npub14euckequu3krttkqcf7ru465getd52aw9wzrp95mqnchq7g6e2esrjvx4x (npub14eu…vx4x) that is the modal logic point of you in a way. All complete coherent sets of statements, form a possible world. Truth is relative to a world. That is a proposition P is a set of possible world. It is true at a world w if w is a world in P.
Consider
P = bblfish is in Munich
There are many ways the world could be and P be true. There is a world in which it is raining now in Munich and there is a world in which it’s not raining in Munich and I am there. There is a world in which there are n grains of sand on a beach in Normandy and P is true and there is a world in which the number of grains n+1….
Information in so far as it is syntactic is just a set of sentences. Let’s assume these have a conventional interpretation in a language L: that is a mapping of sentences to sets of possible worlds. Whether a sentence is true or not depends on where the actual world is. Therefore, we cannot just by looking at sentences find out if they are true or not, unless they are mathematical statements and so true at all possible worlds.
In so far as disinformation is related to truth or falsity, it can only be determined whether it is true or not by looking at the world.
So part of the answer then is that we cannot determine if some sentences phi is disinformation just by looking at the sentence phi.
bblfish /
npub17z…vlu4q
2023-06-08 22:28:23
in reply to nevent1q…m7xl
Author Public Key
npub17zlzl8wpm0fqrx69pa0fqk6ccvxl3tc4y7h2c74c7r9c82ga7waslvlu4qPublished at
2023-06-08 22:28:23Event JSON
{
"id": "9e648d92e5655d91fba9f69a7888df379ea87882f88783c6d8bd04ea29cae8b2",
"pubkey": "f0be2f9dc1dbd2019b450f5e905b58c30df8af1527aeac7ab8f0cb83a91df3bb",
"created_at": 1686263303,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"p",
"ae798b641ce46c35aec0c27c3e57544656da2bae2b8430969b04f170791acab3",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"p",
"36ce1f7400469a5b8d3bb56ccb3309720861cf3283cb1f00fcc8f81446a2aa59",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub"
],
[
"e",
"46f6c57237e83dd30690498be4572ea89a544aec409dd358d33cfb29033aa3db",
"wss://relay.mostr.pub",
"reply"
],
[
"mostr",
"https://mathstodon.xyz/users/bblfish/statuses/110510951881353232"
]
],
"content": "nostr:npub14euckequu3krttkqcf7ru465getd52aw9wzrp95mqnchq7g6e2esrjvx4x that is the modal logic point of you in a way. All complete coherent sets of statements, form a possible world. Truth is relative to a world. That is a proposition P is a set of possible world. It is true at a world w if w is a world in P.\nConsider \nP = bblfish is in Munich\nThere are many ways the world could be and P be true. There is a world in which it is raining now in Munich and there is a world in which it’s not raining in Munich and I am there. There is a world in which there are n grains of sand on a beach in Normandy and P is true and there is a world in which the number of grains n+1….\nInformation in so far as it is syntactic is just a set of sentences. Let’s assume these have a conventional interpretation in a language L: that is a mapping of sentences to sets of possible worlds. Whether a sentence is true or not depends on where the actual world is. Therefore, we cannot just by looking at sentences find out if they are true or not, unless they are mathematical statements and so true at all possible worlds.\nIn so far as disinformation is related to truth or falsity, it can only be determined whether it is true or not by looking at the world. \n\nSo part of the answer then is that we cannot determine if some sentences phi is disinformation just by looking at the sentence phi.",
"sig": "3afc592950edba5d7c4e1cc6e354e3a940c0e84cb21fc17fac7cdeb95b411f1b686e28d51de54fc878555feca9b7b023e4eadd2d17f7d9f6fe6de4032fa62752"
}