📅 Original date posted:2014-12-17
📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>> Comparisons with the SPV security of sidechains are fallacious. The
>> alternative to a proof-of-publication system reliant on client-side
>> validation is a blockchain. The question of whether the token used on
>> said blockchain should be two-way-pegged to BTC is completely orthogonal.
>>
>> (ie. yes, sidechains are "economically secure", in that you're reduced
>> to balancing economic incentives to avoid peg theft. But sidechains also
>> give us something unique in return - the ability to innovate without
>> needing to start new artificial scarcity races. Nothing else can do that.)
>
> I covered this in my original post: 1-way-pegs allow the creation of new
> valuable tokens without those tokens being useful for speculation.
I stand corrected. A permanent 1-way-peg is sufficient to preserve
scarcity; "nothing else can do that" WRT 2-way-pegs was overreaching.
I still don't see what "2-way-peg vs. 1-way-peg" has to do with
"embedded consensus vs. blockchain consensus" though, and feel it
disingenious to conflate them.
Blockchain consensus (eg. sidechains) can utilise either mechanism,
1-way-peg or 2-way-peg. Arguments in favour of 1-way-peg are
interesting, but they're ultimatley just arguments in favour of one
type of sidechain over another.
Arguments in favour of embedded consensus - and I feel I'm being
generous with the term "consensus" here - should surely stand on their
own merit against blockchain consensus, if they're to be convincing.
> Of course even without 1-way-pegs there's a much more important issue
> with your objection: worrying about creating new artificial scarcity
> races while innovating is fundementally a *moralistic* and *regulatory*
> concern that has no little if any bearing on whether or not the systems
> created are useful and secure. It's also an objection that raises
> serious questions about conflicts of interest between giving accurate
> and honest technical advice and promoting ways of using Bitcoin that
> will drive the price up.
IMO the question of whether scarcity can be preserved while enabling
innovation bears heavily on the liklihood of longterm viability of
said innovations - and perhaps of Bitcoin itself.
FWIW I'll happily declare that I hold a modest amount of BTC and have
an interest in the price appreciating. I'm sure you'll admit you're
hardly an impartial party in this discussion yourself Peter :) But it
really shouldn't matter. I'm not here today to make it, but I think
the argument for preservation of scarcity stands quite well on its own
merits - as rightly it should, regardless of anybody's interests.
> A number of mechanisms for detecting divergence are possible in embedded
> consensus systems, some of them even natural outcomes. For instance
> transactions can contain a hash of the previous consensus state, thereby
> creating an indicator of consensus measured in terms of economic stake.
> Extending that idea many anti-censorship proposals are to use such state
> hashes as encryption keys - if you are out of consensus you won't even
> see the transaction. (and you can't be double-spent either if
> implemented correctly; see my other reply to this thread today)
<snip>
> Indeed I did, which is why I worked out a better way to do upgrades
> almost a year ago:
>
> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg06578.html
<snip>
> The quality of Counterparty's software engineering has no bearing on
> whether or not the underlying idea is a good one; you wouldn't say ring
> signatures are an inherently bad idea just because the CryptoNote
> implementation of them is atrocious.
Very interesting. I admit I hadn't come across these ideas before; I
really must search the archive before posting :) They certainly offer
a measure of robustness over the naive approach. I'm not sure they
address my primary concerns however, WRT how consensus is demonstrated
and incentivised.
I know what my own node considers valid transaction history; how can I
be confident that everyone else takes the same view? For contrast,
with blockchain consensus, I can be confident that there is consensus
on the longest chain observed. If I receive a new transaction, simply
waiting for it to be buried under N blocks of PoW provides a high
level of confidence that everyone else considers it valid.
The obvious "embedded consensus" answer of "wait until N other
transactions have occurred that include a hash of system state that
includes your transaction" doesn't provide me with any confidence; it
could be simulated with a Sybil attack.
<snip>
> I prefer to make robust arguments; if I can start with accepting that
> 95% of what my opponents say is true, yet still end up being correct,
> all the better!
