đź“… Original date posted:2018-09-16
📝 Original message:Hash rate cannot get “more uneconomical”. Mining will always seek a return equal to the cost of capital, as does all production, and the energy expended will always be fundamentally a function of the fee level and energy price. Fee level is determined by variable demand for a fixed supply of confirmation.
When you say greed you are simply referring to economically-rational behavior. It canny be eliminated, nor would that be a benefit.
WRT energy consumption, there is nothing that can be done to reduce it except for people to stop using Bitcoin or for energy to get more expensive.
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> On Sep 15, 2018, at 15:45, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
>
> I would prefer to see (not only with your proposal) greater bias toward hashrate being exponentially more uneconomical the more it rises to stifle greed. The current level of mining already greatly exceeds that necessary for the stability of the network and far lower hashrates are completely acceptible provided the network is protected from large switch-ons, which I say is achievable.
>
> I do have other thoughts to approach greed that I have not yet made formal on this list, much unrelated to your proposal, but, I see freedom of use of Bitcoin needing to be censorship resistant but not necessarily mining provided it is protected enough or free or flexible enough to allow for, say, 50k globally distributed standard mining hardware units to exist operating at any one time profitably. That said, I am PoW only and not PoS orientated.
>
> From: akaramaoun at gmail.com <akaramaoun at gmail.com> on behalf of Andrew <onelineproof at gmail.com>
> Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2018 2:01:19 AM
> To: Damian Williamson
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
>
> @Moral Agent: No problem. I did ask in the first post what the current
> plans are for selfish miner prevention. So if anyone has any other
> relevant ideas (not just for selfish mining but for making mining more
> decentralized and competetive), then please post it, but I just prefer
> to focus on my proposal more than others.
>
> @Damian: I think you are concerned that this will incentivize more
> global resource consumption and will be detrimental to our
> environment? Personally, I believe centralization of energy does more
> harm to the environment rather than total energy consumption. If
> Bitcoin helps "power" to become more decentralized, then I wouldn't be
> surprised if total (global) energy consumption actually decreases. The
> debt based economy is forcing us to continuously grow and use up more
> resources, and collectivism is turning individuals into
> super-organisms capable of doing much more harm to the environment
> than can be done by one or a just a few individuals working
> independently. In my proposal, I actually allow for changing
> environmental conditions by measuring only the peak hashrate of the
> past year, and not the full history of blocks.
>
> On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Damian Williamson <willtech at live.com.au> wrote:
> >>This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate
> >> rises.
> >
> >
> > Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought about
> > moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will
> > consume all available resources within the colony's objective just to spread
> > as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individual
> > returns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed model
> > := bacteria.
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: bitcoin-dev-bounces at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <bitcoin-dev-bounces at lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Andrew via
> > bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM
> > To: Bitcoin Dev
> > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
> >
> > I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
> > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
> >
> > The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
> > and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
> > and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
> > order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of
> > changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.
> >
> > You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk
> > thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of
> > "reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout
> > script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total
> > fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "reserve"
> > (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee will
> > be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h
> > and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),
> > a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction
> > (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be
> > released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in
> > that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps
> > rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can be
> > used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for
> > paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block
> > space).
> >
> > This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since
> > if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.
> > Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising
> > hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require
> > transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.
> >
> > I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there
> > is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the
> > block reward, but they will get more important, and this change
> > wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners
> > have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the
> > anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements
> > for validation are quite small I believe.
> >
> > On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew <onelineproof at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to
> >> mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently.
> >> What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the
> >> future plans?
> >>
> >> One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according
> >> to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)
> >> consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1
> >> day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can
> >> then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at
> >> peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of
> >> 0.5 r.
> >>
> >> If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then
> >> they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that,
> >> the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their
> >> interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.
> >>
> >> What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due
> >> to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to
> >> be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment
> >> algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising
> >> indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.
