đź“… Original date posted:2015-08-03
đź“ť Original message:> On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:52 AM, Hector Chu <hectorchu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 3 August 2015 at 09:38, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo at gmail.com <mailto:elombrozo at gmail.com>> wrote:
> We already have much more efficient, far more scalable systems that allow this kind of cooperation you speak of without the inconveniences of blockchains and such.
>
> There is a degree of difference between cooperation in day-to-day usage of the system and cooperation in the rare cases the system has a bug.
>
If it’s an as-of-yet unidentified issue that comes up, yes…obviously we can’t plan for everything and we’ll make some mistakes. But here we’re talking about specific well-known issues (or at least well-known today) for which several people have proposed potential solutions. However, these things have been all but ignored in the public discourse.
> These incidents do, fortunately, present some of the better sides of humanity…but…the design of the network *broke* - and for reasons that are now well understood to be only worsened by larger blocks. These incidents are *not supposed to happen* - and if they do, it means we’ve botched something up and need to fix it. And by fix it, I mean fix the protocol so that given our best understanding of things in the present we can significantly reduce the potential for its occurrence in the future.
>
> Distribution by consensus is inherently a fragile system. The network will continue to break again and again as long as programmers are fallible. But the types of bugs that occur will change over time as we learn the best practices for maintaining the system.
I agree. But again, once we’ve identified specific issues, it is irresponsible to continue to pretend they don’t exist…and to more highly prioritize changes that can only make the problem worse.
Again, for the record, I am not against ultimately allowing bigger blocks. I think it would be a good thing to be able to do this…and my main concerns are not around things like equipment costs or typical household bandwidth. I just think security is a more important feature than greater throughput and prioritize it thusly.
> The correct incentives here were not due to people potentially losing a lot of money. The incentives here were well-intentioned altruism. Some miners lost money as a result of these actions…and they didn’t put up a fight. if you want to design a system around the assumption that this is how all such incidents will be resolved, please don’t spoil this for the rest of us.
>
> Altruism is a facade that hides other motivations. The party cooperating with the miners losing money were doing so to maintain good relationships with those miners and to make sure those miners stay within the system and not attack it.
I don’t disagree…clearly even the miners that lost money believed that consensus was more valuable to them than a few bitcoins. However, it seems to be EXTREMELY dangerous to assume that it will always work out this way. What’s to stop a mining majority from deciding on-the-fly they want to keep a particular consensus rule that benefits them even if the core developers disagree?
>
> - Eric
>
>> On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:31 AM, Hector Chu <hectorchu at gmail.com <mailto:hectorchu at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> What's wrong with a little cooperation to resolve things now and then? Man is not an island unto himself, we compete with each other and we cooperate with each other occasionally if it's mutually beneficial.
>>
>> You said yourself that a lot of money would have been lost if the two hard forks cited weren't resolved - that's the correct incentives at work again.
>>
>> On 3 August 2015 at 09:20, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo at gmail.com <mailto:elombrozo at gmail.com>> wrote:
>> There have already been two notable incidents requiring manual intervention and good-faith cooperation between core devs and mining pool operators that would have either never gotten resolved alone or would have ended up costing a lot of people a lot of money had no action been taken (March 2013 and July 2015). They were both caused by consensus disagreement that directly or indirectly were brought about by bigger blocks. There is *strong* evidence…and a great deal of theory explaining it…that links larger blocks with the propensity for consensus forks that require manual intervention.
>>
>> Please, can we stop saying this is merely about decentralization and trustlessness? The very model upon which the security of the system is based *broke*…as in, we were only able to recover because a few individuals deliberately manipulated the consensus rules to fix it manually. Shouldn’t we more highly prioritize fixing the issues that can lead to these incidents than trying to increase throughput? Increasing block size cannot possibly make these forking tendencies better…but it very well could make them worse.
>>
>> - Eric
>>
>>> On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:06 AM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 3 August 2015 at 08:53, Adam Back <adam at cypherspace.org <mailto:adam at cypherspace.org>> wrote:
>>> Again this should not be a political or business compromise model - we
>>> must focus on scientific evaluation, technical requirements and
>>> security.
>>>
>>> I will assert that the block size is political because it affects nearly all users to some degree and not all those users are technically inclined or care to keep decentralisation in the current configuration as you do. This debate has forgotten the current and future users of Bitcoin. Most of them think the hit to node count in the short term preferable to making it expensive and competitive to transact.
>>>
>>> We all need a little faith that the system will reorganise and readjust after the move to big blocks in a way that still has a reasonable degree of decentralisation and trustlessness. The incentives of Bitcoin remain, so everyone's decentralised decision throughout the system, from miners, merchants and users, will continue to act according to those incentives.
