📅 Original date posted:2019-07-19
📝 Original message:> On Jul 18, 2019, at 20:45, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
>
> Good morning Kenshiro,
>
>
> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>
> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
>> On Thursday, July 18, 2019 11:50 PM, Kenshiro [] <tensiam at hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>>>>> A 51% attack under proof-of-work is only possible, in general, if some singular entity were able to have physical control of almost 50%, or some such close number, of the globe, simply due to the fact that energy availability is somewhat distributed over the globe.
>>
>> Mining is not only about the energy sources, individual miners spread around the globe can join big mining pools, and these mining pools could be hacked to participate in a 51% attack. Some governments (or other groups) could plan this type of attack if it's in their interest.
>>
>> If you look at this graph you will see that controlling 4 mining pools could be enough:
>>
>> https://www.blockchain.com/en/pools
>
> Pools only have short-term power in that they can only temporarily attack the coin until miners notice and then voluntarily leave.
But also long term economic power, since leaving implies a lower proportional hash power, until another comparably-sized pool exists, but this is not the case when there is a majority hash power pool, which is economically inevitable until the majority miner starts censoring.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Pooling-Pressure-Risk
> Pools are themselves still subject to economic forces, and censored transactions can raise their fee until competing pools arise which do not censor (and which would have an economic advantage in taking the higher fee offered).
> The invisible hand abides.
This is why PoW is necessary, and why fee-based confirmation is necessary. It’s the only economically-rational way that the censor can be overpowered. But keep in mind the only net cost to the censor is the *premium* on censored transactions.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Censorship-Resistance-Property
> Further, the correct solution is to support the development and deployment of better pool<->miner protocols, such as BetterHash.
> So we should instead focus on helping Matt Corallo et al. in this work, than proposing a hard fork to proof-of-stake which will be strongly opposed economically.
While this proposal may introduce engineering improvements, it does not change any of the economic forces at work and therefore does not mitigate this issue. The pool controls the payout, and therefore retains power over tx selection regardless of who selects and grinds on them.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Decoupled-Mining-Fallacy
>>>>> Secondly: change of hashing algorithm is pointless in the highly unlikely case of a 51% attack, because what matters is control of energy sources.
>>
>> As far as I know, if the PoW algorithm changes to an ASIC resistant algorithm that can only run in GPUs or CPUs, the hashing power would be much more distributed at least until someone creates a new ASIC for that algorithm. There are many GPUs around the globe, but not so many ASIC miners right?
>
> GPUs still require electricity to run, and are far easier to source.
> Hash change simply means that those with control of energy sources can easily purchase the needed hardware from many sources (as opposed to ASICs which are only sourced from a few places).
> So a hash change will only affect things temporarily, and it will still settle to the existing distribution of mining hashpower.
Yes
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Work-Fallacy
>>>>> Nothing can be more efficient than proof-of-work, and the proof-of-stake delusion is simply a perpetual motion machine that attempts to get something from nothing.
>>
>> As time passes and more PoS coins appears, including big projects like Ethereum, we will see if it's delusional or not 🙂
>>
>> I forgot one, if you do a 51% attack to a PoS coin you know that all your staking funds will be burned. In a PoW coin you don't lose your miners and can use them to mine or attack another coin with the same algorithm.
>
> I already told you that it is always possible to get around this: leverage by use of short options.
> Short the coin to attack, then perform your attack by censorship.
> Coin value will drop due to reduced utility of the coin, then you reap the rewards of the short option you prepared beforehand.
> By this, you can steal the entire marketcap of the coin.
Yes, and of course stealing the value in the chain is not the only way to profit from the destruction of its usefulness. PoS offers no defense against the primary threat to permissionless money.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Fedcoin-Objectives
> Then you still have the economic power (plus what you managed to steal), which you can then use to take over another proof-of-stake coin, regardless of whether it uses the same proof-of-stake algorithm or not.
>
> At least mining hardware are physical hardware and subject to deprecation over time.
Capital cost isn’t the source of this defense, it’s the ability to introduce as much power as necessary to evict the censor, paid for by the rising premium on censored txs. Without this the majority miner can mine indefinitely and be the most profitable. This is of no consequence to confirmation until censorship begins.
In PoS, once a miner achieves necessary stake (also profitably) it can censor indefinitely. It’s a big difference.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Cryptodynamic-Principles
>>>>> You must understand that removing the chain tip puts the transactions in that block back in the mempool, before we ever start following the longer chain.
>>
>> Yep but it could make double spend attacks very easy. People would know what is happening and could send the money to themselves with a higher fee to recover it. Many people would lose money with that.