> >>
> >> Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion
> >> of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
>
> --
> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sg…ppx3c
2023-06-07 18:14:22
in reply to nevent1q…rkgw
Author Public Key
npub1sgs97fe0n9wehe6zw7drcxdz4cy9yt9pfqjv8gasz5jlk4zezc0quppx3cPublished at
2023-06-07 18:14:22Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-09-16\n📝 Original message:Hash rate cannot get “more uneconomical”. Mining will always seek a return equal to the cost of capital, as does all production, and the energy expended will always be fundamentally a function of the fee level and energy price. Fee level is determined by variable demand for a fixed supply of confirmation.\n\nWhen you say greed you are simply referring to economically-rational behavior. It canny be eliminated, nor would that be a benefit.\n\nWRT energy consumption, there is nothing that can be done to reduce it except for people to stop using Bitcoin or for energy to get more expensive.\n\ne\n\n\u003e On Sep 15, 2018, at 15:45, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says \"And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising,\" - what actually happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?\n\u003e \n\u003e I would prefer to see (not only with your proposal) greater bias toward hashrate being exponentially more uneconomical the more it rises to stifle greed. The current level of mining already greatly exceeds that necessary for the stability of the network and far lower hashrates are completely acceptible provided the network is protected from large switch-ons, which I say is achievable.\n\u003e \n\u003e I do have other thoughts to approach greed that I have not yet made formal on this list, much unrelated to your proposal, but, I see freedom of use of Bitcoin needing to be censorship resistant but not necessarily mining provided it is protected enough or free or flexible enough to allow for, say, 50k globally distributed standard mining hardware units to exist operating at any one time profitably. That said, I am PoW only and not PoS orientated.\n\u003e \n\u003e From: akaramaoun at gmail.com \u003cakaramaoun at gmail.com\u003e on behalf of Andrew \u003conelineproof at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2018 2:01:19 AM\n\u003e To: Damian Williamson\n\u003e Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion\n\u003e Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention\n\u003e \n\u003e @Moral Agent: No problem. I did ask in the first post what the current\n\u003e plans are for selfish miner prevention. So if anyone has any other\n\u003e relevant ideas (not just for selfish mining but for making mining more\n\u003e decentralized and competetive), then please post it, but I just prefer\n\u003e to focus on my proposal more than others.\n\u003e \n\u003e @Damian: I think you are concerned that this will incentivize more\n\u003e global resource consumption and will be detrimental to our\n\u003e environment? Personally, I believe centralization of energy does more\n\u003e harm to the environment rather than total energy consumption. If\n\u003e Bitcoin helps \"power\" to become more decentralized, then I wouldn't be\n\u003e surprised if total (global) energy consumption actually decreases. The\n\u003e debt based economy is forcing us to continuously grow and use up more\n\u003e resources, and collectivism is turning individuals into\n\u003e super-organisms capable of doing much more harm to the environment\n\u003e than can be done by one or a just a few individuals working\n\u003e independently. In my proposal, I actually allow for changing\n\u003e environmental conditions by measuring only the peak hashrate of the\n\u003e past year, and not the full history of blocks.\n\u003e \n\u003e On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Damian Williamson \u003cwilltech at live.com.au\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003eThis \"reserve\" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate\n\u003e \u003e\u003e rises.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought about\n\u003e \u003e moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will\n\u003e \u003e consume all available resources within the colony's objective just to spread\n\u003e \u003e as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individual\n\u003e \u003e returns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed model\n\u003e \u003e := bacteria.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e ________________________________\n\u003e \u003e From: bitcoin-dev-bounces at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev-bounces at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e on behalf of Andrew via\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM\n\u003e \u003e To: Bitcoin Dev\n\u003e \u003e Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I discussed this more at bitcointalk:\n\u003e \u003e https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining\n\u003e \u003e and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,\n\u003e \u003e and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in\n\u003e \u003e order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of\n\u003e \u003e changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk\n\u003e \u003e thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of\n\u003e \u003e \"reserve fees\". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout\n\u003e \u003e script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total\n\u003e \u003e fee that is held in \"reserve\" and the time it is held in \"reserve\"\n\u003e \u003e (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This \"reserve\" part of the fee will\n\u003e \u003e be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h\n\u003e \u003e and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),\n\u003e \u003e a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 \u003e h, then the fraction\n\u003e \u003e (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be\n\u003e \u003e released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in\n\u003e \u003e that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps\n\u003e \u003e rising, until the \"contract\" expires, and the leftover part can be\n\u003e \u003e used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for\n\u003e \u003e paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block\n\u003e \u003e space).\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since\n\u003e \u003e if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.\n\u003e \u003e Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising\n\u003e \u003e hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require\n\u003e \u003e transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there\n\u003e \u003e is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the\n\u003e \u003e block reward, but they will get more important, and this change\n\u003e \u003e wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners\n\u003e \u003e have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the\n\u003e \u003e anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements\n\u003e \u003e for validation are quite small I believe.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew \u003conelineproof at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to\n\u003e \u003e\u003e mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e future plans?\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e One idea I have is to let the block reward get \"modulated\" according\n\u003e \u003e\u003e to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1\n\u003e \u003e\u003e day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can\n\u003e \u003e\u003e then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at\n\u003e \u003e\u003e peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of\n\u003e \u003e\u003e 0.5 r.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then\n\u003e \u003e\u003e they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their\n\u003e \u003e\u003e interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due\n\u003e \u003e\u003e to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to\n\u003e \u003e\u003e be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment\n\u003e \u003e\u003e algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising\n\u003e \u003e\u003e indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion\n\u003e \u003e\u003e of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e --\n\u003e \u003e\u003e PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647\n\u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e -- \n\u003e PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180916/71c3ed59/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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