Indeed :) To avoid wasting time it's only ever worth arguing against
the strongest opposing position you're aware of (whether your opponent
is aware of it or not.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity
Gareth Williams [ARCHIVE] /
npub1jk…373ck
2023-06-07 15:27:54
in reply to nevent1q…0q7c
Author Public Key
npub1jkdfcglr59lwnhek94l393g0hhhaj0v5yzz3n5s3p0r9u0576sgs7373ckPublished at
2023-06-07 15:27:54Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-12-17\n📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Comparisons with the SPV security of sidechains are fallacious. The\n\u003e\u003e alternative to a proof-of-publication system reliant on client-side\n\u003e\u003e validation is a blockchain. The question of whether the token used on\n\u003e\u003e said blockchain should be two-way-pegged to BTC is completely orthogonal.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e (ie. yes, sidechains are \"economically secure\", in that you're reduced\n\u003e\u003e to balancing economic incentives to avoid peg theft. But sidechains also\n\u003e\u003e give us something unique in return - the ability to innovate without\n\u003e\u003e needing to start new artificial scarcity races. Nothing else can do that.)\n\u003e\n\u003e I covered this in my original post: 1-way-pegs allow the creation of new\n\u003e valuable tokens without those tokens being useful for speculation.\n\nI stand corrected. A permanent 1-way-peg is sufficient to preserve\nscarcity; \"nothing else can do that\" WRT 2-way-pegs was overreaching.\n\nI still don't see what \"2-way-peg vs. 1-way-peg\" has to do with\n\"embedded consensus vs. blockchain consensus\" though, and feel it\ndisingenious to conflate them.\n\nBlockchain consensus (eg. sidechains) can utilise either mechanism,\n1-way-peg or 2-way-peg. Arguments in favour of 1-way-peg are\ninteresting, but they're ultimatley just arguments in favour of one\ntype of sidechain over another.\n\nArguments in favour of embedded consensus - and I feel I'm being\ngenerous with the term \"consensus\" here - should surely stand on their\nown merit against blockchain consensus, if they're to be convincing.\n\n\u003e Of course even without 1-way-pegs there's a much more important issue\n\u003e with your objection: worrying about creating new artificial scarcity\n\u003e races while innovating is fundementally a *moralistic* and *regulatory*\n\u003e concern that has no little if any bearing on whether or not the systems\n\u003e created are useful and secure. It's also an objection that raises\n\u003e serious questions about conflicts of interest between giving accurate\n\u003e and honest technical advice and promoting ways of using Bitcoin that\n\u003e will drive the price up.\n\nIMO the question of whether scarcity can be preserved while enabling\ninnovation bears heavily on the liklihood of longterm viability of\nsaid innovations - and perhaps of Bitcoin itself.\n\nFWIW I'll happily declare that I hold a modest amount of BTC and have\nan interest in the price appreciating. I'm sure you'll admit you're\nhardly an impartial party in this discussion yourself Peter :) But it\nreally shouldn't matter. I'm not here today to make it, but I think\nthe argument for preservation of scarcity stands quite well on its own\nmerits - as rightly it should, regardless of anybody's interests.\n\n\u003e A number of mechanisms for detecting divergence are possible in embedded\n\u003e consensus systems, some of them even natural outcomes. For instance\n\u003e transactions can contain a hash of the previous consensus state, thereby\n\u003e creating an indicator of consensus measured in terms of economic stake.\n\u003e Extending that idea many anti-censorship proposals are to use such state\n\u003e hashes as encryption keys - if you are out of consensus you won't even\n\u003e see the transaction. (and you can't be double-spent either if\n\u003e implemented correctly; see my other reply to this thread today)\n\n\u003csnip\u003e\n\n\u003e Indeed I did, which is why I worked out a better way to do upgrades\n\u003e almost a year ago:\n\u003e\n\u003e http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg06578.html\n\n\u003csnip\u003e\n\n\u003e The quality of Counterparty's software engineering has no bearing on\n\u003e whether or not the underlying idea is a good one; you wouldn't say ring\n\u003e signatures are an inherently bad idea just because the CryptoNote\n\u003e implementation of them is atrocious.\n\nVery interesting. I admit I hadn't come across these ideas before; I\nreally must search the archive before posting :) They certainly offer\na measure of robustness over the naive approach. I'm not sure they\naddress my primary concerns however, WRT how consensus is demonstrated\nand incentivised.\n\nI know what my own node considers valid transaction history; how can I\nbe confident that everyone else takes the same view? For contrast,\nwith blockchain consensus, I can be confident that there is consensus\non the longest chain observed. If I receive a new transaction, simply\nwaiting for it to be buried under N blocks of PoW provides a high\nlevel of confidence that everyone else considers it valid.\n\nThe obvious \"embedded consensus\" answer of \"wait until N other\ntransactions have occurred that include a hash of system state that\nincludes your transaction\" doesn't provide me with any confidence; it\ncould be simulated with a Sybil attack.\n\n\u003csnip\u003e\n\n\u003e I prefer to make robust arguments; if I can start with accepting that\n\u003e 95% of what my opponents say is true, yet still end up being correct,\n\u003e all the better!\n\nIndeed :) To avoid wasting time it's only ever worth arguing against\nthe strongest opposing position you're aware of (whether your opponent\nis aware of it or not.)\n\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity",
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