📅 Original date posted:2013-07-14
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 7:33 PM, Luke-Jr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
>> Merge mining is very much mining a coin for free. Ask not what the total
>> reward is, ask that the marginal cost of merge mining an additional coin
>> is.
>
> But the total reward is what mining will tend toward equalizing in costs.
> In any case, the cryptocurrencies are neutral to cost of mining, or perhaps
> even benefit from it being as cheap as possible: if it's cheaper to mine, you
> can get an even higher difficulty/security out of it.
Again, you forget that there may exist miners for which the value of the coin
is negative.
Never mind that in practice you want there to exist a cost to encourage miners
to actually pay attention to what they mind and to encourage them to update
software when required and participate.
>> The issue is that unless there is a cost to mining a *invalid* block
>> the merge mined coin has little protection from miners who mine invalid
>> blocks, either maliciously or through negligence. If the coin isn't worth
>> much, either because it's market value is low or the worth is negative to
>> the malicious miner, your theories of value have nothing to do with the
>> issue.
>
> Invalid blocks are rejected by validating clients in all circumstances.
Validating clients, not SPV clients.
> I suspect you may mean a block that doesn't include transactions you want
> confirmed. In that case, you must not be paying sufficient fees for the miner
> to consider it worth their time, or must be doing something the miner
> considers fundamentally objectionable (in which case they won't be satisfied
> by any fee). But these miners, unless they are able to acquire over 50% of the
> hashrate (in which case the cryptocoin is compromised), are not the only ones
> mining blocks, and if another miner accepts your transactions there is no
> issue.
All those things simply change the amount of alt-coin the miner gets, which to
the miner may have no reward. You also have the issue that we may be talking
about a non-currency chain where reward is more nebulous.
In any case, regarding a zerocoin chain, Peter's observation that
proof-of-sacrifice allows a strong 51% attck defense is very clever and IMO is
significantly stronger than proof-of-work mining, merged or not, would provide.
It's essentially the ability to conjur up mining capacity on demand, but only
by those who have a stake in the crypto-coin. It does depend on the existance
of a proof-of-work chain, but we have a perfectly good one handy.
PS: good to see you signing you email!
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John Dillon [ARCHIVE] /
npub15z…kn0zr
2023-06-07 15:04:19
in reply to nevent1q…wrnl
Author Public Key
npub15z6e9t07ugx267aj3s3c487pln852ydytzlgu0vkkqxfznyvx4jq4kn0zrPublished at
2023-06-07 15:04:19Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2013-07-14\n📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nOn Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 7:33 PM, Luke-Jr \u003cluke at dashjr.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Merge mining is very much mining a coin for free. Ask not what the total\n\u003e\u003e reward is, ask that the marginal cost of merge mining an additional coin\n\u003e\u003e is.\n\u003e\n\u003e But the total reward is what mining will tend toward equalizing in costs.\n\u003e In any case, the cryptocurrencies are neutral to cost of mining, or perhaps\n\u003e even benefit from it being as cheap as possible: if it's cheaper to mine, you\n\u003e can get an even higher difficulty/security out of it.\n\nAgain, you forget that there may exist miners for which the value of the coin\nis negative.\n\nNever mind that in practice you want there to exist a cost to encourage miners\nto actually pay attention to what they mind and to encourage them to update\nsoftware when required and participate.\n\n\u003e\u003e The issue is that unless there is a cost to mining a *invalid* block\n\u003e\u003e the merge mined coin has little protection from miners who mine invalid\n\u003e\u003e blocks, either maliciously or through negligence. If the coin isn't worth\n\u003e\u003e much, either because it's market value is low or the worth is negative to\n\u003e\u003e the malicious miner, your theories of value have nothing to do with the\n\u003e\u003e issue.\n\u003e\n\u003e Invalid blocks are rejected by validating clients in all circumstances.\n\nValidating clients, not SPV clients.\n\n\u003e I suspect you may mean a block that doesn't include transactions you want\n\u003e confirmed. In that case, you must not be paying sufficient fees for the miner\n\u003e to consider it worth their time, or must be doing something the miner\n\u003e considers fundamentally objectionable (in which case they won't be satisfied\n\u003e by any fee). But these miners, unless they are able to acquire over 50% of the\n\u003e hashrate (in which case the cryptocoin is compromised), are not the only ones\n\u003e mining blocks, and if another miner accepts your transactions there is no\n\u003e issue.\n\nAll those things simply change the amount of alt-coin the miner gets, which to\nthe miner may have no reward. You also have the issue that we may be talking\nabout a non-currency chain where reward is more nebulous.\n\nIn any case, regarding a zerocoin chain, Peter's observation that\nproof-of-sacrifice allows a strong 51% attck defense is very clever and IMO is\nsignificantly stronger than proof-of-work mining, merged or not, would provide.\nIt's essentially the ability to conjur up mining capacity on demand, but only\nby those who have a stake in the crypto-coin. It does depend on the existance\nof a proof-of-work chain, but we have a perfectly good one handy.\n\nPS: good to see you signing you email!\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)\n\niQEcBAEBCAAGBQJR4wCFAAoJEEWCsU4mNhiPIcwH+gLYbUPDi/7ITK02wftqEV2E\nFSlzZ0W8aw7z7sF7hqPm7jpmtqbXdvQRSSy+XRDgWUxvF72o5oRTwOpY7xN8KOct\n9rMwF35nld8An9FOjOB6NR3sIQxmAg9q7xoilZrOHyRFcz/UT0BexSZ3x5DrKIAB\n6S7qalrGT0NWZx8CI0PRAzY8Nx+WouaoofBaypRaXBVJxigFqJlWNxgUM1FuoCL+\nC1wn0hlbWfO42Mh9jdnFZXhH2Omd5V3PzIS/t2cJGTjrwr7nT6VAJu+0hbNZHI/q\nyg0TGbO/01pp4OVe7WdLz9OktMqqDdDZJd6HWLQk07zqHS3iRJ2cpRIO6k9UCk0=\n=oicX\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----",
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