📅 Original date posted:2016-03-28
📝 Original message:
On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 11:19:42AM +0200, Jérôme Legoupil wrote:
> miners have a strong financial incentive to wait and hope to
> include Alice’s 25BTC offer instead of including Bob’s
> worthless breach tx.
I think you're treating miners here as a single actor when they should
be treated as multiple independent actors competing against each other.
Bob can have his breach transaction included in a block immediately but
the sequence lock on the 50 BTC Alice stole prevents her from spending
it for perhaps hundreds of blocks (I believe the paper uses a value of
1,500 blocks).
This means each miner on the network has a choice:
1. Attempt to mine Bob's transaction immediately to claim its modest fee
before some other miner claims that fee.
2. Hope no one else mines Bob's transaction for several hundred blocks
and then compete with all other miners to attempt to mine Alice's
high-fee transaction.
If the network is functioning correctly (e.g. no miner or mining cartel
has a majority of hash rate) then all miners should consider option #1
to be the more profitable option for them on average.
-Dave
David A. Harding [ARCHIVE] /
npub16d…x4wrd
2023-06-09 12:46:03
in reply to nevent1q…h48j
Author Public Key
npub16dt55fpq3a8r6zpphd9xngxr46zzqs75gna9cj5vf8pknyv2d7equx4wrdPublished at
2023-06-09 12:46:03Event JSON
{
"id": "d8424f790a05f0f9a8e641b7d3d4fa8470bbeb312e9f0bc79f683e673f007752",
"pubkey": "d3574a24208f4e3d0821bb4a69a0c3ae842043d444fa5c4a8c49c369918a6fb2",
"created_at": 1686314763,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"8fab8b303a7abdb21e10f834b0ee98731d6bd11d0d3a3a51f228726cda335fc6",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"849f196fc710eaa528e782b468ccb813a20f3defad50e0c41c09ee0ff82a71e2",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"8753a2f6b57fbde1eaca87c2fe0def1cc3c12ccb2295c30db193c916b301fc7e"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-03-28\n📝 Original message:\nOn Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 11:19:42AM +0200, Jérôme Legoupil wrote:\n\u003e miners have a strong financial incentive to wait and hope to\n\u003e include Alice’s 25BTC offer instead of including Bob’s\n\u003e worthless breach tx.\n\nI think you're treating miners here as a single actor when they should\nbe treated as multiple independent actors competing against each other.\nBob can have his breach transaction included in a block immediately but\nthe sequence lock on the 50 BTC Alice stole prevents her from spending\nit for perhaps hundreds of blocks (I believe the paper uses a value of\n1,500 blocks).\n\nThis means each miner on the network has a choice:\n\n1. Attempt to mine Bob's transaction immediately to claim its modest fee\n before some other miner claims that fee.\n\n2. Hope no one else mines Bob's transaction for several hundred blocks\n and then compete with all other miners to attempt to mine Alice's\n high-fee transaction.\n\nIf the network is functioning correctly (e.g. no miner or mining cartel\nhas a majority of hash rate) then all miners should consider option #1\nto be the more profitable option for them on average.\n\n-Dave",
"sig": "15f6f0daf3bf55f907fe209a18f8343e0bd8a4b42bb1790b450a91661348a755a5770dc94a3f7ce06810c4b3d43a1363d9b372f48b33d66639139d38285bdbd2"
}