shut down\n\u003e when there is an alert, so this risks some small one-time disruption\n\u003e of those services-- but none worse than if an alert were sent to\n\u003e advise about a new system upgrade.\n\u003e\n\u003e At some point after that, I would then plan to disclose this private\n\u003e key in public, eliminating any further potential of reputation attacks\n\u003e and diminishing the risk of misunderstanding the key as some special\n\u003e trusted source of authority.\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev",
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