>>
>> To fix that problem with a PoS algorithm, some community-guided initiative could get all transactions of both chains and create a merged chain with a hard fork so double spends attacks would not be possible. This could be somewhat slow, maybe the network is stopped a few days, but in the end no one will see money disappear from their wallet, much better than pray that your payer doesn't send the money back ato himself.
>
> This happens every day in Bitcoin, and nobody particularly cares.
> You just wait for confirmations that in practice are impossible for some orphaned chain to persist.
Yes, and of course the same scenario as described above can also occur with PoW. Gather up the victims, invest in mining a stronger chain, get the profit from the mining investment, and get your money back.
>>>>> This solution is worse than the problem, and speeds up the dominance of large stakers over the coin, trivially letting someone with the largest stake in the coin grow their stake even faster.
>>
>> I think it's very evident that the rich guy earn coins faster in both algorithms.
>>
>> In PoS if you have 51% of the coins and use them to stake, you make 51% of the blocks, I don't see any problem with that. If you decide to do a 51% attack, stopping doing blocks in the main chain to force the others to follow your "private" chain, well, you know for sure your funds will be burned in the next hard fork.
>
> But your proposal of being non-linear on the size of the stake means that if you have 51% of the coins, if you put them in a single stake UTXO you potentially get 99.999% of the blocks, which is ***much worse***.
It’s sort of like Bitcoin’s nonlinear hash power to hash rate ratio, on steroids. The nonlinearity hasn’t been shown to be avoidable, but certainly something to minimize.
> Just admit that you have no real solution to knowing how much every entity controls of your coin.
>>>>> No, I think it will be very successful in ensuring that smart individuals will spend their time actually doing things that benefit the economy and technology instead of wasting their time being distracted with Ethereum and proof-of-stake.
>>
>> Ok, we the PoS advocates will let the smart people to work in more difficult issues like finding reasons to justify the energy waste and heat generation of PoW when Bitcoin price reaches 1 million dollars 😉
>
> We hope to see you back soon after having learned your lesson.
Let’s all be nice. But WRT energy waste... see last paragraph for a consideration of waste in relation to any other monetary options.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Energy-Waste-Fallacy
e
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
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Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sg…ppx3c
2023-06-07 18:19:23
in reply to nevent1q…kg9n
Author Public Key
npub1sgs97fe0n9wehe6zw7drcxdz4cy9yt9pfqjv8gasz5jlk4zezc0quppx3cPublished at
2023-06-07 18:19:23Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2019-07-19\n📝 Original message:\u003e On Jul 18, 2019, at 20:45, ZmnSCPxj \u003cZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e Good morning Kenshiro,\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.\n\u003e \n\u003e ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐\n\u003e\u003e On Thursday, July 18, 2019 11:50 PM, Kenshiro [] \u003ctensiam at hotmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Hi all,\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e A 51% attack under proof-of-work is only possible, in general, if some singular entity were able to have physical control of almost 50%, or some such close number, of the globe, simply due to the fact that energy availability is somewhat distributed over the globe.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Mining is not only about the energy sources, individual miners spread around the globe can join big mining pools, and these mining pools could be hacked to participate in a 51% attack. Some governments (or other groups) could plan this type of attack if it's in their interest. \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e If you look at this graph you will see that controlling 4 mining pools could be enough:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e https://www.blockchain.com/en/pools\n\u003e \n\u003e Pools only have short-term power in that they can only temporarily attack the coin until miners notice and then voluntarily leave.\n\nBut also long term economic power, since leaving implies a lower proportional hash power, until another comparably-sized pool exists, but this is not the case when there is a majority hash power pool, which is economically inevitable until the majority miner starts censoring.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Pooling-Pressure-Risk\n\n\u003e Pools are themselves still subject to economic forces, and censored transactions can raise their fee until competing pools arise which do not censor (and which would have an economic advantage in taking the higher fee offered).\n\u003e The invisible hand abides.\n\nThis is why PoW is necessary, and why fee-based confirmation is necessary. It’s the only economically-rational way that the censor can be overpowered. But keep in mind the only net cost to the censor is the *premium* on censored transactions.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Censorship-Resistance-Property\n\n\u003e Further, the correct solution is to support the development and deployment of better pool\u003c-\u003eminer protocols, such as BetterHash.\n\u003e So we should instead focus on helping Matt Corallo et al. in this work, than proposing a hard fork to proof-of-stake which will be strongly opposed economically.\n\nWhile this proposal may introduce engineering improvements, it does not change any of the economic forces at work and therefore does not mitigate this issue. The pool controls the payout, and therefore retains power over tx selection regardless of who selects and grinds on them.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Decoupled-Mining-Fallacy\n\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Secondly: change of hashing algorithm is pointless in the highly unlikely case of a 51% attack, because what matters is control of energy sources.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e As far as I know, if the PoW algorithm changes to an ASIC resistant algorithm that can only run in GPUs or CPUs, the hashing power would be much more distributed at least until someone creates a new ASIC for that algorithm. There are many GPUs around the globe, but not so many ASIC miners right?