📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28
📝 Original message:> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:36 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 10:29:54PM +0200, Eric Voskuil wrote:
>>
>>
>>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 08:35:26PM +0200, Eric Voskuil wrote:
>>>> Hi Peter,
>>>>
>>>> What in this BIP makes a MITM attack easier (or easy) to detect, or increases the probability of one being detected?
>>>
>>> BIP151 gives users the tools to detect a MITM attack.
>>>
>>> It's kinda like PGP in that way: lots of PGP users don't properly check keys,
>>
>> PGP requires a secure side channel for transmission of public keys. How does one "check" a key of an anonymous peer? I know you well enough to know you wouldn't trust a PGP key received over an insecure channel.
>>
>> All you can prove is that you are talking to a peer and that communications in the session remain with that peer. The peer can be the attacker. As Jonas has acknowledged, authentication is required to actually guard against MITM attacks.
>
> Easy: anonymous peers aren't always actually anonymous.
>
> A MITM attacker can't easily distinguish communications between two nodes that
> randomly picked their peers, and nodes that are connected because their operators manually used -addnode to peer; in the latter case the operators can
> check whether or not they're being attacked with an out-of-band key check.
An "out of band key check" is not part of BIP151. It requires a secure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't provide the tools to detect an attack, that requires authentication. A general requirement for authentication is the issue I have raised.
e
Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sg…ppx3c
2023-06-07 17:51:38
in reply to nevent1q…hkyv
Author Public Key
npub1sgs97fe0n9wehe6zw7drcxdz4cy9yt9pfqjv8gasz5jlk4zezc0quppx3cPublished at
2023-06-07 17:51:38Event JSON
{
"id": "97f47943e4ef6ef5420f3a8148bd4ffa24c125713ac2afdb0fe0a5c05ad3d4ce",
"pubkey": "82205f272f995d9be742779a3c19a2ae08522ca14824c3a3b01525fb5459161e",
"created_at": 1686160298,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"d0e8bb25d553b30c0cc0d96d85855c267cf10b5981dd5042024df41c59046cbd",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"bab6266af48f008d501b76bf79a64040232045e8c9d04035c814915d2998d3c7",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"daa2fc676a25e3b5b45644540bcbd1e1168b111427cd0e3cf19c56194fb231aa"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-06-28\n📝 Original message:\u003e On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:36 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 10:29:54PM +0200, Eric Voskuil wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:14 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 08:35:26PM +0200, Eric Voskuil wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Hi Peter,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e What in this BIP makes a MITM attack easier (or easy) to detect, or increases the probability of one being detected?\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e BIP151 gives users the tools to detect a MITM attack.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e It's kinda like PGP in that way: lots of PGP users don't properly check keys,\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e PGP requires a secure side channel for transmission of public keys. How does one \"check\" a key of an anonymous peer? I know you well enough to know you wouldn't trust a PGP key received over an insecure channel.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e All you can prove is that you are talking to a peer and that communications in the session remain with that peer. The peer can be the attacker. As Jonas has acknowledged, authentication is required to actually guard against MITM attacks.\n\u003e \n\u003e Easy: anonymous peers aren't always actually anonymous.\n\u003e \n\u003e A MITM attacker can't easily distinguish communications between two nodes that\n\u003e randomly picked their peers, and nodes that are connected because their operators manually used -addnode to peer; in the latter case the operators can\n\u003e check whether or not they're being attacked with an out-of-band key check.\n\nAn \"out of band key check\" is not part of BIP151. It requires a secure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't provide the tools to detect an attack, that requires authentication. A general requirement for authentication is the issue I have raised.\n\ne",
"sig": "feaa9dfcea32f4d1d894e09b19e1da3c686d0797667c72775343d6a9ae2ca8a2fc8c2c098aace36995a1ced187d77408676dee9dea91727c4c2b8ec9c196bd01"
}