📅 Original date posted:2014-03-27
📝 Original message:>
> But these cases are the norm, rather than the exception.
>
Well, you're lucky, you live in Berlin. Most of the payments I make with
Bitcoin are online, to websites. So this will differ between people.
I wonder how critical it is. Let's say you are paying for a meal. In your
head the place you're at is just "the little Indian restaurant on the
corner". In the companies register and therefore certificate it's something
like "Singh Food GmbH". That's probably good enough to prevent shenanigans.
Even if there's a virus on your phone, it can't really replace the cert
with a random stolen one, otherwise your meal could show up like "IronCore
Steel Inc" or something that's obviously bogus. It'd have to be an
incredibly smart virus that knew how to substitute one name for a different
one, from a large library of stolen identities, such that the swap seemed
plausible. That sounds very hard, certainly too hard to bother with for
stealing restaurant fees.
And if a waiter at the restaurant is corrupt and they replace the cert with
one that's for their own 1-man business "BP-Gupta" or something, OK, you
might pay the wrong person by mistake. But eventually the corrupt waiter
will be discovered and then someone will have proof of what they did. It's
FAR more likely they'd just strip the signature entirely and try to
convince you the restaurant doesn't use BIP70 at all.
Still, if we want to fix this, one approach I was thinking about is to have
a super-cheesy CA just for us that issues certs with addresses in them, for
any name you ask for. That is, if you say you want a cert for "Shamrock
Irish Pub, Wollishofen, Zurich, CH" then it either sends a postcard to that
address with a code to check ownership of the address, or it checks
ownership of the place on Google Maps (which does the same postcard trick
but for free!).
That doesn't work for vending machines, but perhaps we just don't care
about those. If a MITM steals your lunch money, boo hoo.
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Mike Hearn [ARCHIVE] /
npub17t…4qgyd
2023-06-07 15:14:26
in reply to nevent1q…h378
Author Public Key
npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgydPublished at
2023-06-07 15:14:26Event JSON
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"created_at": 1686150866,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-03-27\n📝 Original message:\u003e\n\u003e But these cases are the norm, rather than the exception.\n\u003e\n\nWell, you're lucky, you live in Berlin. Most of the payments I make with\nBitcoin are online, to websites. So this will differ between people.\n\nI wonder how critical it is. Let's say you are paying for a meal. In your\nhead the place you're at is just \"the little Indian restaurant on the\ncorner\". In the companies register and therefore certificate it's something\nlike \"Singh Food GmbH\". That's probably good enough to prevent shenanigans.\nEven if there's a virus on your phone, it can't really replace the cert\nwith a random stolen one, otherwise your meal could show up like \"IronCore\nSteel Inc\" or something that's obviously bogus. It'd have to be an\nincredibly smart virus that knew how to substitute one name for a different\none, from a large library of stolen identities, such that the swap seemed\nplausible. That sounds very hard, certainly too hard to bother with for\nstealing restaurant fees.\n\nAnd if a waiter at the restaurant is corrupt and they replace the cert with\none that's for their own 1-man business \"BP-Gupta\" or something, OK, you\nmight pay the wrong person by mistake. But eventually the corrupt waiter\nwill be discovered and then someone will have proof of what they did. It's\nFAR more likely they'd just strip the signature entirely and try to\nconvince you the restaurant doesn't use BIP70 at all.\n\nStill, if we want to fix this, one approach I was thinking about is to have\na super-cheesy CA just for us that issues certs with addresses in them, for\nany name you ask for. That is, if you say you want a cert for \"Shamrock\nIrish Pub, Wollishofen, Zurich, CH\" then it either sends a postcard to that\naddress with a code to check ownership of the address, or it checks\nownership of the place on Google Maps (which does the same postcard trick\nbut for free!).\n\nThat doesn't work for vending machines, but perhaps we just don't care\nabout those. If a MITM steals your lunch money, boo hoo.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140327/f46de8de/attachment.html\u003e",
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