https://www.zerohedge.com/energy/trump-aims-400-gw-nuclear-2050-10-large-reactors-under-construction-2030
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naddr1qq…vn9f1. Introduction
Over the last 250 years the world’s appetite for energy has soared along an unmistakably exponential trajectory, transforming societies and economies alike. After a half‑century of relative deceleration, a new mix of technological, demographic and political forces now hints at an impending catch‑up phase that could push demand back onto its centuries‑long growth curve. This post knits together the history, the numbers and the newest policy signals to explore what that rebound might look like—and how Gen‑4 nuclear power could meet it.
2. The Long Exponential: 1750 – 1975
Early industrialisation replaced muscle, wood and water with coal‑fired steam, pushing global primary energy use from a few exajoules per year in 1750 to roughly 60 EJ by 1900 and 250 EJ by 1975. Over that span aggregate consumption doubled roughly every 25–35 years, equivalent to a long‑run compound growth rate of ~3 % yr‑¹. Per‑capita use climbed even faster in industrialised economies as factories, railways and electric lighting spread.
3. 1975 – 2025: The Great Slowdown
3.1 Efficiency & Structural Change
• Oil shocks (1973, 1979) and volatile prices pushed OECD economies to squeeze more GDP from each joule.
• Services displaced heavy industry in rich countries, trimming energy intensity.
• Refrigerators, motors and vehicles became dramatically more efficient.3.2 Policy & Technology
• The Inflation Reduction Act (U.S.) now layers zero‑emission production credits and technology‑neutral tax incentives on top of existing nuclear PTCs citeturn1search0turn1search2.
• The EU’s Net‑Zero Industry Act aims to streamline siting and finance for “net‑zero technologies”, explicitly naming advanced nuclear citeturn0search1.3.3 Result
Global primary energy in 2024 stands near 600 EJ (≈ 167 000 TWh)—still growing, but the line has flattened versus the pre‑1975 exponential.
4. Population & Per‑Capita Demand
World population tripled between 1950 and today, yet total energy use grew roughly six‑fold. The imbalance reflects rising living standards and electrification. Looking ahead, the UN projects population to plateau near 10.4 billion in the 2080s, but per‑capita demand is poised to climb as the Global South industrialises.
5. The Policy Pivot of 2023‑2025
Region Signal Year Implication COP 28 Declaration 20+ nations pledge to triple nuclear capacity by 2050 2023 High‑level political cover for rapid nuclear build‑out citeturn0search2 Europe Post‑crisis sentiment shifts; blackout in Iberia re‑opens nuclear debate 2025 Spain, Germany, Switzerland and others revisit phase‑outs citeturn0news63 United States TVA submits first SMR construction permit; NRC advances BWRX‑300 review 2025 Regulatory pathway for fleet deployment citeturn1search9turn1search1 Global Strategy Report “Six Dimensions for Success” playbook for new nuclear entrants 2025 Practical roadmap for emerging economies citeturn0search0 U.S. Congress Proposed cuts to DOE loan office threaten build‑out pace 2025 Finance bottleneck remains a risk citeturn1news28
6. The Catch‑Up Scenario
Suppose the recent 50‑year pause ends in 2025, and total energy demand returns to a midpoint historical doubling period of 12.5 years (the average of the 10–15 year rebound window).
6.1 Consumption Trajectory
Year Doublings since 2024 Demand (TWh) 2024 0 167 000 2037 1 334 000 2050 2 668 000 2062 3 1 336 000 (Table ignores efficiency gains from electrification for a conservative, supply‑side sizing.)
7. Nuclear‑Only Supply Model
7.1 Reactor Math
- 1 GWᵉ Gen‑4 reactor → 8.76 TWh yr‑¹ at 100 % capacity factor.
- 2062 requirement: 1 336 000 TWh yr‑¹ → ≈ 152 500 reactors in steady state.
- Build rate (2025‑2062, linear deployment):
152 500 ÷ 38 years ≈ 4 000 reactors per year globally.
(Down from the earlier 5 000 yr‑¹ estimate because the deployment window now stretches 38 years instead of 30.)
7.2 Policy Benchmarks
- COP 28 triple target translates to +780 GW (if baseline 2020 ≈ 390 GW). That is <100 1 GW units per year—two orders of magnitude lower than the theoretical catch‑up requirement, highlighting just how aggressive our thought experiment is.
7.3 Distributed vs Grid‑Centric
Small Modular Reactors (300 MW class) can be sited on retiring coal plants, using existing grid interconnects and cooling, vastly reducing new transmission needs. Ultra‑large “gigawatt corridors” become optional rather than mandatory, though meshed regional grids still improve resilience and market liquidity.
8. Challenges & Unknowns
- Finance: Even with IRA‑style credits, first‑of‑a‑kind Gen‑4 builds carry high cost of capital.
- Supply Chain: 4 000 reactors a year means a reactor‑grade steel output roughly 20× today’s level.
- Waste & Public Trust: Advanced reactors can burn actinides, but geologic repositories remain essential.
- Workforce: Nuclear engineers, welders and regulators are already in short supply.
- Competing Technologies: Cheap renewables + storage and prospective fusion could displace part of the projected load.
9. Conclusions
Recent policy shifts—from Europe’s Net‑Zero Industry Act to the COP 28 nuclear declaration—signal that governments once again see nuclear energy as indispensable to deep decarbonisation. Yet meeting an exponential catch‑up in demand would require deployment rates an order of magnitude beyond today’s commitments, testing manufacturing capacity, finance and political resolve.
Whether the future follows the modest path now embedded in policy or the steeper curve sketched here, two convictions stand out:
- Electrification will dominate new energy demand.
- Scalable, dispatchable low‑carbon generation—likely including large fleets of Gen‑4 fission plants—must fill much of that gap if net‑zero targets are to remain credible.
Last updated 1 June 2025.