\n\u003e \n\u003e GPUs still require electricity to run, and are far easier to source.\n\u003e Hash change simply means that those with control of energy sources can easily purchase the needed hardware from many sources (as opposed to ASICs which are only sourced from a few places).\n\u003e So a hash change will only affect things temporarily, and it will still settle to the existing distribution of mining hashpower.\n\nYes\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Proof-of-Work-Fallacy\n\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Nothing can be more efficient than proof-of-work, and the proof-of-stake delusion is simply a perpetual motion machine that attempts to get something from nothing.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e As time passes and more PoS coins appears, including big projects like Ethereum, we will see if it's delusional or not 🙂\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e I forgot one, if you do a 51% attack to a PoS coin you know that all your staking funds will be burned. In a PoW coin you don't lose your miners and can use them to mine or attack another coin with the same algorithm. \n\u003e \n\u003e I already told you that it is always possible to get around this: leverage by use of short options.\n\u003e Short the coin to attack, then perform your attack by censorship.\n\u003e Coin value will drop due to reduced utility of the coin, then you reap the rewards of the short option you prepared beforehand.\n\u003e By this, you can steal the entire marketcap of the coin.\n\nYes, and of course stealing the value in the chain is not the only way to profit from the destruction of its usefulness. PoS offers no defense against the primary threat to permissionless money.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Fedcoin-Objectives\n\n\u003e Then you still have the economic power (plus what you managed to steal), which you can then use to take over another proof-of-stake coin, regardless of whether it uses the same proof-of-stake algorithm or not.\n\u003e \n\u003e At least mining hardware are physical hardware and subject to deprecation over time.\n\nCapital cost isn’t the source of this defense, it’s the ability to introduce as much power as necessary to evict the censor, paid for by the rising premium on censored txs. Without this the majority miner can mine indefinitely and be the most profitable. This is of no consequence to confirmation until censorship begins.\n\nIn PoS, once a miner achieves necessary stake (also profitably) it can censor indefinitely. It’s a big difference.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Cryptodynamic-Principles\n\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e You must understand that removing the chain tip puts the transactions in that block back in the mempool, before we ever start following the longer chain.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Yep but it could make double spend attacks very easy. People would know what is happening and could send the money to themselves with a higher fee to recover it. Many people would lose money with that.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e To fix that problem with a PoS algorithm, some community-guided initiative could get all transactions of both chains and create a merged chain with a hard fork so double spends attacks would not be possible. This could be somewhat slow, maybe the network is stopped a few days, but in the end no one will see money disappear from their wallet, much better than pray that your payer doesn't send the money back ato himself.\n\u003e \n\u003e This happens every day in Bitcoin, and nobody particularly cares.\n\u003e You just wait for confirmations that in practice are impossible for some orphaned chain to persist.\n\nYes, and of course the same scenario as described above can also occur with PoW. Gather up the victims, invest in mining a stronger chain, get the profit from the mining investment, and get your money back.\n\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e This solution is worse than the problem, and speeds up the dominance of large stakers over the coin, trivially letting someone with the largest stake in the coin grow their stake even faster.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e I think it's very evident that the rich guy earn coins faster in both algorithms. \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e In PoS if you have 51% of the coins and use them to stake, you make 51% of the blocks, I don't see any problem with that. If you decide to do a 51% attack, stopping doing blocks in the main chain to force the others to follow your \"private\" chain, well, you know for sure your funds will be burned in the next hard fork.\n\u003e \n\u003e But your proposal of being non-linear on the size of the stake means that if you have 51% of the coins, if you put them in a single stake UTXO you potentially get 99.999% of the blocks, which is ***much worse***.\n\nIt’s sort of like Bitcoin’s nonlinear hash power to hash rate ratio, on steroids. The nonlinearity hasn’t been shown to be avoidable, but certainly something to minimize.\n\n\u003e Just admit that you have no real solution to knowing how much every entity controls of your coin.\n\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e No, I think it will be very successful in ensuring that smart individuals will spend their time actually doing things that benefit the economy and technology instead of wasting their time being distracted with Ethereum and proof-of-stake.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Ok, we the PoS advocates will let the smart people to work in more difficult issues like finding reasons to justify the energy waste and heat generation of PoW when Bitcoin price reaches 1 million dollars 😉\n\u003e \n\u003e We hope to see you back soon after having learned your lesson.\n\nLet’s all be nice. But WRT energy waste... see last paragraph for a consideration of waste in relation to any other monetary options.\n\nhttps://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin-system/wiki/Energy-Waste-Fallacy\n\ne\n\n\u003e Regards,\n\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20190718/5897e975/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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