📅 Original date posted:2019-10-04
📝 Original message:Since the user can't prove that they are using this technique, or
petertodd's timelock encryption for that matter, an attacker has little
incentive to stop physically attacking until they have a spendable UTXO.
I believe you can get the same effect with on-chain timelocks, or
delete-the-bits plus a rangeproof and a zero-knowledge proof that the
rangeproof corresponds to some secret that can be used to derive the
expected public key. I think Jeremy Rubin had an idea for such a proof.
Also, adam3us has described a similar thought here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=311000.0
- Bryan
On Fri, Oct 4, 2019, 4:43 AM Saulo Fonseca via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi everyone
>
> If you are a hodler, I like to propose the creation of a key stretching as
> a new layer of protection over your current wallet.
>
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Bryan Bishop [ARCHIVE] /
npub1vt…jsjpg
2023-06-07 18:21:07
in reply to nevent1q…0pcu
Author Public Key
npub1vtwuk4rjyj6zrq3tv2z9lvdm6a7g8zujf0gz9q2vljlztdaqw36sjjsjpgPublished at
2023-06-07 18:21:07Event JSON
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"pubkey": "62ddcb547224b421822b62845fb1bbd77c838b924bd022814cfcbe25b7a07475",
"created_at": 1686162067,
"kind": 1,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2019-10-04\n📝 Original message:Since the user can't prove that they are using this technique, or\npetertodd's timelock encryption for that matter, an attacker has little\nincentive to stop physically attacking until they have a spendable UTXO.\n\nI believe you can get the same effect with on-chain timelocks, or\ndelete-the-bits plus a rangeproof and a zero-knowledge proof that the\nrangeproof corresponds to some secret that can be used to derive the\nexpected public key. I think Jeremy Rubin had an idea for such a proof.\n\nAlso, adam3us has described a similar thought here:\nhttps://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=311000.0\n\n- Bryan\n\nOn Fri, Oct 4, 2019, 4:43 AM Saulo Fonseca via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi everyone\n\u003e\n\u003e If you are a hodler, I like to propose the creation of a key stretching as\n\u003e a new layer of protection over your current wallet.\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20191004/1473ba33/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "ef2a83f21394dc96bb03c4e7faa6bb84b1fba4bcab642ca0afad3af869ee5c96573af88ef34f44827ab55d4f1ccd7d3523889a061952c47bee8ae89fd650652f"
}