š
Original date posted:2014-12-16
š Original message:On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:55:50AM +0200, Alex Mizrahi wrote:
> Usually at this point people say "we assume that miners aren't going to
> collude, otherwise even Bitcoin is not secure".
> Well, this is BS. The fact that a pool can acquire more than 50% of total
> hashpower was successfully demonstrated by ghash.io.
> But the thing is, Bitcoin doesn't offer one a good way to attack the whole,
> as there are powerful factors which will work against the attacker.
> But this is not the case with sidechains (or any merged-mined chains, for
> that matter).
> And once you have a clear incentive, collusion is much more likely.
+1
It's notable that blockstream hasn't published much if anything concrete
on what exactly you'd use merge-mined sidechains for; they're even worse
than Ethereum in that regard.
> > Proof of Burn is a real cost for following the rules.
> >
>
> So what? As long as cost is less than revenue, it is OK.
It's even better than that: if an attack does happen, the participants
in the consensus system have an incentive to defend against it to
maintain the value of their tokens. Proof-of-burn allows that defense to
be in response to a threat, and essentially unlimited in size.
So now any attacker knows that if they launch an attack in theory the
response could be as strong as the value of the system itself.
This can be improved upon with systems that allow the tokens to be
burned, "internal" proof-of-burn. This suffers from "nothing-at-stake"
vulnerabilities to an extent, OTOH within the context of the system it
is a true sacrifice of value; probably not a big deal in a zookeyv-style
block-DAG where multiple lines of history can be combined. Here the
incentives of the defenders are even more strongly tipped towards
burning their value to preserve the system, not unlike
replace-by-fee-scorched-earth thinking.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] /
npub1m2ā¦a2np2
2023-06-07 15:27:47
in reply to nevent1qā¦30nf
Author Public Key
npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2Seen on
wss://relay.noswhere.comPublished at
2023-06-07 15:27:47Event JSON
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Original date posted:2014-12-16\nš Original message:On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:55:50AM +0200, Alex Mizrahi wrote:\n\u003e Usually at this point people say \"we assume that miners aren't going to\n\u003e collude, otherwise even Bitcoin is not secure\".\n\u003e Well, this is BS. The fact that a pool can acquire more than 50% of total\n\u003e hashpower was successfully demonstrated by ghash.io.\n\u003e But the thing is, Bitcoin doesn't offer one a good way to attack the whole,\n\u003e as there are powerful factors which will work against the attacker.\n\u003e But this is not the case with sidechains (or any merged-mined chains, for\n\u003e that matter).\n\u003e And once you have a clear incentive, collusion is much more likely.\n\n+1\n\nIt's notable that blockstream hasn't published much if anything concrete\non what exactly you'd use merge-mined sidechains for; they're even worse\nthan Ethereum in that regard.\n\n\u003e \u003e Proof of Burn is a real cost for following the rules.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \n\u003e So what? As long as cost is less than revenue, it is OK.\n\nIt's even better than that: if an attack does happen, the participants\nin the consensus system have an incentive to defend against it to\nmaintain the value of their tokens. Proof-of-burn allows that defense to\nbe in response to a threat, and essentially unlimited in size.\n\nSo now any attacker knows that if they launch an attack in theory the\nresponse could be as strong as the value of the system itself.\n\nThis can be improved upon with systems that allow the tokens to be\nburned, \"internal\" proof-of-burn. This suffers from \"nothing-at-stake\"\nvulnerabilities to an extent, OTOH within the context of the system it\nis a true sacrifice of value; probably not a big deal in a zookeyv-style\nblock-DAG where multiple lines of history can be combined. Here the\nincentives of the defenders are even more strongly tipped towards\nburning their value to preserve the system, not unlike\nreplace-by-fee-scorched-earth thinking.\n\n-- \n'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n00000000000000000e0c078667795abe21bfdebb913eba60cc7a625c732f0a89\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 650 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20141216/369a1f00/attachment.sig\u003e",
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