📅 Original date posted:2020-07-06
📝 Original message:On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:49 PM Itay Tsabary <sitay at campus.technion.ac.il>
wrote:
> Note the required token amount for the collateral contract is low and
> independent of the required deposit tokens -- only a relatively small
> incentive is required to make "acting honestly" Bob's preferred choice.
> So, this is basically a negligible overhead, token-wise. As a downside, it
> does create slightly larger transactions (another UTXO, etc.).
>
I read the MAD-HTLC paper and I think it actually doesn't get into the size
of the collateral (v^{col}). I might have missed it though. Can you please
point me to the section in the paper where the amount is discussed?
I assumed that v^{col} has to be at least the size of v^{dep}. Otherwise,
Bob can threaten Alice with an HTLC bribery attack, and Alice knows that
Bob has very little to lose. Bob *should* have the same amount to lose, to
make it work - no?
>
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Tejaswi Nadahalli [ARCHIVE] /
npub12f…e5846
2023-06-07 18:25:50
in reply to nevent1q…clkl
Author Public Key
npub12f7kf5f49m65w3dxpdsu80pdg96uyzmnjv4sw5r409luknwusmsshe5846Published at
2023-06-07 18:25:50Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2020-07-06\n📝 Original message:On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:49 PM Itay Tsabary \u003csitay at campus.technion.ac.il\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e Note the required token amount for the collateral contract is low and\n\u003e independent of the required deposit tokens -- only a relatively small\n\u003e incentive is required to make \"acting honestly\" Bob's preferred choice.\n\u003e So, this is basically a negligible overhead, token-wise. As a downside, it\n\u003e does create slightly larger transactions (another UTXO, etc.).\n\u003e\n\nI read the MAD-HTLC paper and I think it actually doesn't get into the size\nof the collateral (v^{col}). I might have missed it though. Can you please\npoint me to the section in the paper where the amount is discussed?\n\nI assumed that v^{col} has to be at least the size of v^{dep}. Otherwise,\nBob can threaten Alice with an HTLC bribery attack, and Alice knows that\nBob has very little to lose. Bob *should* have the same amount to lose, to\nmake it work - no?\n\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200706/9218119e/attachment.html\u003e",
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