📅 Original date posted:2020-10-23
📝 Original message:
Hi Bastien,
We add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid
> unconditionally when offering an HTLC.
> We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when
> receiving an HTLC, but refunded
> if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes
> about this).
>
It is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively
independent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment
could quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said,
just transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the
offerer to the receiver.
I am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I
agree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be
enough.
Maybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make
5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be
willing to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor.
Suppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should
the fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still
earn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both
the controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario?
- Joost
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Joost Jager [ARCHIVE] /
npub1as…wfqmx
2023-06-09 13:01:16
in reply to nevent1q…7h2w
Author Public Key
npub1aslmpzentw224n3s6yccru4dq2qdlx7rfudfnqevfck637cjt6esswfqmxPublished at
2023-06-09 13:01:16Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2020-10-23\n📝 Original message:\nHi Bastien,\n\nWe add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid\n\u003e unconditionally when offering an HTLC.\n\u003e We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when\n\u003e receiving an HTLC, but refunded\n\u003e if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes\n\u003e about this).\n\u003e\n\nIt is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively\nindependent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment\ncould quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said,\njust transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the\nofferer to the receiver.\n\nI am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I\nagree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be\nenough.\n\nMaybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make\n5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be\nwilling to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor.\n\nSuppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should\nthe fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still\nearn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both\nthe controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario?\n\n- Joost\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20201023/9b24ec04/attachment.html\u003e",
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