Nothing that is nearly as secure:
From their github description:
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.
WestleBittle
npub1fm…dd68n
2024-07-31 03:03:42
in reply to nevent1q…h4sf
Author Public Key
npub1fmcnvrf7kf6jupqljvajwwssfvmlredp3hfa6g7gmanyggzrgczsvdd68nPublished at
2024-07-31 03:03:42Event JSON
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"pubkey": "4ef1360d3eb2752e041f933b273a104b37f1e5a18dd3dd23c8df664420434605",
"created_at": 1722395022,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
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],
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],
"content": "Nothing that is nearly as secure:\n\nFrom their github description:\nhttps://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases\n\nSimple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to content or files. Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the apk assets. It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with no access to the network (unlike a browser), files, or other content.",
"sig": "c3ede6f2f08e5597a58fd0d33c816c620b1200b04ddb03dedbec330ecb778ca19752cb06a0efc6f34f6c73c7c41db0a8cf49ffcbe788f233443674d98a156f25"
}