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>;
>>
>>
>
>
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Eric Lombrozo [ARCHIVE] /
npub1az…t2krq
2023-06-07 17:32:19
in reply to nevent1q…0clq
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2023-06-07 17:32:19Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-08-03\n📝 Original message:\u003e On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:52 AM, Hector Chu \u003chectorchu at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e On 3 August 2015 at 09:38, Eric Lombrozo \u003celombrozo at gmail.com \u003cmailto:elombrozo at gmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e We already have much more efficient, far more scalable systems that allow this kind of cooperation you speak of without the inconveniences of blockchains and such.\n\u003e \n\u003e There is a degree of difference between cooperation in day-to-day usage of the system and cooperation in the rare cases the system has a bug.\n\u003e \n\nIf it’s an as-of-yet unidentified issue that comes up, yes…obviously we can’t plan for everything and we’ll make some mistakes. But here we’re talking about specific well-known issues (or at least well-known today) for which several people have proposed potential solutions. However, these things have been all but ignored in the public discourse.\n\n\u003e These incidents do, fortunately, present some of the better sides of humanity…but…the design of the network *broke* - and for reasons that are now well understood to be only worsened by larger blocks. These incidents are *not supposed to happen* - and if they do, it means we’ve botched something up and need to fix it. And by fix it, I mean fix the protocol so that given our best understanding of things in the present we can significantly reduce the potential for its occurrence in the future.\n\u003e \n\u003e Distribution by consensus is inherently a fragile system. The network will continue to break again and again as long as programmers are fallible. But the types of bugs that occur will change over time as we learn the best practices for maintaining the system.\n\nI agree. But again, once we’ve identified specific issues, it is irresponsible to continue to pretend they don’t exist…and to more highly prioritize changes that can only make the problem worse.\n\nAgain, for the record, I am not against ultimately allowing bigger blocks. I think it would be a good thing to be able to do this…and my main concerns are not around things like equipment costs or typical household bandwidth. I just think security is a more important feature than greater throughput and prioritize it thusly.\n\n\n\u003e The correct incentives here were not due to people potentially losing a lot of money. The incentives here were well-intentioned altruism. Some miners lost money as a result of these actions…and they didn’t put up a fight. if you want to design a system around the assumption that this is how all such incidents will be resolved, please don’t spoil this for the rest of us.\n\u003e \n\u003e Altruism is a facade that hides other motivations. The party cooperating with the miners losing money were doing so to maintain good relationships with those miners and to make sure those miners stay within the system and not attack it.\n\nI don’t disagree…clearly even the miners that lost money believed that consensus was more valuable to them than a few bitcoins. However, it seems to be EXTREMELY dangerous to assume that it will always work out this way. What’s to stop a mining majority from deciding on-the-fly they want to keep a particular consensus rule that benefits them even if the core developers disagree?\n\n\u003e \n\u003e - Eric\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:31 AM, Hector Chu \u003chectorchu at gmail.com \u003cmailto:hectorchu at gmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e What's wrong with a little cooperation to resolve things now and then? Man is not an island unto himself, we compete with each other and we cooperate with each other occasionally if it's mutually beneficial.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e You said yourself that a lot of money would have been lost if the two hard forks cited weren't resolved - that's the correct incentives at work again.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e On 3 August 2015 at 09:20, Eric Lombrozo \u003celombrozo at gmail.com \u003cmailto:elombrozo at gmail.com\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e There have already been two notable incidents requiring manual intervention and good-faith cooperation between core devs and mining pool operators that would have either never gotten resolved alone or would have ended up costing a lot of people a lot of money had no action been taken (March 2013 and July 2015). They were both caused by consensus disagreement that directly or indirectly were brought about by bigger blocks. There is *strong* evidence…and a great deal of theory explaining it…that links larger blocks with the propensity for consensus forks that require manual intervention.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Please, can we stop saying this is merely about decentralization and trustlessness? The very model upon which the security of the system is based *broke*…as in, we were only able to recover because a few individuals deliberately manipulated the consensus rules to fix it manually. Shouldn’t we more highly prioritize fixing the issues that can lead to these incidents than trying to increase throughput? Increasing block size cannot possibly make these forking tendencies better…but it very well could make them worse.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e - Eric\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e On Aug 3, 2015, at 1:06 AM, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org \u003cmailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e On 3 August 2015 at 08:53, Adam Back \u003cadam at cypherspace.org \u003cmailto:adam at cypherspace.org\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Again this should not be a political or business compromise model - we\n\u003e\u003e\u003e must focus on scientific evaluation, technical requirements and\n\u003e\u003e\u003e security.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e I will assert that the block size is political because it affects nearly all users to some degree and not all those users are technically inclined or care to keep decentralisation in the current configuration as you do. This debate has forgotten the current and future users of Bitcoin. Most of them think the hit to node count in the short term preferable to making it expensive and competitive to transact.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e We all need a little faith that the system will reorganise and readjust after the move to big blocks in a way that still has a reasonable degree of decentralisation and trustlessness. The incentives of Bitcoin remain, so everyone's decentralised decision throughout the system, from miners, merchants and users, will continue to act according to those incentives.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org \u003cmailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev \u003chttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e \n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150803/d014d504/attachment-0001.html\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 842 bytes\nDesc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150803/d014d504/attachment-0001.sig\u003e",
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