📅 Original date posted:2014-10-05
📝 Original message:On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 1:40 AM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:
> Something you might want to try to formalize in your analysis is the
> proportion of the network which is "rational" vs
> "honest"/"altruistic". Intuitively, if there is a significant amount
> of honest hashrate which is refusing to aid the greedy behavior even
> at a potential loss to themselves this strategy becomes a loser even
> for the purely greedy participants. It would be interesting to
> characterize the income tradeoffs for different amounts of altruism,
> or whatever convergence problems an attempt by altruistic
> participaints to punish the forkers might create.
Not only that, greedy miners may actually have an incentive to just
follow the longest chain. Say I'm a small miner and I know that the
chances of re-mining the high tx and getting that block into the
longest chain are minimal or null. Then I will probably prefer to just
mine on top of the longest chain.
So "If everyone acts rationally in his own interest, then the best
choice for the remaining miners is to try to mine a competing block at
the same height n including the high-fee transaction, to collect the
fee for themselves" is not necessarily true.
p * 50 can be lower than q * 25 if p < 2*q. P and q depend on what
everyone is doing, not just you.
In any case, it is interesting to think about this things since mining
subsidies will eventually disappear and then transaction fees will
ALWAYS be higher than subsidies.
Jorge Timón [ARCHIVE] /
npub1fx…cl2d8
2023-06-07 15:26:16
in reply to nevent1q…8sge
Author Public Key
npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8Published at
2023-06-07 15:26:16Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-10-05\n📝 Original message:On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 1:40 AM, Gregory Maxwell \u003cgmaxwell at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e Something you might want to try to formalize in your analysis is the\n\u003e proportion of the network which is \"rational\" vs\n\u003e \"honest\"/\"altruistic\". Intuitively, if there is a significant amount\n\u003e of honest hashrate which is refusing to aid the greedy behavior even\n\u003e at a potential loss to themselves this strategy becomes a loser even\n\u003e for the purely greedy participants. It would be interesting to\n\u003e characterize the income tradeoffs for different amounts of altruism,\n\u003e or whatever convergence problems an attempt by altruistic\n\u003e participaints to punish the forkers might create.\n\nNot only that, greedy miners may actually have an incentive to just\nfollow the longest chain. Say I'm a small miner and I know that the\nchances of re-mining the high tx and getting that block into the\nlongest chain are minimal or null. Then I will probably prefer to just\nmine on top of the longest chain.\nSo \"If everyone acts rationally in his own interest, then the best\nchoice for the remaining miners is to try to mine a competing block at\nthe same height n including the high-fee transaction, to collect the\nfee for themselves\" is not necessarily true.\np * 50 can be lower than q * 25 if p \u003c 2*q. P and q depend on what\neveryone is doing, not just you.\n\nIn any case, it is interesting to think about this things since mining\nsubsidies will eventually disappear and then transaction fees will\nALWAYS be higher than subsidies.",
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