📅 Original date posted:2016-07-10
📝 Original message:
Hi .... forgive me if I have missed something obvious.
In the LN whitepaper (like many others) the discussion revolves around
Alice and Bob interacting ... fine.
IF Alice and Bob interact many times during an interval, there is clear
chance to optimize that to a single 'settlement' on the block chain.
My question is about how likely it is that Alice and Bob are going to
interact many times per interval.
Take the Point Of Sale case - just using myself as an example. I might
make a number of purchases, but that will be with a number of shops in
any given day. So there is no optimization possible there. Lots of
single A-->B interactions ... but many different 'B' entities.
If the interval is a month ... then since I am fairly predictable... ,
I purchase from the same shops many times in that month... that could be
optimized. BUT will the merchants be happy with (up to) a months worth
of revenue still pending inside LN? I dont think so. Visa via the
banks, allows merchants access to the pending funds, with the proviso
that they may be reversed in the future. Cashflow is vital to merchants.
OK - that is for the Alice and Bob case of interactions. Now for the
other little problem I see here - which makes things even worse.
With Bitcoin it is NOT 'Alice transacting with Bob'.
It is Address(1) transacting with Address(2) .... and if both parties
are following the recommended practice of not re-using addresses, then
their next interaction is Address(3) transacting with Address(4) -
removing any possibility of optimization.
As far as I can tell, long running channels, are by definition identical
to address re-use for the period they are open. That makes them very
vulnerable to traffic analysis and thus have lower security that native
Bitcoin transactions. That is probably acceptable for many use cases,
but it is a tradeoff to gain performance.
I have some other questions for Rusty about routing and location
brokerage too - but that can wait.
Cheers
Ron OHara
--
Talent hits a target no one else can hit, genius hits a target no one
else can see
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